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Why do states grow stronger and more capable in some areas of their territory than in others? 
This dissertation examines the origins of domestic variation in state strength in Mexico and 
Colombia and shows that the geography of state power in each country reflects historical lines of 
political antagonism. Challenging prevailing geographic and economic explanations of the reach 
of the state, it traces the uneven development of state capacity across territory and functions to 
sharp domestic cleavages that organize state-building efforts and societal reactions to the state 
during formative historical periods. The dissertation argues that partisanship is a pervasive force 
in the state’s penetration of territory and society, but partisanship spawns different territorial 
patterns of state capacity across constituent dimensions of the concept. The result is that, unlike 
conventionally assumed, not all types of state capacity hang together at the sub-national level. 
The study pursues this argument empirically relying on new, geo-referenced, and highly 
disaggregated historical datasets for both Mexico and Colombia, collected through intensive 
archival research and spanning various domains of state activity. Using historical analysis and 
statistical methods, I demonstrate the connections between the religious cleavage that split 
Mexican society in the aftermath of the Revolution and the state’s subsequent ability to extract 
fiscal revenue, monopolize the means of violence at the local level, provide law and order, 
allocate land, and educate its citizens across territory. Similarly, I show that the historical 
 hegemonic struggle between the Liberal and Conservative Parties in Colombia impressed a 
squarely partisan logic into state development in key domains like taxation and education. In 
both cases, the study documents that intense political struggles during state formation made 
states develop unevenly across geography and institutional arenas simultaneously, with legacies 
that extend to this day. The dissertation’s findings are significant for our understanding of state-
building, the varying ability of states to enhance citizens’ welfare, and the origins of institutional 
weakness. 
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1 THE POLITICS OF UNEVEN STATE FORMATION 
 
 
 This is a study about states and their varying ability to shape human life and implement 
decisions across the territory they claim to govern. It investigates the political forces that lie 
behind the development of coercive, extractive, and social regulatory state institutions, as well as 
their territorially uneven implantation. This kind of investigation speaks to the very essence of 
state power because “the modern state has been constructed to create a uniformity or universality 
to life within its borders,” which underlies the promise of equal citizenship rights for those 
subject to the state’s authority.1 In practice, of course, states have often formed very unevenly 
within their borders. Their performance varies sharply across territory and functions, with great 
consequence for the quality of citizenship, among many other relevant outcomes. 
 The study grounds this variation in politics. It aims to show that differences in state 
performance within a polity are deeply shaped by historical struggles for political dominance 
between rival groups, and cannot simply be explained by geography or levels of economic 
development. During formative periods of the state, internal political oppositions lead to fateful 
decisions about what types of capacities are built and where. The cleavages or fault lines of the 
past thus offer a window into the workings of the state across its territory. In a series of empirical 
chapters that disaggregate the state both spatially and functionally, I document the key impact 
that the structure of intergroup conflict during decisive historical moments can have on the 
development of different state capabilities, as well as on the strength of the linkages between the 
                                                 
1
 The quote is from Migdal (2001, 232). 
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state and distinct segments of society. Uncovering the historical lines of political antagonism 
helps illuminate the performance of the governing apparatus across the territory it formally 
controls. 
 The findings span different spheres of state power over long time periods and in two 
quite distinct countries, but abstracting from time and place, they fall under a common 
theoretical logic. Historically, some groups, in conflict with others, take over the state and build 
up its capacities in order to accomplish certain political ends, that is, to impose their will upon 
political enemies. Rival groups seek to undermine their authority and resist. Institutions and 
attitudes toward the state are formed unevenly over the course of these conflicts for supremacy 
and domination, with lasting legacies: sub-national outcomes related to state performance vary 
depending on who state-built, and which groups, in turn, were politically excluded. State-
building can thus be seen as embedded in a certain structure of political oppositions that shapes 
both institutional investments and the societal responses to the state, the two constituent parts of 
state formation. The state’s performance across territory and issue domains is a function of these 
two basic, interactive components. 
 Throughout the study, I show that this simple theoretical logic goes a long way in 
explaining where, and what type, of institutional capacity is developed or under-developed in a 
certain polity. It helps account for variation in the state’s ability to provide personal security, 
raise taxes, educate citizens, and perform other important tasks. Given its deep roots in the 
structure of intergroup conflict, state capacity is intrinsically political. Independent of the 
benefits or welfare-enhancing functions we may attribute to modern states, their emergence and 
capabilities are bound up with efforts by political actors and social groups to exercise power over 
others—that is, with the very substance of politics. 
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 I elaborate and empirically substantiate these arguments for the cases of Mexico and 
Colombia, two countries displaying sharp internal variation in state strength, both 
contemporaneously and historically. In both of these countries, too, the inability of governments 
to control internal violence, extract sufficient tax revenues, and effectively uphold a set of 
citizenship rights has had major consequences for social integration and individual wellbeing. I 
trace the spatial and functional differences in state performance that have figured so prominently 
in these countries’ development to pronounced internal fractures that lay at the basis of their 
processes of state formation. 
 Major episodes of political change and state-building in twentieth-century Mexico and 
Colombia, backed by specific sociopolitical coalitions, increased the weight of the state in 
everyday life and its impact on individuals’ choices and life chances. Yet these formative 
institutional periods were also moments of acute political polarization and deep intergroup 
conflict. State-building was not the fruit of broad agreements in order to improve the provision of 
public goods or better fight against external enemies, but a highly contested project tied to the 
pursuit of partisan goals, which mirrored and reproduced sharp internal political antagonisms. 
 Rulers’ efforts to develop different forms of institutional capacity varied pronouncedly 
along cleavage lines, and so did social support for state measures. Out of these foundational 
conflicts, discernible territorial patterns of state capacity emerged, although these could vary 
across arenas of state activity. Cleavage structures shaped state development in identifiable ways, 
but could spawn different, sometimes opposing trajectories in the state’s ability to tax, provide 
order, impart justice, or educate citizens. The complex geography of state power, marked by an 
uneven and possibly discordant development of different capacities and institutions, becomes 
intelligible when superimposed on the map of historical political antagonisms. 
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 In the case of Mexico, my account examines the religious cleavage that pitted anticlerical 
elites against political Catholics in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) as a 
generative force of uneven patterns of state development. The dialectical conflict between 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, fought most intensely in the 1920s and 1930s, 
conditioned state performance in the short and long runs, via its powerful effects on founding 
institutional investments and state-building decisions, as well as on social groups’ relative 
inclination to grant compliance. This last factor, key in determining what the state could actually 
accomplish, was rooted in mass political identities and views about legitimacy that varied 
sharply across the cleavage. Even after the open and often violent clashes over religious issues 
subsided, resentment, suspicion, and opposition continued to mark relations between political 
Catholics and the Mexican party-state. The salience of religious-based antagonism during a 
formative period of the state thus translated into distinctive patterns of institutional development 
and performance, still visible in several domains. 
 In the Colombian case, a deep-seated partisan fracture, partly animated by religious 
issues but ultimately acquiring autonomous political weight, was similarly decisive for state 
development. The Liberal-Conservative polarity that permeated society and the political class 
since the nineteenth century blurred the distinctions between building the state’s capacity and 
accomplishing staunchly partisan ends. Locked into a struggle for partisan hegemony, both 
political formations converted state institutions into tools to achieve out-party subordination. The 
fusion of state and party, a feature of Colombian politics until the mid-twentieth century, 
impressed a squarely partisan logic into state development in key domains like taxation or 
education. Sub-national outcomes would vary across state functions depending on which of the 
parties historically pushed forward with institutional investments, and which was in turn 
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politically excluded, but partisan effects were in any case pervasive. The foundational Liberal-
Conservative cleavage cast a long shadow over the contours and performance of the Colombian 
state. 
 The analysis of the relationship between intergroup conflict and state development draws 
in each country on a rich and original empirical base. Examining various dimensions of state 
capacity sub-nationally required significant historical research and original data collection. In 
subsequent chapters, I exploit new country datasets covering fiscal, coercive, and social 
regulatory functions of the state over long time periods, and built at the lowest administrative 
level. The bulk of these data were coded for each municipality from previously untapped primary 
sources, collected through painstaking archival work in both Mexico and Colombia. In addition, 
I draw on newly coded historical census data, unexplored historical government publications, 
qualitative archival evidence, and close engagement with secondary sources from across the 
social sciences. The datasets that form the empirical core of this study are among the most 
comprehensive sources on the presence and performance of key state institutions collected to 
date in both countries. They allow mapping and analyzing, at a high level of spatial 
disaggregation, how the state was built and what it could actually accomplish, from relevant 
historical junctures into the present. 
 Before moving into the empirical sections, this introductory chapter lays the theoretical 
and conceptual ground. I begin by delineating the puzzle of state development in territory. This 
is a question about one of the key historical political processes of the modern world—how states 
that are territorially sovereign and expected to perform crucial functions for human wellbeing 
organize power, develop institutions, and put down roots within their borders. I then present a 
general theoretical framework that connects the structure of domestic conflict—which I 
 6 
 
conceptualize as cleavages—during formative institutional periods, to the uneven development 
of the state in its territory. My discussion elaborates on why an approach emphasizing historical 
cleavages can be theoretically productive in the study of sub-national state development and 
state-society relations, as well as help us illuminate empirical variation in state performance.  
 In presenting my argument, I enter into dialogue with the broader state building literature, 
which tends to explain the rise of territorially well-developed states as a product of sustained 
external warfare and threats. I argue that absent those unifying pressures from outside, state 
building projects are deeply marked by internal antagonisms that bequeath highly uneven states. 
States’ capacities across space reflect, precisely, those historical cleavages. After presenting the 
theoretical framework, I discuss conceptual and measurement issues relevant to the study of the 
territorial formation of the state across functional domains. The chapter ends by outlining the 
structure of the rest of the study. 
1.1 States in Territory 
 Territoriality is part of the very definition of the state.2 It implies that political authority 
extends over geographic space and is also geographically bounded, which makes of space an 
outright political category (Maier 2016). In this sense, the development of institutions and 
governing capacities across a territory is a fundamental question about politics—indeed, it 
addresses the essence of the state. Across a wide variety of topics, scholars have adopted a sub-
national approach to understand the determinants of relevant political and economic outcomes 
(e.g. Giraudy 2015) and transcend “whole nation bias” (Snyder 2001). “Scaling down” can 
                                                 
2
 The most prominent example is, of course, Weber’s definition. For him, the state is a “ruling organization” whose 
“political character” is determined by the combination of two factors: the use of physical force and “the fact that the 
authority of its administrative staff is claimed as binding within a territorial area” (1978, 54–55). The most 
conventionally cited definition also emphasizes territory: “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (M. Weber 1991, 78). 
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confer important inferential advantages, and often striking subnational contrasts are a fertile 
ground for comparative research. But in the study of state-building and state capacity, examining 
within-country variation not only carries potential methodological advantages and empirical 
promise. Because to speak of the state is to speak of territory, it is a conceptual imperative. 
 It is a fact that within countries, life under the state varies sharply with geographic 
location. “Unevenness” is a matter of degree, but in political systems founded upon principles of 
equal citizenship and territorial sovereignty, even moderate levels of irregularity carry important 
normative implications. As O’Donnell explained, the rule of law, rights of all kind, and core 
democratic tenets are all premised on the notion of a state that upholds its claim to authority 
uniformly across space (1993, 2004).  
 The uneven capacity or “reach” of state institutions has also been shown to be an 
important causal factor in empirical studies. It figures prominently in research on crime, civil 
wars, and armed group governance (Arjona 2016; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gambetta 1993); 
revolutionary movements and state collapse (Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979); public good 
provision and economic growth (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015); cultural and 
linguistic diversity (Darden and Mylonas 2016; E. Weber 1976); and the workings of social 
movements (Tarrow 2011; Yashar 2005). The list, of course, is far from exhaustive, but it 
illustrates why investigating the state within borders matters.  
 In fact, given its multiple implications, scholars increasingly emphasize the importance of 
relying on indicators of national state capacity that are sensitive to territorial reach (Giraudy and 
Luna 2017; Kurtz and Schrank 2012; Soifer 2008, 2015). Like much recent research on the state, 
these works build on Michael Mann’s influential concept of “infrastructural power,” which 
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considers the ability to actually shape social life throughout territory the essence of “stateness.”3 
As these scholars argue, measures that account for this spatial aspect are better characterizations 
of the overall capacity of the state in a given country. They are thus preferable, for the purposes 
of cross-country comparative research, to crude whole-country averages that do not adjust for 
territorial diversity. 
 Yet how do we account for the uneven formation of states within their borders itself? 
What explains internal patterns of variation? Much subnational empirical research in the social 
sciences of course addresses outcomes related to state capacity and performance, even if not 
explicitly working in a state formation framework. Yet there is no broadly accepted theoretical 
paradigm or historical narrative on the within-country mechanics of state-building, and certainly 
no equivalent to the mature cross-national literature on the topic, in which explanations centered 
on interstate warfare are well-established (Tilly 1992). 
 Studies of state-building centered on the variation across countries or world regions, for 
their part, seldom pay close attention to how differences in institutional development emerge 
within a country’s territory, beyond basic considerations related to the control of strategic versus 
peripheral regions.4 In dominant theories of state development, based mainly on studies of 
Western Europe, the process of organizing power in territory appears largely as a by-product of 
the external threats that make the state. As a result, our understanding of a key political process 
of the modern era is still incomplete. The recent words of prominent scholars of the state are 
worth quoting at length: 
 
                                                 
3
 Mann defined infrastructural power as “the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its 
territories and logistically implement decisions” (Mann 2012, 59). The concept of “stateness,” or how much of a 
state the state actually is, is from Nettl (1968). 
4
 Relevant exceptions, all dealing with cases outside Latin America, include Bensel (1990); Hechter (1999); Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993); and Ziblatt (2006). 
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We also need to understand that the state is not a solid mass equally present throughout a territory, but a 
fluid variable that is more and less present in one part or another…Such variation may be a critical part of 
how we can understand and improve the social wellbeing of people throughout the world. Although 
scholars have recognized the existence of subnational variation in the territorial reach of the state, more 
empirical studies are needed to demonstrate this reality as it relates to development outcomes. We wish to 
argue that ‘reach’…is an important component in ‘state performance’ in and of itself (Centeno, Yashar, and 
Kohli 2017, 16). 
 
 Investigating the processes by which within-country variations in institutional 
development and state performance have emerged is of particular relevance for Latin America. 
As mentioned above, “unevenness” is itself a variable. Some states provide services and govern 
their territory more uniformly than others. At the high end of the world distribution of stateness, 
strong states have come closer to creating the kind of homogeneity or “universality to life” 
(Migdal 2001, 232) within their borders implied by classic definitions, and feared by critics of 
standardizing states (Scott 1998). At the other end, governments in inchoate states often lack the 
resources, basic administrative structure, and even the will to extend meaningfully beyond the 
centers of power or to link existing local power structures into a coherent unit. Low levels of 
territorial unevenness may exist not because state structures are broadly-implanted, but because 
there is not much of a state at all. 
 In the middle of the range, many states in Latin America display striking levels of 
domestic variation in institutional performance (Soifer 2015). In a recent study comparing the 
territorial reach of states across regions of the world, Giraudy and Luna conclude that 
“unevenness, in spite of intermediate to high levels of resources for territorial penetration, seems 
to be a characteristic trait of Latin American countries” (2017, 107). As this suggests, states in 
the region are “neither dwarfs nor Leviathans” (Harbers 2015). For good or ill, their hand is 
visible in the lives of the majority of their subjects. In parts of their territory, and not just capital 
cities, their authority is reasonably strong and uncontested. Over the past two centuries, they 
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have meaningfully transformed their societies and withstood major changes in world politics as 
independent organizations, much longer than states in other regions of the developing world.  
 At the same time, most Latin American states have far from monopolized the means of 
violence, become efficient fiscal machines, or extended their legal systems homogeneously 
throughout territory. Moreover, they preside over the highest levels of socioeconomic inequality 
in the world, which readily betray their uneven provision of public services and inability to build 
cohesive territorial units. As Centeno explains, the paradox of the Latin American state is that it 
has been independent and sovereign for quite long without growing into a competent ruling 
organization (2002, 3).  
 One crucial point must be brought up now, and because of its significance, it will arise 
repeatedly in this study. The issue of the territorial unevenness of the state is not properly 
addressed by letting an encompassing concept like “state capacity” or “state performance” vary 
in space along a single dimension (like overall bureaucratic presence) or task (like taxation or 
service provision)—as most research, at all levels of analysis, tends to do. Nor is it simply or 
mainly a matter of administratively abandoned geographic space, sparsely populated areas, or 
remote regions far from the political centers. Complex geographies have shaped the extension of 
political authority in Latin America (Safford 2013), but the state is not merely “present” in some 
regions and “absent” in others, nor is the variation reducible to such kind of structural 
environmental factors—more on this below. 
 Rather, and this is the key point, patterns of territorial unevenness may differ across state 
capacities, as I will thoroughly document for Mexico and Colombia. This means that states have 
developed unevenly in two senses simultaneously—across geography and domains of state 
activity. By implication, as one points to different locations in a country’s map, contact with the 
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state varies not simply in intensity, but qualitatively. The fiscal state, the coercive state, or the 
education state, as the analysis will show, are different creatures shaped by common forces, but 
different after all. At stake are inconsistent forms of linking with society, exerting authority, and 
cultivating specific capabilities across territory. 
 For the purposes of cross-national analysis, sharper contrasts in institutional capacity and 
state performance can be properly considered as indicative of overall lower stateness (Soifer 
2015). My concern here, however, is different. It is about the drivers of within-country variation 
itself, as a core political question in a world of territorially sovereign states and purportedly equal 
citizenship within national boundaries. The considerable unevenness that characterizes states in 
Latin America is not reducible to a sheer absence of state-building projects. To the contrary, it 
logically implies that institutional development has taken place, yet of a particularly unequal 
kind. What requires analysis is not simply an overall lack of state-building, but its very 
asymmetric character.  
 The question lies in understanding why specific institutions and capacities have (not) 
been built in certain parts of the territory to a similar extent as in others. Why have identifiable 
periods of state development unfolded differently across geographic space and state function, 
and how have uneven patterns of performance persisted over time? We need, in short, a 
historically-grounded explanation of the process leading to the emergence of “malformed,” 
fractured states. 
 Constraints and incentives arising from physical and economic geography play, 
undoubtedly, an important role. Many existing arguments associate state weakness or regional 
institutional inequalities with the obstacles that rough terrain, large distances, and the like create 
for the exercise of political authority. Herbst, for example, argues that extensive and sparsely-
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populated “inhospitable territories” discouraged African state-builders from broadcasting power 
within boundaries arbitrarily defined by colonizers (2000, 11). As a result, state control decreases 
as distance from the center of power increases. Fearon and Laitin famously identified “rough 
terrain” at a “distance from the centers of state power” as one of the best predictors of 
insurgency, arguing that it allows rebels to hide from the state (2003, 80). The impact of 
geography has become a well-established finding in empirical studies of conflict, with the state’s 
uneven reach playing a mediating role (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009). Similarly, “friction-of-
terrain remoteness” is one of the state-thwarting strategies that according to Scott recalcitrant 
groups deploy to elude the inconveniences of incorporation into central states (2009, 279). 
 It is unquestionable that geography can constrain state-building in important ways, a 
problem that historically was only aggravated by technological limitations. In the newly 
independent Latin American nations of the early nineteenth century, the combination of complex 
physical geographies and scarce resources hindered transportation, political integration, and 
penetration by central states, with only a few exceptions (Whitehead 1994). As Safford writes, 
“Mexico’s great expanse and Colombia’s topography and climate limited territorial control, 
delaying the development of relatively effective states until the last decades of the nineteenth 
century in Mexico and the first decades of the twentieth century in Colombia” (2013, 54). In 
trying to understand how states grow, govern, and perform in territory, we must therefore place 
them in proper geographic context. 
 Yet geography can only take us thus far. Arguments based on the effects of natural 
barriers and geographic remoteness suffer from problems of structural determinism and leave 
meaningful spatial and temporal variation unexplained. They fail to account for differences in 
state capacities across similarly situated regions, changes in internal patterns of stateness over 
 13 
 
time, and institutional fragilities in areas that, in principle, states should be able to control with 
relative ease. Advances in communications and transportation have revolutionized the means 
available to prevail over distance and penetrate geographic and social space (Maier 2012), yet 
the performance of states remains spotty and their modes of exercising authority highly irregular.  
 As I will show using fine-grained, disaggregated data in the empirical sections, even in a 
country as deeply affected by a complex topography and extensive inhospitable territories as 
Colombia (see Safford and Palacios 2002), a purely geographic lens misses meaningful variation 
in domestic patterns of state capacity. In some instances, an unqualified geographic approach can 
simply be misleading. The Andean highlands in Colombia historically displayed higher levels of 
state penetration—pace Scott (2009)—than the river valleys or the Eastern Plains. Holding 
geographic variables constant, sharp variations can also be observed from one Colombian 
municipality to the next in any given region. In Mexico, the potent Catholic challenge to the 
postrevolutionary state, crucial in shaping its capacities throughout the twentieth century, came 
not from the distant and expansive north, once difficult to control. The weak spot instead 
appeared in the fertile and pious Bajío region in the center-west, an area close to the country’s 
capital where state and Church had put down deep roots in the colonial period—in the words of 
Meyer, “the center of gravity of Mexican history” (1995, 108). 
 Apart from physical geography, economic factors are also obvious determinants of 
patterns of state development across space. State-building efforts in late nineteenth-century Latin 
America were strongly shaped by economic forces. Internally, power was organized and 
infrastructures laid following the imperatives of commodity exportation in world markets (Saylor 
2014). Earlier in history, institutional developments in territory had obeyed the logic of colonial 
economic extraction.  
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 More generally, Tilly long noted the links between the concentration of capital in towns 
and cities and rulers’ efforts to get a share of the pie (1992). Similarly, Olsonian revenue-
maximizing roving bandits have more incentives to prey upon and turn stationary in wealthier, 
fiscally promising areas (Olson 1993; see also Levi 1988). States may be content with not 
governing nor providing any service in “fiscally sterile” areas, “territories considered 
wastelands” (Scott 2009, 10). These well-established models of the state as an institution that 
emerges, develops, and gives something in return for the purposes of extraction have clear 
implications for how we expect them to put down roots across territory. At a basic level, they 
imply that the spatial distribution of economic activity should influence the allocation of state-
building effort, so as to extract, control, and extract more. 
 However, the development of state capacities across territory is neither an automatic nor 
a sole reflection of economic factors and extractive impulses. First, incentives to state-build 
arising from spatial economic structures are necessarily politically mediated. Jumping from 
economics and rulers’ intentions to state capacity outcomes requires an explanation of how 
interests are formulated, articulated, and transformed into state-building decisions in the political 
sphere. Independent of what deep factor propels them to extract, rulers need to “work out the 
politics” to gain the ability to extract, yet “the politics itself is rarely laid bare” (Hoffman 2015, 
305).5  
 Second, while greedy rulers’ institutional investments across territory may follow wealth, 
the causal arrows flow in both directions. There is an ongoing and strong reappraisal of state 
capacity as a key determinant of growth in the fields of economic history and development 
economics (Besley and Persson 2011; Hoffman 2015; Johnson and Koyama 2017). Classic 
                                                 
5
 Hoffman makes this criticism about arguments linking warfare to state capacity, but it can be cast more broadly. 
For a study that explicitly investigates how politics mediates the relationship between warfare and fiscal state-
building, see Saylor and Wheeler (2017). 
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arguments about the importance of Weberian bureaucracies (Evans and Rausch 1999) or the 
state’s provision of order and property rights for economic prosperity (Bates 2010; North 1990) 
posit a similar causal ordering, in which state development shapes, not simply tracks, economic 
variables. These arguments have been typically advanced at the national level, but nothing 
precludes their logic from operating within national borders. There is indeed evidence that 
territorial variation in state capacity causally explains within-country differences in economic 
growth (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015; Acemoglu, Moscona, and Robinson 
2016). 
 Moreover, while theoretical approaches focused on the interaction between abstract rulers 
and subjects around issues of extraction have produced major insights into state-building 
processes, it cannot be forgotten that societies are not homogenous entities detached from states, 
nor are rulers pure revenue maximizers unlinked to social interests. States are built and directed 
by concrete political elites who care about various goals, have historically defined social 
constituencies, advance some interests over others, and act in a multiplicity of policy realms out 
of several types of motivations. 
 I will thus take economic and geographic factors seriously into account, but center my 
theoretical attention elsewhere. Without either denying or overlooking their evident importance, 
I approach the territorial organization of state power from an explicitly political angle. I argue 
(and show empirically) that state-building and state performance within borders are poorly 
understood without allowing for an autonomous role of politics, whose “essence,” in Weberian 
terms, “is struggle” (M. Weber 1978, 1414).6 The construction of states is carried out by political 
actors involved in political battles, and for political purposes. To understand how institutions 
                                                 
6
 The full quote reads: “The essence of politics—as we will have to emphasize time and again—is struggle, the 
recruitment of allies and of a voluntary following.” 
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formed across territory, what states can(not) accomplish and where, we not only need a 
topographic or an economic map, but an understanding of the historical conflicts and group 
oppositions that went into the making of the state. 
1.2 Cleavage Structures and State Development 
 I propose a framework in which the fault lines or “cleavages” that organize group conflict 
in a polity, especially during formative historical periods, serve as a theoretical foundation to 
analyze why states develop unevenly across territory and functions. Key to this approach is to 
first pin down the cleavage concept as employed here, to then explain why it is useful to 
understand the sequences of institution-building and societal reaction that, I argue, shape state 
capacity and performance. In a nutshell, I propose that cleavages, as the polarities that define 
political contestation, influence two key sets of variables: first, the type and location of 
institutional investments made by political actors and groups in control of state power during 
decisive moments; second, the responses to state-building measures among different groups in 
society, most relevantly those excluded from governing coalitions. State-building projects that 
unfold in a context of sharp cleavages, which entail high levels of intergroup political 
polarization, are expected to produce sates with more uneven capacities and performance 
records. 
1.2.1 The cleavage concept 
 Given that the concept of “cleavage” occupies an important role in the theoretical 
argument, it is worth elaborating how the term is used in this study, and what kind of social and 
political dynamics it is meant to capture. Although a vast literature exists on the topic and 
different authors use the term with somewhat different connotations, at its core it refers to the 
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dividing lines that de facto structure political contestation within a national community (Mair 
2006; Roberts 2014, chap. 2). Cleavages define the “system of contrasts” or political oppositions 
between groups in a polity. They are, so to speak, the coordinates of political conflict. They vary 
in content and depth across political systems and over time, but defining them as lasting and 
salient fractures that organize “membership in ‘we’ versus ‘they’ groups” captures the essence of 
the concept (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3). My use of the term concerns these basic “friend-
enemy” political distinctions.7 Deeper or more intense cleavages, under this perspective, imply 
higher levels of political polarization and hardened political identities.  
 Cleavages are central to the literature on parties and party systems, where scholars in the 
sociological tradition have long used the term to refer to sharp social divides—like class, region, 
ethnicity, or religious affiliation—that become politicized in the electoral arena (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1999). Because these classic works placed an emphasis on a given set of 
social group distinctions as the raw materials for the construction of political identities, usage of 
the concept is often mistakenly taken to imply a mechanistic translation of social divisions into 
political oppositions, and thus criticized for socio-structural reductionism.8  
 However, generally understood as the boundaries that separate individuals and groups 
into rival political camps, the cleavage concept retains analytical power, without carrying with it 
an assertion of sociological predetermination of those camps. Put differently, I use the term in a 
political sense, not as a synonym of structural social differentiation. I further argue that under 
                                                 
7
 The reference is to Carl Schmitt’s famous definition of the friend-enemy antithesis as the specific political 
distinction. For Schmitt, “an enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people 
confronts a similar collectivity” (2007, 28). 
8
 The literature on these issues is too vast to cite here. For an early formulation of this critique, see Sartori (1990). 
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this definition, cleavage structures hold explanatory potential for outcomes beyond electoral 
politics, the research area in which they are perhaps more frequently examined.9 
 My understanding of the term also draws on insights from other bodies of research on 
intergroup relations, mainly in the fields of social psychology and behavioral economics. In fact, 
it is possible to draw connections between the classic cleavage literature, focused on macro-
historical processes of political differentiation in Western Europe, and findings in these 
alternative research fields, which work at lower levels of analysis. Myriad empirical studies 
document that group identification has powerful effects on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors 
toward others, depending on which side of the group boundary those others are located. A core 
insight in this literature is that once membership to a distinctive group is brought to the 
psychological foreground, individuals are inclined to favor their in-group and display bias 
against out-group members (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986).  
 This includes increased willingness to emulate and cooperate with fellow group 
members, make personal sacrifices in the in-group’s benefit, conform to group norms and 
stereotypes, and display hostile attitudes and behavior toward the out-group.10 Importantly, 
increasing the salience of a group divide only enhances such biases. These tendencies are 
observed even in experiments where an arbitrary attribute, unrelated to “deep” sociological 
distinctions or preexisting grievances, is employed to activate a temporary group boundary 
(Bourhis and Gagnon 2003; Chen and Li 2009).  
 In reality, of course, people identify with groups associated with specific histories, 
experiences, and struggles, and these collective identifications tend to be relatively durable. 
                                                 
9
 A large literature also adopts a cleavage framework to examine ethnicity and civil wars. My discussion below also 
borrows from this body of work. 
10
 Useful survey works in this vast literature include Huddy (2003), Simon and Klandermans (2001), and Worchel 
and Coutant (2001). 
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Absent systematic examination of those histories, it is impossible to understand the substantive 
content of group boundaries across national contexts. This was the distinctive contribution of 
classic works on cleavage structures in political sociology, then furthered by many others. 
Findings in behavioral economics and the psychological literature reveal the micro-mechanics of 
intergroup relations, which we can then examine in a proper, historically-produced social context 
that stimulates certain identifications or group belongings.  
 My purpose here is to highlight the pertinence of a general definition of cleavages as the 
lines that, in practice, demarcate groups that have coalesced politically, independent of whether 
these conform to some predefined sociodemographic categories, something that can be left to 
empirical investigation. Notice that this approach also has the crucial advantage of potentially 
increasing the external validity of the theoretical framework. While the content of cleavages and 
attendant political identities naturally varies across contexts, we can nevertheless expect the 
cleavage structure relevant in a given country at critical historical moments to influence state-
building patterns across territory, in systematic ways.   
 Lipset and Rokkan themselves spoke of the possibility of “alignments by strictly political 
criteria of membership in ‘we’ versus ‘they’ groups,” as opposed to those following “obvious 
sociocultural criteria.” They explained that political parties, for instance, may “establish 
themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their own alignments independently of 
the geographical, the social, and the cultural underpinnings” (1967, 3). In speaking generally of 
the sorting of individuals into opposing groups contesting for supremacy, they captured the 
essence of the cleavage concept as it is employed here: the axes of “us” versus “them” in the 
political arena, or the dividing lines between in-groups and out-groups, in the language of social 
psychology. 
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 The complementarity of both approaches lies in their analytical focus on group loyalties 
and inter-group conflict as basic social phenomena that play a large role in political processes 
and outcomes. Returning to the level of the nation-state, cleavages thus denote the internal 
boundaries that demarcate political “others.” These antagonisms define what politics is about, 
and as I will elaborate, can have lasting consequences on the development of the state within its 
borders. To preview my argument, I suggest that the set of interactions between groups on 
opposite sides of a cleavage—in particular between those who build the state and those who, 
while carrying the identification of broad segments of society, are excluded from state-building 
coalitions—give rise to distinctive patterns of sub-national state capacity. 
 Numerous scholars have advanced arguments about the process by which certain divides 
acquire political primacy, thus properly turning into cleavages as defined here. Careful analyses 
tend to posit a politically-driven (and hence contingent) process of construction and activation of 
collective identities, in which individuals’ social context, shared life experiences, and grievances, 
play a constraining but not deterministic role (e.g. Kalyvas 1996; Posner 2017; Sambanis and 
Shayo 2013). Individuals’ social environment, ideas, and value orientations interact with the 
politicization efforts of organizations and movements to ultimately sort them into opposing 
camps in the political arena.  
 In this vein, the most elaborate conceptual formulations in the sociological tradition 
contend that cleavages comprise three elements: a socio-structural referent; an embodiment in 
concrete social and political organizations; and a cultural-ideational representation, by which 
group identities are constructed as such and become associated with specific attitudes, values, 
symbols, and belief systems (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 2006). This strict three-dimensional 
conceptualization represents an ideal-type. Fully-formed cleavages rank high in all three 
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properties, but for analytical and empirical purposes the development of each dimension can be 
seen as varying along a continuum (Roberts 2002).  
 These three components will become useful in discussing why cleavage structures can 
shape episodes of state-building and thus translate into patterns of state capacity, and why these 
patterns may persist over time. As I will explain in more detail, social dynamics generated by 
deep cleavages can operate as mechanisms connecting the “system of oppositions” in place at a 
relevant state-building juncture to subsequent measures of state performance. These cleavage-
related dynamics include the encapsulation into parallel organizational networks, the 
reproduction of group identities, and the association of these identities with a set of attitudes, 
interests, and behaviors that may prove resistant to change, even as circumstances vary. 
 This serves to highlight another important feature of the cleavage concept as defined 
here, which is that it implies a certain durability as an organizing political boundary. The 
intensity of polarization or conflict around a cleavage may vary over time, and in the long run a 
given divide may cease to demarcate contesting political camps, thus losing its character as a 
cleavage. However, cleavages are distinct from episodic differences of opinion or transient 
divisions that do not develop into proper polarities. They thus denote a system of contrasts 
capable of producing enduring patterns of group identification and repeated, dialectical 
interaction. This means that cleavages do not simply entail difference, but political camps that 
are at odds with each other, indeed that can be said to need of each other for self-definition. 
 In the rest of the study, I will also borrow from the three dimensions mentioned above to 
characterize the historical cleavages or oppositions relevant to each of my two country cases. It 
should be noted at the outset, however, that the theoretical and empirical contributions of this 
study lie in specifying the effects of sharp cleavages on the process and outcomes of state 
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formation, not in how cleavages come into being. Specifically, I will develop the argument that 
the cleavage structures prevalent during critical historical moments shape the decisions of 
governing coalitions about how and where to state-build, as well as the reactions to those 
investments among different segments of society. In advancing this argument, I pay close 
attention to the constitution and features of the cleavages that serve as explanatory factors in my 
cases. I make no general theoretical attempt, however, at specifying the conditions under which 
particular divides become politically activated and outweigh others. The construction of states, 
not cleavages, is at issue here. 
 A final consideration about the relationship between cleavages and violent conflict is 
necessary before delving into the theoretical argument. The question is of substantive theoretical 
interest but also directly relevant to my cases. As I explain in subsequent chapters, in both 
Mexico and Colombia I trace patterns of state development to cleavages that, in periods of 
varying durability across the cases, manifested in serious political violence, including outright 
civil wars.  
 As salient political boundaries, cleavages involve, by definition, contrasts in political 
preferences between groups who strive to alter the balance of power in society. Yet each group 
does not just hold different preferences or views; it wants to make them authoritative, to make 
them govern the functioning of the whole. The distinctions may concern fundamental principles 
and values, the allocation of material goods to some (but not all), or other factors, but the key 
issue is that advancing them entails political struggle. And in political struggle, violence is a 
latent possibility. Although clearly not all cleavages erupt into violence, greater incompatibility 
of preferences and higher levels of intergroup hostility—that is, deeper cleavages—can be 
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expected to increase the risk of violent conflict, especially when state institutions are still in an 
early formative stage.11  
 It is also well-understood that violence itself can reinforce group attachments and 
accentuate “us” versus “them” boundaries, a process that has been most analyzed with reference 
to ethnic cleavages (e.g. Sambanis and Shayo 2013). In this sense, the relationship between 
violence and cleavage depth is bidirectional. Violent conflict deepens the grievances attributed to 
the out-group and increases in-group solidarity, thus helping collective identification patterns to 
congeal. A heightened sense of group membership in turn reproduces intergroup biases over time 
and potentially facilitates future rounds of political mobilization. Empirical studies have 
documented that the reinforcing effects of violence on political identities—and on resulting 
attitudes and behaviors toward in-group and out-group members—may remain visible across 
generations, as loyalties are transmitted through families and social networks (Lupu and 
Peisakhin forthcoming; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov forthcoming; Wittenberg 2006). 
 In my examination of the religious and the partisan polarities in Mexico and Colombia, 
respectively, I discuss such kinds of two-way interactions between cleavage-based identities and 
political violence. More importantly, political identities, partly constituted and heightened by 
historical violence, play a key role in my theoretical argument. They explain durable attitudes 
and behaviors toward the state which, in turn, help account for differences in state performance. 
Moreover, in empirical tests concerning the case of Mexico, I exploit the translation of the 
                                                 
11
 Historical timing and sequence are therefore relevant. A state that has already attained a monopoly over the means 
of violence and developed comprehensive capacities can prevent large-scale armed challenges from opponents, and 
generally prevent the violent escalation of intergroup conflicts even under high polarization. In addition, power-
sharing arrangements and inclusive political institutions that broadly represent contending groups may help manage 
sharp cleavages and even reduce preference incompatibility (for a recent example of this large literature, see 
Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016). However, in contexts where state institutions are inchoate, acute 
polarization and deep cleavages between groups are more likely to erupt into violence. This situation describes 
Mexico and Colombia in the historical periods analyzed in this study. 
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religious cleavage into violent conflict in the 1920s to operationalize the underlying religious 
cleavage. Overall, political violence is therefore a centerpiece of my account of Mexican and 
Colombian state formation. 
 However, as should be clear from this introduction, the historical instances of cleavage-
related violence are in each case best understood in their broader context of political enmity. 
From a theoretical standpoint, they constitute crucial but not exclusive pieces of a deep power 
struggle that structured political affiliations, attitudes, and choices throughout formative 
institutional periods. Mexican revolutionary anticlericals and political Catholics, and Colombian 
Liberals and Conservatives, were collective antagonists locked in a sequential, dialectical 
confrontation that produced quite violent episodes (more so in Colombia). However, these 
collective antagonisms also found continued expression in nonviolent forms of contestation, and 
they predated and outlived any single instance of violent fighting (see Tarrow 2007, 589).12 
States (and their capacities) took form, territorially, over the course of these dualistic conflicts 
involving both peaceful dispute and bloodshed. The argument I present therefore properly 
concerns the impact of cleavage structure on the construction of the state in territory, not solely 
the state-institutional legacies of civil war. 
 I return to this theme in subsequent chapters, where I make practical but historically-
grounded decisions to make cleavage structures empirically tractable. Now, having cleared the 
conceptual terrain, I develop the theoretical argument linking the state’s uneven development to 
cleavage politics. 
                                                 
12
 I am borrowing from Tarrow’s warning that “hiving off civil wars from other forms of contention” risks “reifying 
the category of civil war and downplaying the relationship between insurgencies and ‘lesser’ forms of contention.” 
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1.2.2 Cleavages and the Ins and Outs of State-building Coalitions 
 The cases of Colombia and Mexico share a crucial commonality: important historical 
moments in the formation of the state, when efforts were made to build up its capacities for 
extraction, coercion, and control, were also moments of intense domestic polarization and 
conflict. Their states were built upon divided grounds. In the conceptual terms outlined above, 
state-building took place in a context of sharp cleavages. The central argument of this study is 
that these early political struggles shaped the territorial formation of the state in systematic ways 
and across various types of capacities, leaving a durable mark in patterns of state performance.  
 My approach is based on the premises that, in any given time or place, it is specific 
sociopolitical coalitions and political elites that give agency to the state, and that the composition 
of these coalitions is not irrelevant. Though this may seem uncontroversial, plenty of state-
building models in political economy instead start from generic revenue-maximizing rulers 
interacting with a homogenous citizenry in abstract settings, as discussed above (e.g. Acemoglu 
2005). I emphasize that state-builders and their supporting coalitions are embedded in a structure 
of political oppositions and make politically motivated decisions—in the sense of partisanship 
and struggle—about the development of state capabilities. Because the state is a vehicle to 
exercise power over others and advance political ends, I highlight the importance of analyzing 
who state-built and in the context of which conflicts, in order to understand how the state came to 
be as it is, what it can accomplish, and where. In his work on the modern state, Michael Mann 
called to “make clear who this Leviathan is: Who controls it? Who is doing what to whom?” 
(2012, 359). I take Mann’s call seriously and show how it matters for the state’s development 
within its borders. 
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 I argue that the struggles between rival political groups can propel uneven state-building 
and spawn lasting domestic contrasts in state performance, especially when formative 
institutional periods are ridden by high levels of political polarization or deep cleavages. The key 
reasons are that, under these conditions, foundational investments in institutions across territory, 
and the ties that emerge between state and society, which affect compliance, vary sharply along 
lines of political identity. This general argument has potential implications for two different 
levels of analysis: the cross-national and the sub-national. This study concentrates squarely on 
the latter, but for the sake of argument it is worth sketching how the two levels are connected 
under my theoretical framework. 
 The implications at the first level concern the conditions under which state-building 
projects are likely to be more successful in producing well-formed states, possessing 
comprehensive capacities throughout their territory and commanding broad compliance. Stated 
as above, the argument implies that the higher the levels of polarization during the period in 
which state institutions are born and develop their basic features, the more pronounced the 
partisan biases in state capacity investments and in societal compliance can be expected to be. In 
turn, more auspicious conditions for coherent state development may exist when unifying forces, 
like war against a common external enemy, reduce the intensity of domestic intergroup conflict 
during state-building. 
 This perspective about the effects of internal cohesion is compatible with prominent 
arguments in the state-building literature, as I explain below. Several classic and recent works 
suggest that the degree of domestic polarization matters for how the state develops. However, the 
point often appears only implicitly in narratives about successful cases. When explicitly 
manifested, arguments have tended to stop at the general point that greater domestic 
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homogeneity or cohesion facilitates state-building, implying that more divided polities see little 
institutional improvements and, in competitive international environments, are eliminated (e.g. 
Gennaioli and Voth 2015). With few exceptions, notably Slater’s work on counterrevolutionary 
Leviathans (2010), the ways in which polarization and internal conflict may themselves stimulate 
certain kinds of state development have received less attention.13 
 Moreover, this line of reasoning has not been pursued beyond the national level, to 
examine how deep domestic cleavages impact the construction of state capabilities internally. As 
I have argued, this is a crucial political process in and of itself. My unique contribution is thus to 
illuminate how internal political conflicts occurring early in the process of state building shape 
institutional development within a country’s borders. 
 Let us start by showing how the existing literature suggests a relationship between the 
depth of domestic cleavages and state-building processes, if sometimes only indirectly. 
Dominant approaches to the study of state formation emphasize external pressures that push 
rulers to build institutions. In the most extended formulation, identified with the work of Tilly, 
                                                 
13
 Slater argues that when major popular contention threatened elites before the consolidation of authoritarian rule in 
Southeast Asia, elites forged “protection pacts” and erected powerful, authoritarian party-states to counter 
mobilization from below. While I share Slater’s emphasis on domestic contention as an engine for investments in 
state capacity, my argument differs in three main ways.  
First, whereas he analyzes state-building as an elite reaction to mass contentious politics, my argument refers to 
intergroup cleavages that run through the society and need not take the form of fearful counterrevolutionary elites 
versus mobilized masses. Put differently, Slater is concerned with “vertical” elite-mass conflicts, whereas I focus on 
“horizontal” cleavages between opposing collectivities that enlist each broad segments of society. Relatedly, I leave 
aside questions of political regime, whereas Slater analyzes the joint outcome of state development and authoritarian 
durability in his cases.  
 Second, I analyze the uneven development of the state within its territory as a result of sharp cleavages that 
affect both state-building efforts and societal compliance, whereas he explains cross-country variation and focuses 
primarily on the first component—namely, the conditions that push elites to invest in state capacity, somewhat 
assuming that those investments succeed and produce the intended effects in society.  
 Third, I disaggregate state capacity into various dimensions and show the distinctive ways in which cleavages 
shape each. Slater approaches state power mainly as a combination of coercion and extraction, arguing that they 
jointly serve to consolidate authoritarian rule. 
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capable states were born in war (1975, 1992).14 The mechanics are well-known. Rulers at 
constant war were compelled to extract revenues and accumulate coercive means. Out of 
ambition and fear, they raised armies, set up fiscal systems, subordinated rival internal 
powerholders, and erected central administrative structures with extensive territorial control. 
Among those that did not perish, successful institution-building enabled further war-making, 
thus keeping the cycle in motion. Because sustaining war efforts involved predation and many 
“invasions of small-scale social life” that sparked resistance (Tilly 1992, 25), rulers had to make 
concessions to the ruled. Over the course of history, these sequential bargains gave rise to new 
state structures that strengthened popular control and enhanced public good provision. Incessant 
war and preparation for war thus engendered competent and far-reaching states, which brought 
with them taxes, conscription, and surveillance, but also representation and citizenship rights 
(Levi 1988, 1997; Tarrow 2015; Tilly 1998, 2007). 
 The vast literature that has followed this bellicist approach offers a range of mechanisms 
that link external threat to highly capable states. For analytical purposes, we can classify them 
under two main types.15 The most commonly invoked associate the fiscal-military pressures 
involved in war-making to institutional creation, innovation, and reform within the governmental 
apparatus itself (Ertman 1997). Rulers not only created new far-reaching state structures. In order 
to effectively fight wars, they implemented measures to solve principal-agent problems in tax 
extraction, professionalized coercive bodies, rationalized administrations, made their societies 
more legible, and took steps toward greater centralization and bureaucratization. These reforms, 
                                                 
14
 For critiques and elaborations focused on Europe, see among others (Ertman 1997; Gorski 2003). Recent works 
emphasizing the importance of warfare for state development include (Besley and Persson 2011; Karaman and 
Pamuk 2013; Scheve and Stasavage 2016). For a review, see (Dincecco 2015). The main studies examining state-
building in Latin America in dialogue with the bellicist approach are those of Centeno (1997, 2002). See also (Thies 
2005). For Africa, see (Dincecco, Fenske, and Gaetano Onorato 2016; Herbst 2000). 
15
 Soifer (2016b) employs a similar classification of intra-state versus society-based mechanisms in his review of the 
literature on failed state-building. 
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taking place over a long historical period, ultimately made state organizations more modern and 
effective at implementing decisions, an institutional inheritance that future rulers could redeploy 
for other governance purposes. The first set of mechanisms in bellicist theory thus points to the 
growth of available governing infrastructure and the intra-state improvements in public 
administration triggered by military competition. 
 However, other arguments suggest that this is only part of the explanation for the 
emergence of high-performing states in threatening international environments. Another set of 
mechanisms looks beyond the state itself and toward society. There is an important body of work 
that, though not always focused on state capacity outcomes, examines how external warfare 
alters societal dynamics, patterns of social identification, and state-society relations. Several 
studies trace links between war and the forging of national identities (e.g. Posen 1993; Wimmer 
2013). In this same area, Darden and Mylonas argue that threats to a country’s territorial 
integrity push state elites to pursue nation-building in order to generate internal cohesion, which 
results in more developed national institutions and lower linguistic diversity (2016). For 
Sambanis et al., victory in war can help induce national identification and cooperation between 
rival domestic groups, a potential benefit that leads rulers to fight wars they believe winnable in 
order to reap these benefits (Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth 2015). 
 The relevant lesson of these works, for the issue that concerns us, is that external threats 
and common struggles can induce shifts in patterns of political identification and in levels of 
internal cohesion that are favorable to coherent state-building.16 Interstate warfare may aid state 
development because it reduces the intensity and salience of domestic cleavages, instead 
                                                 
16
 A similar logic underlies the work of Besley and Persson, who use external war as a measure of common interests 
and argue that these lead to greater investments in fiscal and legal capacity. More heterogeneous interests instead 
discourage state development because groups in society fear greater redistribution from a stronger state when they 
are out of power (2011). 
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activating a collective sense of “we” that makes citizens more willing to cooperate with rulers 
and with each other, in order to confront an external enemy. If a threat to the whole is 
sufficiently strong, the salient boundaries of “us” versus “them” shift from the inside to the 
outside. Antagonism is directed to the international arena. The set of attitudes and behaviors 
associated with group identity become in such cases favorable to the emergence of institutions 
with comprehensive capacities across geographical and social space, as the in-group versus out-
group boundaries are made to coincide with those of the nation-state. 
 To be sure, the occurrence of external warfare is not equivalent to the cessation of 
domestic politics. State-builders may take advantage of wars to lock in their partisan interests, 
for example by implementing fiscal policies that are necessary to fight but simultaneously 
advance the distributive interests of core constituencies (Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013). 
Moreover, wars and internal contention are interlocking processes, as rulers and their populations 
bargain over the restriction and expansion of rights during and after war efforts (Tarrow 2015). 
The point here is that fighting external enemies has the potential of reducing polarization and 
activating collective processes that do not respond narrowly or solely to the logic of internal 
antagonisms. Groups that, in terms of the dominant domestic cleavage, do not identify with the 
coalition in power may nevertheless be more willing to cooperate with state-building measures 
directed toward a common objective. By reducing the salience of internal fractures and inducing 
greater inter-group cooperation across cleavage lines, warfare can create opportunities for state-
building backed by broad societal compliance. 
 Not all wars may produce such a rally-around-the-flag effect, especially if not commonly 
perceived as a fundamental threat across sides of a cleavage. Only when opposing political 
groups in a polity come to see an external state or actor as an “other” that needs to be combated, 
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and thereby a collective identity acquires primacy, can we properly argue that the resulting 
increase in internal cohesion aids coherent state-building. However, large-scale wars of mass 
mobilization and even some decolonization struggles arguably produced effects in this direction, 
activating a sense of shared purpose and reducing the impact of domestic rivalries on patterns of 
state-building.  
 Empirical studies provide support for this view. Using cross-country data on interstate 
conflicts from 1970 onwards, for example, Feldman and Slemrod find that the number and length 
of international conflicts faced by a country is positively related with attitudes toward tax 
compliance (2009). Scholars have also found that concern for international issues increases trust 
in government (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008), which has been found to bolster citizen 
compliance and thus improve state performance (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). It is also telling 
that it took major world wars that threatened their very existence for countries to erect 
comprehensive welfare regimes, funded with taxes raised broadly across societies and 
administered by large state structures. Sharp internal polarization along class cleavages, by itself, 
failed to produce this outcome (Berman 2006; Scheve and Stasavage 2010, 2016).17 In a similar 
vein, Sparrow, noting the “massification” of fiscal citizenship obligations in the U.S. during 
World War II, highlights “how the extraordinary state-building of the period was accomplished 
with so little opposition” (2008, 265). Comparing subnational units, Singh argues that higher 
levels of collective solidarity—which in terms of my argument entail lower polarization and less 
intense cleavages—are positively related to public good provision and welfare outcomes across 
India (2015). 
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 Speaking of the consolidation of social democratic states in Europe, Berman writes “both a strong, interventionist 
state and generous, universalistic welfare policies...depend on the support of a citizenry driven by a high degree of 
fellow feeling and a sense of shared purpose” (2006, 214–15). Emphasis added. 
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 Overall, we can appreciate from these arguments that the intensity of domestic political 
oppositions is an important variable in processes of state-building. Governments’ investments in 
state capacity and societal attitudes toward the state, both of which have a key impact on 
institutional performance, can vary systematically depending on what types of group 
identifications acquire primacy (domestic group versus collective) and how deep inter-group 
divides are. This is of special importance during formative periods of the state apparatus. There 
is a broad consensus that there are decisive episodes or “critical junctures” in the formation of 
institutions, when political actors make foundational decisions and key events mold the political 
future. States carry with them deep historical legacies (Centeno, Yashar, and Kohli 2017; Kurtz 
2013; Soifer 2016b)—they are “institutions with considerable historical momentum” (Slater and 
Fenner 2011, 16).  
 With high internal polarization and rigid domestic-group political identities—that is, in a 
situation of deep cleavages—societal compliance with state-building measures varies sharply 
along cleavage lines, depending on who governs and attempts to strengthen the state. If this 
occurs during the early stages of state formation, it may produce uneven patterns of state 
development that mirror internal cleavages (and decrease national state capacity averages). In 
contrast, in contexts of greater political cohesion during formative periods, less resistance from 
society and less partisan state-building measures allow for the construction of a common 
institutional core capable of sustaining further development of state capacity. A more competent 
state with far-reaching capacities can thus emerge. 
 In his classic work on Latin American state-building in the nineteenth century, Centeno 
argued that the weakness of interstate military competition, unlike the Darwinian Western 
European experience, explains why states in the region failed to develop high state capacity 
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(2002; Centeno and Ferraro 2013, 7). The mobilization of Latin American populations around 
collective war efforts was just too weak and infrequent to set off cycles of extraction and 
institution-building. In the terms of my argument, the lack of sustained external pressures created 
few instances of state-building in which the political “other” was a foreign enemy, rather than an 
internal political rival. Indeed, peaceful international relations allowed internal political 
antagonisms to reproduce without restraint, as reflected in the high incidence of civil wars 
throughout the region in the nineteenth century. Few state-building projects were minimally 
collective enterprises, and their partisan features prevented broad-based collaboration from 
society. This dynamic, according to my theoretical framework, plays a key role in explaining the 
outcome of relatively low levels of state capacity highlighted by Centeno. 
 Two examples from the countries examined in this study serve to illustrate the point. 
Mexico might seem to challenge my argument that international relations did not work to reduce 
the intensity of domestic cleavages, which in turn became an obstacle to coherent state-building. 
Two major international wars took place in the nineteenth century, namely the Mexican-
American War (1846-48) and the French Intervention. The latter conflict claimed some forty to 
fifty thousand lives (Rugeley and Fallaw 2012, 5) and resulted in the three-year empire of 
Maximilian of Habsburg (1864-1867).  
 Yet on deeper examination, it is clear that the French-supported intervention was not a 
motive for national cohesion and mutual collaboration, but in fact a new round in the deep 
Liberal-Conservative antagonism that structured domestic politics in the nineteenth century. 
Many Conservatives, defeated by Liberals in the War of the Reform (1857-1860), supported and 
even actively promoted the imposition of a foreign monarchy, along with the Catholic Church. 
For Conservatism, one of the two dominant political forces in the country at the time, external 
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intervention was not a threat that merited cooperation with Liberals to defend the nation-state, 
but rather a much-desired restoration of monarchical order. The case thus confirms, more than 
invalidates, that external wars failed to reduce domestic polarization, which prevented broad-
based state-building.  
 The brief Colombia-Peru War (1932-33) over a piece of territory in Colombia’s southern 
border offers another good example of the connections between sharp domestic cleavages, 
external pressures, and uneven state formation. The war motivated the adoption of new taxes 
under a Liberal government (Junguito and Rincón 2007, 249) and produced a brief outbreak of 
popular nationalism(Deas 2015, 24; Weinert 1966). 18 Archival sources also indicate that it led 
the Colombian government to plan large-scale construction of infrastructure in the largely 
abandoned Amazonas region.19 The conflict, however, was too short-lived to sustain collective 
efforts of this type. Liberal-Conservative enmity quickly and forcefully resurfaced as the 
dominant political opposition and the source of identification for Colombians. This cleavage, as I 
show in the empirical chapters, produced sharp variation in state capacity across Colombia’s 
municipalities, based on their partisan affiliation.   
 I have explained how my theoretical framework, centered on the intensity of domestic 
political conflict, fits into broader accounts about the emergence of well-formed states. Yet 
because most arguments are pitched at the cross-national level, the only logical conclusion we 
can draw thus far is that polities in which state-building projects were associated with high levels 
of intergroup political polarization should display lower average levels of stateness, as internal 
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 Speaking about partisan clashes after the 1930 Colombian presidential election, Weinert writes: “The violence of 
the 1930s was short-lived, however. One reason was a brief war with Peru in 1932 which elevated nationalist over 
partisan passions and drew attention from local violence” (1966, 342). Emphasis added. 
19
 Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá. Personal documents of Alfonso Araujo Gaviria, volume 15. 
Memorandums and communications between the Minister of War and the Minister of Public Works and 
expenditures reports from the Ministry of War. 
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antagonism stunts coherent institutional development. But as argued above, Latin American 
states are not simply weak, they are highly uneven. They possess certain capacities in certain 
areas of their territory, but are unable to sustain them throughout the realm, achieve a relatively 
uniform performance, or participate in people’s daily lives in consistent ways. 
 To explain this distinctive type of institutional development we must examine the 
relationship between domestic cleavages and state capacity within countries. Instead of stopping 
at the country level, the unevenness that we observe merits a theoretical focus on subnational 
variation. I argue that examining the structure and intensity of internal political oppositions 
equips us to explain the development of the state within its borders. Analytically, state formation 
comprises two main sets of processes. First, the adoption by those who hold power of policies to 
increase the capacities of the governing apparatus; second, the responses of the governed to 
rulers’ measures and intentions. When sharp cleavages form in a polity, intergroup struggles 
powerfully shape both sets of processes and result in subnational patterns of state capacity that 
reflect the underlying political antagonisms. Importantly, if core state structures are still 
inchoate, the prevailing cleavages during formative institutional episodes will mark the 
construction of those basic state pillars. 
 Let us analyze the first component. I argue that rather than purely inhibiting institutional 
development, strong polarization between “us” versus “them” political camps can stimulate 
state-building, yet of certain characteristics. The reason is straightforward: a stronger state 
represents, for those who control it, a more powerful vehicle to impose their will upon others, 
and this is most desired when the conflict with the enemy is most intense.20 It may seem 
paradoxical that the conditions of polarization and deep conflict that have been thought to hinder 
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 The first sentence paraphrases Weber: “as an instrument for ‘societalizing’ relations of power, bureaucracy has 
been and is a power instrument of the first order—for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus” (1991, 228). 
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state-building are simultaneously considered to be favorable to the development of other key 
institutions in modern societies, namely, political parties (Levitsky et al. 2016; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Shefter 1994). The paradox dissolves, however, if we consider that polarized 
conflict can spawn institution-building efforts that span the state, but also that under such 
conditions investments in state capacity respond heavily to partisan, group-based 
considerations. It is therefore crucial to consider who builds the state and who are the political 
enemies, that is, who are the included or excluded elements of society in a coalition that sets out 
to strengthen the state in a particular domain. 
 State-building is a process of institutional transformation that sets new objectives and 
purposes for governing authorities, provides them with greater tools to accomplish them, and 
establishes new criteria about the proper behavior of the ruled. Those definitions about what the 
state will do and how people are to behave do not simply entail a coordination problem (Moe 
2005).21 They are not politically neutral, in the sense of being detached from political enmities or 
group attempts to subordinate the rest of the society to their will. To the contrary, they are 
fundamentally informed by the views and interests of ruling elites and their sociopolitical 
coalitions, which are not equally accepted across the society. These views and interests are, in 
fact, defined in contraposition to those of others.22 In a polarized polity where political-group 
identifications are strong, state-building measures are part of a struggle for supremacy. For the 
political group in government, part of the rationale for strengthening the state machinery is to 
                                                 
21
 This borrows from Moe’s critique that most rational choice theories, despite seemingly addressing questions of 
political power, in reality tend to explain the origins and functioning of political institutions as power-free solutions 
to coordination problems, failing to capture their essence as imposed arrangements by winners upon losers. As I 
have argued throughout this chapter, many recent studies that conceive state capacity as essentially welfare-
enhancing are vulnerable to a similar critique. They present states—in Moe’s terms—as structures that “resolve 
collective action problems and benefit all concerned” and less so as “structures of power” (2005, 215). 
22
 I am deliberately speaking of “views” and “interests” in a general way in this theoretical chapter to accommodate 
the possibility of many different types of distinctions serving as a basis for the structuration of rival political groups. 
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possess a more effective instrument to make its own politically contested interests and goals 
prevail—that is, to decisively alter the balance of power in its favor.  
 They key point is that ruling elites launch and direct state-building projects in conflict 
with a political “other,” a political collectivity that in holding opposite preferences about the 
governing of the whole and the uses of state power, anchors the opposite side of a cleavage. This 
is a crucial feature of state-building efforts. They pursue the subordination or defeat of a 
particular political enemy, which makes the analysis of the development of state capacity 
inseparable from the analysis of the political ends of those who seek to use the state.  
 State-building choices during formative historical periods therefore respond strongly to 
the political conflicts in which governing elites and their social bases are immersed, the more so 
when the contradictions between the opposing camps are more acute (i.e., the deeper the 
cleavage). This has immediate consequences for how we expect state-building policies to be 
designed and investments in governing infrastructure to be allocated. When the cleavage 
between insiders and outsiders to the governing coalition manifests geographically—that is, 
when collective support for each camp is unevenly distributed throughout the territory, as is 
commonly the case—state-builders’ adherence to partisan-political criteria translates into 
differential state action across territory. In other words, it shapes the spatial location of 
institutional investments in ruling infrastructure. Politically-aligned areas are likely to be treated 
systematically different by state-builders than those where opponents hold greater sway.  
 The structure of political antagonisms also shapes the type of institutional investments. 
During state-building, governing coalitions are likely to concentrate capacities to constrain 
contention, dissidence, and political participation in rival areas of the territory. The possible tools 
include institutions to exercise coercion, mechanisms of surveillance, and alliances with locally-
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based coercion-wielders, but also ideological and cultural strategies to reshape identities and 
beliefs. Revolutionary states, run by committed elites and supported by mobilized popular 
coalitions, have been particularly inclined to supplement coercive capacity with these more 
ambitious and insidious tools for social control. The empirical chapters examine the structuring 
effects of cleavages on the development of coercive capacity and also on policies for social 
penetration. 
 The specific combination of capacities cultivated by state-builders to deal with political 
out-groups will inevitably depend upon a host of case-specific, contextual factors. In the 
empirical chapters, for example, I show that in the scenario of postrevolutionary Mexico, state 
elites allied with local rural militias to surveil communities and coercively break Catholic 
opposition; simultaneously, they aggressively pushed land reform and secular education in 
Catholic areas to sap resistance. In Colombia’s electorally competitive environment, conversely, 
Conservatives used their control over the construction of the education system to foster literacy 
in their own strongholds and suppress it in Liberal areas. This was a viable means to contain 
Liberalism in this context given existing literacy restrictions on the right to vote. The relevant 
point is that all these strategies require their own institutional apparatuses which, given limited 
resources and partisan interests, are strategically deployed in territory following cleavage lines. 
 In laying different institutional foundations across territory and arenas of state power, 
these early distributive decisions can profoundly shape subsequent trajectories, crystallizing into 
historically-grounded patterns of unevenness in the available instruments of rule (offices, 
personnel, resources, etc.). Differences in state physical infrastructure, once generated, tend to 
persist. Bureaucratic inertia, continuity in budgetary spending patterns (e.g. Huillery 2009), and 
the vested interests created within state organizations incline them to exhibit path-dependence 
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(Pierson 2004). In the long-run, small changes made to respond to new pressures and necessities 
may add up and erode existing patterns. New rounds of major state-building or institutional “big 
bangs” (Centeno, Yashar, and Kohli 2017, 9) are another possible route to change.  
 In everyday politics, however, there are important forces pushing towards persistence. 
Governments can fine-tune the state machinery, but even skillful reformers are constrained by 
what they inherit. In this sense, territorial patterns in the presence and resources of different state 
apparatuses, which affect how the state routinely governs and what it can accomplish across 
territory, may long outlive the historical conflicts that engendered them. This continuity in the 
architecture of the state is thus one possible mechanism connecting historical state-building 
decisions, shaped by political antagonisms, to persistent state capacity outcomes.  
 An important point is that this general logic, by which the cleavage structure in which 
state-building coalitions are embedded shapes early arrangements that evolve into durable 
patterns of state activity, may apply not to the state apparatus as a whole, but to particular parts 
of functions.23 Any country’s particular experience of state formation follows an identifiable 
chronology, with important institutional moments typically occurring during and after wars, 
liberation from a foreign power, revolutions, and so forth. There is a broad consensus, for 
example, that the two decades following the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution (1910-
1917) were critical in the formation of the core structures of the modern Mexican state. 
 However, not all parts of the state may develop at the same pace or in the same cycle, 
which extends the relevant question from who built the state to who built what part of its 
apparatus. To offer another concrete example, in the empirical chapters I show that the dominant 
Liberal-Conservative cleavage in Colombian politics shaped state capacity outcomes in both 
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 Here I draw on Braddick (2004), who makes this point in his discussion of the inconsistent chronologies offered 
in the literature about the formation of the English state. 
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education and taxation. Yet while Liberals pushed forward with investments in the state’s fiscal 
capacity in the 1930s, which strengthened the fiscal state disproportionately in Liberal areas due 
to strong Conservative resistance, it was the Conservatives who dominated the education state, to 
Liberals’ detriment. 
 The above discussion highlights how deep cleavages can structure governing coalitions’ 
efforts to develop state capacity. In a polarized society, the geographic distribution of support for 
opposing political groups shapes the incentives to invest in different types of institutions and 
allocate material and human resources necessary for governing across regions. This is, in my 
theoretical framework, one of the paths leading to the rise of uneven states.  
 Yet a pure focus on the state machinery and state-builders’ intentions is insufficient to 
account for the observed subnational contrasts in stateness. States are not, so to speak, simply 
uneven by design. While the system of oppositions in which rulers build the state leads them to 
make uneven institutional investments, states’ actual performance is not a simple function of 
rulers’ plans or intentions. Patterns in state development are also affected by the ways in which 
individuals and groups in society make claims on the state and respond to authorities’ efforts at 
shaping their behavior. The actual ability of the state to do certain things, indeed the very content 
of state action, is a joint outcome of top-down and bottom-up forces that escape the will and 
purposes of state-builders. In this sense, states form unevenly rather than simply being made 
unevenly. 
 Cleavages, as the set of salient political oppositions, also structure this second component 
of state formation, which takes us beyond the resources and features of the governing apparatus 
itself into the realm of state-society relations. I argue that the lines of political antagonism during 
formative institutional periods carry over into the ability of emerging states to link to different 
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groups in society. When the camps on opposite sides of a cleavage carry, each, the identification 
of sizable segments of the population, polarization can severely hamper the ability of rulers to 
secure broad compliance with state-building measures. The deeper the cleavage, the less a 
forming state’s claim to legitimate authority is likely to resonate among members of the group(s) 
that is excluded from the state-building coalition.  
 With starker “us” versus “them” alignments, the out-group(s) of state-building processes 
develop an adversarial, oppositional relationship with the state. Because one political camp 
factiously commands the state, seeking to strengthen it to achieve supremacy, impose its will on 
the whole, and accomplish essentially partisan ends, state-building measures become themselves 
a source of intergroup contestation and grievance. Among the out-group, political identity 
combines with distrust and negative attitudes toward state institutions, which predispose its 
members toward noncompliance. As explained above, sequences of resistance and repression 
may further harden group identification and resentment, especially when they escalate into 
serious violence.  
 In the extreme, anti-state cultural norms, values, and patterns of behavior may become 
integral part of the identity of the politically excluded group. This imbrication, in turn, 
undermines state performance in parts of the territory where support for the out-group is 
stronger, and across governance functions that depend heavily on societal acceptance of state 
authority. Ultimately, because political identities and concomitant attitudes and behaviors can be 
transmitted across generations, subnational variation in state strength may lastingly reflect the 
geography of historical cleavages. 
 The various steps in this argument merit further elaboration. A central premise of this 
part of the theoretical framework is that states significantly depend on societal assent, “quasi-
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voluntary compliance” (Levi 1988), even legitimacy to effectively carry out complex governance 
tasks throughout territory and society.24 Force is, by definition, the ultimate means that states 
possess to generate compliance. However, the pure threat of coercion is an unviable foundation 
for an effective state, one that can routinely, consistently, and meaningfully shape behavior and 
intervene in everyday life—for example, by collecting substantial amounts in taxes. High-
performing states function by eliciting broad respect, cooperation, and a sense of obligation from 
the governed. Their myriad rules and directives are observed without constant recourse to 
coercion, and not only out of the fear of being sanctioned, narrow self-interested calculations, or 
short-term evaluations of government performance. A high degree of stateness therefore not only 
entails organizational muscle, but the integration of broadly shared notions of responsibility and 
obligation into citizenship. 
 This, of course, is a description of an ideal-type. Every political order rests on the threat 
of coercion. It is nevertheless clear that the willingness to follow along with state authorities 
varies across contexts, and this predisposition conditions what states can accomplish, how they 
govern, and what they need to do to implement decisions. Empirical studies confirm that 
compliance, or the process by which individuals adapt their conduct to conform to laws and 
regulations issued by state authorities, flows from several types of motivations. Importantly, 
broad and sustained societal compliance is achieved not simply via instrumental calculations 
about the likelihood of punishment for rule-breaking and the personal benefits of rule-following, 
but through normative judgments and feelings of obligation that are encapsulated in the concept 
of legitimacy (Tyler 2006).  
                                                 
24
 Many scholars have argued that state performance rests heavily on voluntary compliance or other proximate 
concepts (e.g. Levi 1988, 1997; Lieberman 2003). My discussion on legitimacy and consent (which are, of course, 
contested concepts) in the following paragraphs draws mainly on (Braddick 2004, chap. 2; Hechter 2013, 14–24, 
40–41; Knight 2002; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Tyler 2006). 
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 Although legitimacy is a contested concept, in almost any formulation it denotes the 
situation in which citizens grant validity to state claims to authority and thus feel an internal 
obligation to honor regulations even without the anticipation of immediate rewards or 
sanctions.25 Uncovering motivations for abiding behavior is empirically difficult, but systemic 
noncompliance and “collective resistance...can only indicate the absence of rulers’ legitimacy” 
(Hechter 2013, 21).  
 Core state-building processes and state tasks, including collecting taxes, maintaining 
order, monopolizing the means of coercion, and imparting justice, are facilitated when the belief 
that state authorities are entitled to be obeyed is widespread among the ruled. Put differently, 
state strength implies compliance, and compliance is aided by the perception that state authorities 
are justified in issuing and enforcing regulations that individuals are responsible for observing. 
The fact that considerations about approval/acceptance of state rule, consent, and legitimacy are 
difficult to grasp empirically does not make them less important in evaluating the strength of the 
state. States that fail to cultivate a normative sense of duty broadly in the society are unable to 
achieve and sustain high levels of performance. 
 Thus we can say that the strength and “stamina” (Knight 2002, 238) of the state depend 
heavily on the breadth, quality, and density of its linkages to society. As Mann explained, the 
acquisition of “infrastructural power” by modern states, the kind of power that allows them to 
perform effectively across territory and functional domains without naked force, involves “a 
tightening state-society relation” (2012, 61). The interpenetration of state and society is a staple 
feature of successful processes of state formation. Areas of social life that were previously 
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 Some authors would prefer the Gramscian notion of hegemony to the proximate Weberian concept of legitimacy. 
Although the terms carry somewhat different connotations, they both serve to convey the basic idea that power 
relations, including those between state and subjects/citizens, vary in the degree to which they are based on coercion 
and immediate instrumental calculation, or consent. This is my interest here. 
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lightly touched by the state, if at all, are brought into its effective reach. States that integrate 
society into broad-based institutions and forge ties with associations and networks that span wide 
sections of the population can, through these linkages, better communicate with society, 
discipline behavior, and cultivate legitimacy.  
 In contrast, those that put down only shallow roots, even when they build up robust 
apparatuses and material capabilities, are vulnerable to poor performance in activities that 
demand sacrifice or willing collaboration from citizens, like taxation or routine policing. They 
may also face sudden episodes of mass disobedience.26 To the extent that they are unable to tap 
into a reservoir of social assent, their authority rests exclusively on the credibility of their 
punishment threats and their promises of short-term rewards. 
 Such processes of state-society linkage can vary subnationally and help explain why 
states form unevenly. In situations when the state apparatus is thoroughly colonized by a political 
force that is locked into a power struggle with another significant domestic bloc, the ability of 
the state to tie into different segments of society varies systematically along cleavage lines. The 
greater the polarization, the more likely it is that political identities will demarcate differing 
conceptions about appropriate behavior toward the state and correlate with social perceptions 
of legitimacy.27 As just explained, these predispositions are important determinants of the success 
of state-building measures. Contrasting taxpaying cultures, for instance, may develop between 
state-building in-groups and out-groups, with members of excluded groups refusing to “quasi-
voluntarily” grant resources to a state controlled by political enemies. 
                                                 
26
 This draws on Knight (2013), who notices the paradox in classifying as “strong” states that then quickly collapse. 
Knight makes this point about the Mexican state during the Porfirian dictatorship (1876-1911), a period that many 
authors consider of successful state-building (e.g. Soifer 2015). The point that revolutions are launched against 
increasingly invasive (yet detached from society) central states has been prominent in social thinking at least since 
Tocqueville. 
27
 Of course, states can (and do) attempt to mold identities and beliefs in ways that favor voluntary compliance, for 
example through education and cultural policies. I address this issue empirically in chapter 4. 
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 Empirical studies suggest that evaluations of fairness in the conduct of state authorities 
are a fundamental predictor of beliefs in legitimacy (Hechter 2013; Tyler 2006). State institutions 
that act in ways that significant groups or collectivities perceive to be biased against them will 
fail to earn their trust or cultivate a sense of obligation among those groups’ adherents. Political 
exclusion and a sense of unfair treatment hinder consent. The same happens when state measures 
are considered to be fundamentally incompatible with deeply held values and beliefs. In order to 
bolster claims about their right to rule and justify decisions that expand the power of the state 
over people, governments draw on principles, social conventions, values, and beliefs current in 
the given society (Braddick 2004, 69). Yet where these justifications are in stark conflict with 
what parts of the body politic consider normatively acceptable, state incursions are met with 
hostility and breed resentment, rather than willing obedience. 
 State-building under sharp cleavages thus produces states that antagonize segments of 
society and by virtue of their uneven linkages, malfunction, or best, display highly heterogeneous 
performance. This is, in my theoretical framework, the other force propelling uneven states, apart 
from state-builders’ varying founding investments in governing infrastructure: during formative 
periods in polarized polities, attitudes toward an expanding state across the society come to 
reflect the structure of political antagonism—that is, the political boundaries between state-
building coalitions and their rivals. This second component thus speaks directly to the role of 
legitimation in state formation. 
 Just as initial investments in governing infrastructure can set a different institutional base 
for the state across territory, thereby contributing to persisting differences in state capacity, so 
this alternative source of unevenness can set off its own mechanisms of historical persistence. As 
explained above, an important characteristic of deep cleavages is that group members are 
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socialized into parallel subcultures and may pass down political identities, along with attendant 
beliefs and norms of behavior, to succeeding generations. Students of party systems have long 
recognized that the selective exposure of individuals to particular political outlooks, as well as 
their encapsulation into cleavage-based organizational networks, can produce long-term 
“continuities of sentiment and identification” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 53). The 
intergenerational transmission of political attitudes has received renewed attention from scholars 
that trace outcomes to historical causes (e.g. Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016; Nunn and 
Wantchekon 2011). Levels of trust, cultural norms, and beliefs can persist well after the 
institutions or conditions that spawned them disappear (Nunn 2012).  
 Drawing on these works, I argue that hegemonic struggles during state-building periods 
may produce similar effects on patterns of political identification and mass attitudes toward 
government institutions. Compliance with state authorities—for example, in taxpaying—is, to an 
important extent, a form of learned behavior. Hence inherited norms, habits, and beliefs about 
the state, shaped by political group membership and the group’s status during early state-building 
struggles, matter. Individuals who are socialized within families, associations, and social 
networks that established an oppositional relationship with state institutions during formative 
periods will be less likely to trust authorities, feel an obligation to comply, or see the state as a 
shared instrument to solve common problems. Lingering hostility may continue to shape state-
society relations and hence institutional performance even after political polarization subsides. 
This cultural continuity in political identification, learned patterns of behavior, and attitudes 
toward the state is another mechanism linking historical struggles to persistent state capacity 
outcomes. 
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 To illustrate, in both of my country cases we observe certain “continuities of sentiment 
and identification” that durably shaped political groups’ behaviors and inclinations to collaborate 
with state institutions. The hegemonic struggle between anticlerical revolutionaries and political 
Catholics during the formative years of the Mexican state in the 1920s and 1930s left a deep 
mark on the latter’s group relationship with the state, a mark that would last for at least the rest 
of the century.28 As historian Ben Fallaw writes, even as violence and polarization started to 
wane in the 1940s, and Church and state reached a modus vivendi, “Catholics retained a lasting 
antipathy to key elements of the revolutionary project…Mexico’s predominantly Catholic civil 
society denied the revolutionary ruling party generalized consent” (2013, 12).  In his detailed 
study of grassroots Catholic activism in four different regions of the country, Fallaw finds 
“widespread popular antipathy and antagonism toward the postrevolutionary state” (224); argues 
that “the postrevolutionary state at the dawning of the PRI’s [Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional] golden age in 1940 was much feebler, and its social support much shallower” than 
typically portrayed due to Catholic opposition (223); and concludes that this opposition 
“continued even after most anticlerical restrictions had ended. Even after [President Lázaro] 
Cárdenas left office, this remained an uncivil society” (2). 
 Defeated in the battlefield during the bloody “Cristero” War (1926-1929), Catholics 
continued to engage in various forms of resistance and to mobilize through lay associations and 
church-based networks.29 They supported the formation of various conservative organizations 
opposed to the Mexican state, or more precisely to the party-state, some of which mimicked, in 
                                                 
28
 Following Alan Knight, throughout the study I use the term “political Catholics” to refer to the segment of the 
Mexican population “whose politics were premised on their Catholicism” (2010, 234). The distinction is relevant 
because Catholicism was (and is) by far the dominant religion in Mexico, but levels of religiosity are of course 
variable, and not all Catholics based their politics on their religion. 
29
 Catholic insurgents took up arms to the cry of “¡Viva Cristo Rey!” or “Long live Christ the King!” which gives 
the Cristero War its name. 
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the dialectical logic typical of deep cleavages, the corporatism and organic militancy of the 
state’s mass organizations (Knight 2007, 26, 37–42).30 These organizations, along with the 
institutional Church, helped reproduce identities and hostile attitudes toward the revolutionary 
state. Ultimately, Catholic networks formed the backbone of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), 
founded in 1939. The PAN, as is well-known, became the main opposition party to the regime 
throughout the twentieth century (Loaeza 1999; Mabry 1973; Smith 2007). 
 The attitudinal effects of the Cristero War itself, a broad-based mass Catholic insurgency 
that represents the violent peak of the religious cleavage, remain visible. In a recent qualitative 
study of the Cristero diaspora in the United States and the sending regions in Mexico, historian 
Julia Young documents that some ninety years after, stories, symbols, and memories of the war 
continue to shape beliefs and behaviors among descendants of those who experienced it. Young 
writes that “devotion to the memories, myths, and martyrs of the Cristero War has endured 
across both time (through multiple generations of Mexican families) and space (from the 
Mexican interior to cities and towns across the United States)” (2015, 157).31 
 Also in Colombia we find political socialization effects that lastingly conditioned how 
Colombians on opposite sides of a cleavage related to different state institutions, depending on 
which party historically drove investments in the relevant dimension of state power. In this case, 
Liberals and Conservatives formed, since the nineteenth century, a vertically integrated, 
                                                 
30
 Catholic-based organizations included Mexican Catholic Action (ACM),  the National League for the Defense of 
Religious Liberty (LNDLR), the National Sinarquista Union (UNS), the Union of Mexican Catholic Ladies 
(UDCM), and the Catholic Association of Mexican Youth (ACJM), among others. For a complete list, see (Fallaw 
2013, xi–xiii). 
31
 She cites as an example the veneration of Toribio Romo, a Cristero priest and martyr, as the patron saint of 
migrants from Mexico’s center-west, the epicenter of the Cristero insurgency. Romo was canonized in 2000 along 
with other priests who died during the Church-state conflict. 
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Schmittian system of “hereditary hatreds” that ran through the society.32 Political rivals were 
entirely locked out from the state (and state patronage), persecuted, and put at serious 
disadvantage when either party held power (González 2014; Stoller 1995). In consequence, 
whatever state-building measures the governing party adopted, their legitimacy stopped at 
partisan boundaries. 
 Pécaut captures the broadly-accepted interpretation of historical Colombian politics when 
he writes that “to a much greater extent than the state, the two parties [enlisted] the population as 
a whole in their local networks, both rural and urban, and [constituted] authentic subcultures 
passed down from generation to generation” (Pécaut 2013, 9; see also Dix 1987; Oquist 1980). 
Karl notes that partisan loyalties were associated with “ingrained patterns of thought and 
behavior” that fed into cycles of violence (2017, 49). Even after coalition rule during the 
National Front (1958-1974) sought to reduce sectarianism, gave both parties equal access to state 
office at all levels, and blurred any programmatic distinctions, partisan loyalties remained visible 
and continued to structure behavior at the mass level. As Hartlyn notes, one of the parties tended 
to remain hegemonic in any given territorial unit, and voting patterns pre- and post-National 
Front displayed remarkable continuity (1988, 155–56). 
 In the rest of this dissertation, I continue to put flesh on this general, organizing 
theoretical framework by examining the effects of these historical cleavages on the building of 
the Mexican and Colombians states. Before doing so, I briefly discuss relevant conceptualization 
issues. 
                                                 
32
 I am again referring to Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction (see footnote 7 above). The widely-used description of 
Liberal-Conservative identities as inherited hatreds is attributed to Miguel Antonio Caro, a doctrinaire Conservative 
writer-politician who governed from 1894 to 1898 (Karl 2017, 248, fn. 51). 
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1.3 The State as a Concept and the Dimensions of State Power 
 Throughout this introductory chapter, I have emphasized the importance of examining 
state-building processes below the national level. Another core message, which will be 
exhaustively substantiated in the empirical chapters, has been that we must disaggregate state 
power into its constituent dimensions and allow for the possibility that states may develop 
unevenly not only across territory, but across functional domains simultaneously. Once we think 
about processes of state-building in this way, it becomes clear that different causal forces may 
possibly drive the development of different aspects of the state; that the same causal forces may 
in turn have a distinct impact on separate dimensions of state capacity; and that not all state 
institutions may share a common development chronology. 
 Yet the fact that states are not monolithic or homogeneous institutions—and that we must 
carefully analyze how each of their different parts and capacities develop—does not eliminate 
the value of the concept itself, as the set of interconnected apparatuses that exercise political 
power within a given territory. Drawing on historian Michael Braddick’s careful 
conceptualization (2004, chap. 1), I here understand the state in the basic sense of a discrete set 
of agencies with the following characteristics: they are connected to each other according to a 
legally specified framework; they are each invested with authority over individuals, and this 
authority is both territorially and functionally bounded; within those bounds, their activity is 
ultimately backed by the threat of force.33 The state thus includes the military and police, the 
fiscal and educational bureaucracies, local administrations, the courts, and so on. It is a 
coercively-backed network of agencies that have delimited functions within a geographical area. 
                                                 
33
 Braddick’s definition of the state is the following: “a coordinated and territorially bounded network of agents 
exercising political power” (2004, 9). Political power, in turn, is understood in the Weberian sense that, unlike other 
forms of power, it is territorially based and backed by the threat of force. This threat is claimed to be legitimate. 
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 This definition has important advantages. First, it does not determine a priori what 
specific functions belong to the state and which do not. The accumulation of functions in the 
state apparatus is an important aspect to consider when evaluating its weight over society and its 
overall power. Unlike the majority of studies of state-building in Latin America (Centeno 2002; 
Saylor 2014; Soifer 2015), which concentrate on the nineteenth century, mine focuses on state 
formation in Mexico and Colombia in the twentieth century.34 A key reason is that a “quantum 
leap” (Whitehead 1994, 91) in state power occurred between both centuries, in part through the 
accumulation of greater functions.  
 States in the region, despite their well-known weaknesses, adopted much more ambitious 
economic and social roles (for example, in popular education) and penetrated territory and 
everyday social life to unprecedented levels. Bluntly put, the twentieth century was the century 
of the “massification” and internal spread of state organizations that previously possessed a 
limited social and territorial reach. This allows me to provide new insight into processes of state 
formation in the region. Yet in terms of the definition of the state, we need one that is flexible 
enough to allow for variation in the functions adopted by states across countries and over the 
course of history. The definition above accomplishes just that. 
 The second advantage of the definition above is that the state is not reduced to, nor 
conflated with, the institutions of central government. A central set of governing institutions with 
control over coercive means and claiming ultimate authority over a territory must of course exist 
for it to be possible to speak of a state in the first place. Beyond this point, however, different 
forms of politically integrating the territory and distributing functions and prerogatives within the 
state apparatus are possible.  
                                                 
34
 An important exception is Kurtz (2013), who rightly considers the rise of mass politics as a second critical 
juncture in the formation of Latin American states—the first being the initial consolidation of national institutions, 
typically in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
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 The general definition allows for different institutional structures (e.g. federal versus 
unitary arrangements) and varying levels of centralization of functions. This is relevant because 
many arguments, implicitly drawing on a model of unitary governance and concentrated 
sovereignty, tend to evaluate state strength by reference only to the capacities of central 
governments, leaving aside regional and local institutions that also form part of the network of 
agencies formally exercising political power (see Katznelson 2002).35 Under this approach, the 
key point in evaluating the strength of the state is how effectively it performs—through its 
various apparatuses—the governance functions it accumulates, not how centralized it is. 
 This discussion also makes clear that state performance and the commonly used concept 
of “state capacity” are essentially multidimensional. For analytical purposes, it is useful to 
classify the various activities of states into separate categories. In this study, I follow classic 
works by Tilly (1975) and Skocpol (1985), as well as more recent contributions by Soifer (2008, 
2015) and Ziblatt (2006), to decompose state power into a few key constituent dimensions. Tilly 
explained that state-building involved, at its core, processes of “extraction, coercion, and 
control” and the attendant development of institutions to perform those functions (50). Soifer and 
Ziblatt both draw on this disaggregation to analyze three arenas of state activity: the extraction of 
revenue, the conscription of armed forces, and the administration of basic services, the latter 
component capturing “the capacity to actually implement policy or to regulate social life” 
(Ziblatt 2006, 87).  
                                                 
35
 Katznelson makes this point in his examination of the seemingly weak antebellum American state. The problem 
lies in assuming that strength is equivalent and directly proportional to a particular structure of the state. Katznelson 
argues that the American state was remarkably successful in asserting sovereignty, expanding its territory, and 
mobilizing resources and manpower when needed. Its considerable stateness nevertheless resulted from the 
aggregation of capabilities which were diffused throughout subnational structures, rather than concentrated in the 
center. 
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 As I explore in chapters 4 and 5, the latter dimension includes the provision of goods and 
services that, while cementing state control over society, are also valuable for the population, 
like education. Here we thus encounter the co-evolution of state capacity and citizenship rights.36 
We can similarly include in the sphere of control/regulation the “cognitive capacity” 
(Whitehead 1994, 46–47) of the state, or its ability to collect, process, and classify information in 
ways that make territory and society “legible,” and hence controllable for rulers (Scott 1998). 
 To this three-way classification of state activity we may add the judicial function, which 
Tilly recognized to be an important omission in his seminal framework (1975, 6, 49). Indeed, for 
Skocpol “administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations are the core of any state,” 
which closely matches the three above dimensions but adds the administration of law and justice 
as a relevant category in and of itself (1985, 7). These four dimensions thus encapsulate the basic 
work of modern states and guide the organization of the rest of this study. My empirical chapters 
attend primarily to the capacity to tax, coerce, and carry out policies of social reform, but I touch 
on the provision of justice at the local level, for the Mexican case, in chapter 3. 
1.4 Chapter Outline  
 The rest of this dissertation is divided into four empirical chapters that analyze the 
uneven development of the state within Mexico and Colombia, based on the organizing 
theoretical framework presented above. I start by examining the evolution of fiscal capacities in 
both countries in chapter 2. The Mexican and Colombian states both expanded their ability to 
extract revenue in the form of domestic taxes during relevant junctures in the first half of the 
twentieth century. For the first time in their history, internal taxes became the main financial 
                                                 
36
 Similarly, a state capable of effectively deploying coercive capacity can potentially direct it to repress its citizens 
and imprison them for rule breaking, but also to protect them from each other. 
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source to provide services and develop other apparatuses. The chapter nevertheless shows, using 
original historical data on tax collection for both central and local governments, that sharp 
cleavages severely affected the development of fiscal institutions throughout territory, with 
consequences that are felt to this day. In both countries, tax capacities developed unevenly based 
on which political force pushed through with the expansion of the fiscal state, and which one 
resisted. 
 Chapter 3 examines the reorganization of coercive capacity in the aftermath of the 
Mexican Revolution, focusing on the central state’s articulation with locally-based militias to 
exercise control and advance the revolutionary project. Drawing on a new geo-referenced dataset 
of the location of over 1,700 state-sanctioned militia forces in the 1930s and 1940s and other 
archival sources, the chapter documents how cleavage-based political contention pushed 
postrevolutionary governments to delegate control over physical force on these local armed 
groups, which straddled the boundary between state and society. This strategy had fateful 
consequences for state capacity in the long run, as it stunted the development of civilian security 
and justice institutions at the local level. The chapter documents that a higher historical incidence 
of militias is associated with weaker law enforcement and conflict resolution institutions across 
Mexican municipalities, as well as higher homicide rates and a higher probability of presence of 
vigilante organization in the contemporary period. 
 Chapter 4 also deals with the case of Mexico, but it extends the analysis to non-violent 
forms of social control. Specifically, it analyzes the development of three crucial institutions 
through which the postrevolutionary state penetrated society: the ejido, or the agrarian reform 
settlements through which the central state transformed the structure of property and linked to 
the rural masses; the education system, through which rulers attempted to “defanaticize” 
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Mexico’s Catholic population and cultivate loyalty to the Revolution; and the civil registry, 
which increased the state’s knowledge of its subjects and broke the control of the Church over 
the registration of basic life events. The chapter shows, using new municipal-level data, that the 
religious cleavage strongly influenced state-building efforts throughout territory, as 
governments’ made heavier investments in these forms of social penetration in areas of Church 
strength and Catholic resistance. 
 Chapter 5 returns to the case of Colombia, this time to analyze the impact of the Liberal-
Conservative opposition on patterns of expansion of education and mass literacy throughout the 
twentieth century. Although both the central and local governments could historically extract 
greater amounts in taxes in Liberal municipalities, the fiscal state did not develop in harmony 
with the education state. This last empirical chapter shows that the Conservative Party and the 
allied Catholic Church used their strong historical control over the education system to privilege 
Conservative areas in the provision of education. Given literacy restrictions on the right to vote, 
only lifted in 1936, the uneven spread of literacy skills along partisan lines also unevenly 
broadened the electorate, and thereby could help the Conservative Party in its pursuit of political 
hegemony. The chapter documents that the gap in educational attainment between historically 
Liberal versus Conservative municipalities persisted throughout the century of mass education, 
and remains visible today. In this arena, then, historical cleavages also cast a long shadow. 
 After these four empirical chapters, the conclusion reflects on the broader contributions 
and implications of the study, considers its limitations, and outlines potential avenues for future 
research.
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2 RESISTING TAXATION: HISTORICAL CLEAVAGES AND FISCAL 
(IN)CAPACITY IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the historical origins of within-country variation in fiscal capacity. In 
contrast to prevailing economic and geographic explanations of the reach of the state, I argue that 
domestic patterns of state fiscal strength reflect historical lines of political conflict. Fiscal 
capacity stagnates in areas where state-building coalitions exclude or antagonize interests and 
values along a politically salient cleavage during formative periods of the national state. I test 
this general argument using hand-collected, municipal-level historical data from Mexico and 
Colombia, derived from previously untapped archival sources. The analysis documents a 
significant negative relationship between Catholic insurgency against the Mexican 
postrevolutionary state, spawned by a religious cleavage, and governments’ subsequent ability to 
collect tax revenues, deploy tax collectors, and broaden the tax base. The effects span both 
central and local governments and are observable to this day. I also present evidence that a deep-
seated partisan divide mapped onto geographic patterns of tax extraction in Colombia. While 
fiscal capacity grew considerably under Liberal administrations in a crucial period of institution-
building in the first half of the twentieth century, tax revenues stagnated and remain lower in 
more Conservative municipalities. These factors have robust explanatory power even after 
accounting for differences in socioeconomic development, geography, and preexisting levels of 
state capacity. The findings trace the political roots of state fiscal weakness and provide new 
insight into the process of state formation across a national territory.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 How do states gain the ability to tax? In the previous chapter, I argued that domestic 
political oppositions play a large role in the development of the state and proposed an organizing 
theoretical framework to relate those cleavages to within-country differences in state 
performance. This chapter applies core insights from this framework to taxation, which as Tilly 
wrote, “constitutes the largest intervention of governments in their subjects’ private life” (2009, 
xiii).  As I will show, the intensity of such intervention increased substantially in both Mexico 
and Colombia during relevant state-building junctures in the first half of the twentieth century. 
However, their respective fiscal states linked unevenly with society and failed to extend their 
powers uniformly across the territory, contributing to an overall dismal tax performance. Even 
by the standards of a region inhabited by “fiscal dwarfs” (Centeno 2002, 6), Mexico and 
Colombia remained poor performers throughout the twentieth century, in part due to the 
precarious foundations laid during the early incursions of the fiscal state. 
 At least since Hobbes, who alerted that the “the tenacity of the people” in “the passage of 
money to the public treasury” was one of the main diseases that endangered Leviathan and 
weakened “its life and motion,” ([1651] 1996, 228–29), scholars have identified taxation as one 
of the core functions of modern states and relied on the fiscal system to examine the social 
contract (Levi 1988; Tilly 2007). Following this prominent tradition, the chapter examines the 
sources of domestic variation in the development of fiscal institutions and tax compliance. I 
argue that the existing structure of political antagonisms as states sought to fiscally penetrate 
their societies conditioned who could be taxed and where taxpaying habits failed to take root. 
Unlike subsequent chapters that deal with individual countries, here I jointly apply this 
general argument to both of my country cases. In each case, I test my theoretical expectations 
 58 
 
using original historical datasets, which I manually compiled through intensive archival work 
and consultation of multiple unexplored primary sources. I show that the underlying theoretical 
logic of the argument maintains explanatory power in what were two otherwise quite distinct 
country contexts.  
By way of introduction, it is at this point worth explaining this relevant aspect of my 
research design. Mexico and Colombia share the outcome of states that formed highly uneven 
capacities within the territory they claimed to govern. My core argument traces this important 
development to the intensity of domestic political conflict in both countries, which imprinted a 
strong partisan character upon state-building processes and made attitudes toward state 
institutions highly variant across cleavage lines. 
However, Mexico and Colombia followed opposite political trajectories in other 
important dimensions that, in principle, could be responsible for their respective internal patterns 
of state development. Mexico retained a federal constitutional design after Liberals emerged 
victorious from the Liberal-Conservative clashes of the nineteenth century. It went through a 
social revolution that generated a broad process of popular class incorporation, spearheaded by a 
dominant-party authoritarian regime that undermined landed elites, gave the state broad 
socioeconomic responsibilities, and governed uninterruptedly throughout the twentieth century. 
After high levels of political violence in the first of half of the century, the state consolidated and 
the country developed one of the most stable authoritarian political systems in the world. The 
anticlerical Mexican state forcefully confined the Catholic Church to civil society. With respect 
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to this decisive cleavage, it found expression through a violent insurgency (the Cristero War) 
after the dominant revolutionaries closed other channels of political participation.37 
Now consider Colombia. It maintained a unitary constitutional design after Conservatives 
emerged victorious from the clashes of the nineteenth century. The state retained organic 
linkages to the Catholic Church well into the twentieth century. The two elitist parties were so 
entrenched that they remained electorally dominant even as the rise of mass politics destroyed 
party systems elsewhere. Processes of lower-class incorporation occurred within the existing 
parties, the state eschewed an ambitious socioeconomic role, and traditional elites preserved 
control over land. After a few decades of relative peace in the first half of the twentieth century, 
levels of political violence exploded in the second half as a new partisan conflict (La Violencia) 
and then guerrilla movements kept the country in a permanent state of civil war. Yet the country 
maintained a democratic public sphere and a competitive electoral system all throughout its 
history, in which the two traditional parties continually confronted each other. With respect to 
this overriding cleavage, it found expression in high levels of political violence, but also in the 
ballot box. 
Throughout the rest of the dissertation, I explain how several of these distinctive aspects 
interacted with processes of state formation in each country. It is clear that state development 
acquired, in each case, unique characteristics. Yet at a more basic level of analysis, and all these 
differences notwithstanding, the countries fall under a common theoretical logic. I demonstrate 
that in both cases it was sharp internal divisions that spawned uneven patterns of state 
development across territory and spheres of state power. The exhaustive within-country analyses 
                                                 
37
 Confessional parties were banned in the Constitution of 1917, blocking the formation of an openly Catholic-based 
political party. Although armed religious mobilization led state elites to contemplate the possibility of relaxing 
existing constraints on party politics (President Plutarco Elías Calles’s speech in Congress in September 1, 1928, as 
the Cristero War ravaged the center-west, is illustrative in this respect), the constitutional ban remained in place. 
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that form the empirical core of this dissertation are therefore embedded, at the country level, in a 
different-systems type of comparison that draws on the logic of Mill’s method of agreement 
(Gerring 2007, 139–47). The theoretical framework advanced in chapter 1 may thus be 
potentially useful in explaining state development in diverse contexts and time periods.  
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly discusses the 
importance of analyzing the strength of the state through the lens of taxation. Section 2.3 
presents the puzzle of uneven fiscal state-building in postrevolutionary Mexico. It then details 
how the religious cleavage structured the process of state formation and generated state-society 
dynamics that affected the development of fiscal institutions and societal norms of compliance 
during this critical stage. After doing so, the section proceeds to present the data and empirical 
analysis. Section 2.4 replicates this structure for the Colombian case. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Taxation and State Capacity 
There is perhaps no better manifestation of stateness than the ability to extract revenue 
from society. As Levi writes, “the history of state revenue production is the history of the 
evolution of the state” (1988, 1). In some definitions, the very boundaries of the state are 
determined by the power to tax constituents (North 1981).38 There are at least three reasons that 
make taxation a privileged window into state power.  
 First, states face considerable administrative, logistical, and cognitive challenges in 
raising compulsory payments from their populations. To overcome them, they must build a far-
reaching institutional apparatus (Weber’s “material implements” of rule and administrative 
staff); address the principal-agent problems inherent to any organization, particularly in tax 
                                                 
38
 North defines the state as “an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic 
area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents” (1981, 21). Emphasis added. 
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collection; and develop technical and administrative capabilities to register, measure, and 
ultimately render society “legible,” which lie at the core of modern infrastructural forms of 
political rule (Mann 2012; Scott 1998).39 In this first sense, fiscal indicators provide us with 
information about the level of bureaucratic development of the state organization. 
 Second, although the capacity to coerce ultimately underpins the state’s fiscal demands, 
resource extraction rests heavily on “quasi-voluntary” compliance on the part of citizens (Levi 
1988). Effective tax collection demands more than technical ability, administrative capacity, or 
credible punishment threats (Lieberman 2003). Even the most qualified tax bureaucracy would 
struggle to mobilize revenue in a context of broad societal opposition. Systemic tax evasion, after 
all, is fundamentally political. Taxation links subjects and states in relations of mutual obligation 
and is, simultaneously, the main channel through which citizens in modern societies make 
sacrifices for other members of the national community, via contributions to their common 
political authorities (Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009, 3). The level and origin of fiscal 
revenues thus speaks to the depth of state roots in society, the strength of social bonds, and the 
ability of rulers to cultivate at least a thin form of legitimacy. Put differently, the amount and 
type of taxes that a state can impose on its population are a good index of its ability to generate 
consent. 
 Third, fiscal capacity underlies every other dimension of state power. Although the intra-
country incidence of state capacity in different domains of governance does not co-vary as 
strongly as often assumed, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, the capacity to extract directly 
conditions the state’s overall ability to undertake other governance tasks. In this sense, fiscal 
capacity is a precondition of effective state power across functional realms, including the 
                                                 
39
 As Mann notes, it is no coincidence that the term “statistics” itself emerged at the end of the 18th century with the 
expansion of infrastructural capacities, as meaning “data pertaining to the state” (2012, 361).  
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maintenance of civil order and the provision of other growth-promoting public goods (Besley 
and Persson 2011; Hoffman 2015). 
2.3 Catholic Insurgency and Uneven State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico 
2.3.1 The Uneven Fiscal State in Mexico 
 The Mexican Revolution ushered in a marked period of state- and nation-making that 
took the size, scope, and capacities of the central state to unprecedented levels in Mexican 
history. A broad scholarly consensus exists that the two decades between 1920 and 1940 
represent the formative period of the modern Mexican state (Aguilar Camín and Meyer 1993). 
By the end of Lázaro Cárdenas’s presidency in 1940, major armed challenges to the 
postrevolutionary regime had ceased, central institutions had expanded and stabilized, and the 
party-state had incorporated lower- and middle-class sectors into the corporatist structures that 
characterized Mexico’s durable authoritarian regime (Garrido 1982).  
 In the fiscal arena, postrevolutionary state-building involved a substantial expansion of 
the fiscal bureaucracy, the adoption of new direct taxes—most prominently the income tax in 
1924, and a contentious process of tax centralization, through which central state elites sought to 
end “fiscal anarchy,” subordinate autonomous regional strongmen, and create an integrated 
national market (Díaz Cayeros 2006). In 1910, on the verge of the Revolution, the federal 
government collected approximately 67% of total public revenues, with the remainder distributed 
between the states, the municipalities, and the Federal District. By the late 1940s, the figure was 
up to 83%, and hence regional and local political elites were almost completely dependent on 
central transfers (Aboites 2003, 39). The centralization of fiscal powers was a key feature of the 
political economy of the postrevolutionary authoritarian regime. 
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 Other fiscal indicators also clearly reflect the increase in central state capacity occurring 
in the decades following the armed Revolution. Data collected during archival research indicate 
that tax personnel in domestic tax collection offices, for instance, more than doubled between the 
late 1920s and the late 30s.40 Actual revenues also grew, both in absolute terms and relative to 
the size of the national economy. The overall tax take of the national government averaged 3.3% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) during the last five years of the Porfirian dictatorship (1876-
1911). By the early 1940s, it had reached 6% of GDP. Given the considerable growth of the 
economy over the period, this represented a significant increase in the resources at the disposal 
of the national government. 
 Perhaps more importantly, postrevolutionary governments oversaw a decisive shift in the 
composition of taxation. Along with revenue levels, the structure of tax revenue is highly 
revealing of the capacity of the state to exert effective authority over territory and people 
(Lieberman 2002; Soifer 2015). Customs duties require a minimal degree of state capacity, as 
they can be collected simply by controlling ports and border cities. They also make governments 
highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets. By comparison, domestic indirect taxes 
demand greater territorial presence and administrative capacity, and as such signal a more 
developed tax state. Indirect levies are nevertheless easier to collect than direct taxes on income 
and wealth, which are the most visible, require far greater knowledge of society and legitimacy, 
and fall disproportionately on powerful economic interests. 
                                                 
40
 Data on tax personnel, offices, and their collected revenues come from research conducted in the Archivo General 
de la Nación (AGN) and the Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP), located in 
the National Palace. Specific printed sources located in the SHCP’s archive are listed in the Bibliography under 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (1927, 1939b, 1939a, 1940a, 1940b, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944a, 1944b, 
1945a, 1945b, 1946, 1955, 1932). In the AGN’s presidential archives, the main data sources are: Obregón-Calles, 
121-H-H-37; Abelardo Rodríguez, caja 226, exp. 650/3; Lázaro Cárdenas, caja 1062, exp. 566.1. 
 64 
 
In the Mexican case, customs duties were the main source of state revenue for the entire 
nineteenth century and up to the Revolution, a reflection of the state’s shallow roots throughout 
territory.41 Again by the early 1940s, however, the pattern had shifted. Internal taxes were now 
close to 70% of total tax revenues, and newly adopted direct taxes represented a higher 
proportion of the state’s fiscal income than ever before. Figure 2.1 below summarizes this 
decisive change. The figure shows the origin of fiscal revenue for the federal government in the 
first half of the twentieth century, distinguishing between customs duties and taxes raised 
internally. As is clear from the graph, internal taxes grew as the main source of revenue during 
postrevolutionary state-building, putting governments on a more secure fiscal footing. This is a 
clear indication of the increasing ability of the state to intervene in society. 
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 The capacity to collect domestic indirect taxes improved in the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
throughout the Porfiriato (Carmagnani 1989; Soifer 2015), without replacing customs duties as the main source of 
revenue. By 1910, internal indirect taxes represented some 30% of total national tax revenues; direct taxes came 
close to 8%. All figures in this section are author calculations based on INEGI (2015) and Estadísticas Económicas 
del Porfiriato (1965). 
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Figure 2.1.  Sources of national tax revenue in Mexico, 1900-1950 
(five-year moving averages) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on INEGI (2015) and Estadísticas económicas del porfiriato (1965). 
Internal taxes include all direct and indirect taxes collected by the federal government. Five-year 
moving averages are shown to remove year-specific fluctuations. 
 
 
 Yet crucial for this study, the substantial national-level expansion of state infrastructural 
power in the aftermath of the Revolution conceals great heterogeneity in the ability of the state to 
extract revenue across the territory. The most comprehensive study of the fiscal system suggests 
that the central government issued a blanket “fiscal pardon” to the provinces, drawing the vast 
majority of its fiscal income from Mexico City (Aboites 2003, 53–54). However, issues of data 
availability prevented the author from reaching more detailed conclusions about the territorial 
distribution of taxation.42 
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 Aboites presents evidence that central elites considered the geographic origin of federal tax collection an 
important issue, but the lack of available data leads him to speculate that the information remained confidential 
(2003, 395). The data I uncovered in the archive of the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público thus constitute an 
important contribution to the specialized literature.  
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 My data, drawn from previously untapped archival sources, allow for a deeper 
understanding of the regional variance in the central state’s fiscal strength. To my knowledge, 
this is the first study to present systematic subnational data on the federal government’s tax 
revenues for this crucial historical period. Based on estimations of state-level GDP by economic 
historians (Esquivel 1999; Germán-Soto 2005), I calculated the amount of taxes extracted by the 
national government in each Mexican state in the 1940s, relative to the size of the regional 
economy.43 Federal domestic taxes were collected by centrally-controlled tax offices throughout 
the country, whose number oscillated between 62 in 1925 and 98 in 1945. 
 The territorial jurisdiction of several tax offices crossed state boundaries, and therefore 
state-level figures are estimated with some error. The empirical analysis in the next section is 
performed at a more disaggregated level (the federal tax office) to avoid this problem. As an 
approximation, state-level estimates are nevertheless informative of the considerable unevenness 
in the central state’s fiscal capabilities across territory. Figure 2.2 below shows subnational 
variation in federal tax revenues across states in Mexico, relative to each state’s GDP. To smooth 
out the data, the graph presents average revenues for five years (1938-1942), as a share of 
regional GDP in 1940. 
 As the graph shows, by the late 1930s and early 1940s the federal government collected 
less than 1% of regional GDP in national taxes in seven out of 32 states (counting federal 
territories and Mexico City as states), and less than 2% in thirteen. In contrast, extraction was 
above 4% of regional GDP in northern states like Sonora and Chihuahua, and it surpassed 8% in 
the industrialized state of Nuevo León. It took some thirty additional years for the aggregate 
national figure to reach that level. Even today, some eighty years later, the national state has not 
                                                 
43
 Taxes levied by states and municipalities are not included. The federal government collected more than 70% of 
total public revenues in this period (Aboites 2003, 39). That said, I also analyze local government revenues below. 
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been able to expand its tax force much beyond that point (relative to the size of the economy). 
From 2005 to 2015, the federal government’s tax revenues in Mexico averaged 9.5% of GDP.44 
 
Figure 2.2.  Federal tax revenues as share of regional GDP across 
Mexican states, 1938-1942 averages 
 
Source: Federal tax revenues at the state level come from archival sources (see 
footnote 40). GDP estimates are from Esquivel (1999) and Germán-Soto (2005) 
 
 In significant parts of the country, then, the postrevolutionary state exercised little fiscal 
authority. The negligible tax contributions of several regions betray the state’s inability to forge 
uniform links to society and develop consistent administrative and cognitive capacities. Although 
the state clearly became stronger and more centralized in the decades following the Revolution, 
its ability to raise tax revenue was highly irregular throughout territory, and therefore mediocre 
even by Latin American standards (Knight 2013, 129–30). In contrast to other durable, 
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 The figure excludes oil revenues and pensions, to make it comparable with the historical figures that do not 
include these kinds of revenues either. Income taxes, consumption taxes, and other taxes levied by the federal 
government are all included. Source: Servicio de Administración Tributaria (2015) and INEGI, Cuentas Nacionales, 
series “Producto Interno Bruto, base 2008” and “Ingresos del Sector Público.” 
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authoritarian “party-state complexes,” the Mexican regime did not rest on an “effectively 
extractive” state (Slater 2010, 51). In the mid-1960s, before the major oil boom, Mexico ranked 
at the bottom of the Latin American distribution in terms of total taxation as a percentage of 
GDP (Hansen 1971, 84). Today, the Mexican state’s fiscal powers remain among the weakest in 
the region. The inability of postrevolutionary governments to coherently develop fiscal 
institutions during the formative period of the state contributed to putting Mexico in this path. 
 The uneven development of fiscal capacity in this crucial historical period of institutional 
reconstruction hamstrung the effectiveness of the postrevolutionary state in other realms, and it 
locked in a vicious circle of low fiscal income and poor public goods provision that persists to 
this day (Flores-Macías and Sánchez-Talanquer 2016). It also contributed to the consolidation of 
regionally divergent patterns of authority, with the postrevolutionary state outsourcing even core 
policing functions to unpaid semi-formal actors (see chapter 3) and periodically intervening 
“despotically” in areas where it lacked infrastructural power, so as to maintain order (Mann 
2012).45 
2.3.2 The religious cleavage and the politics of postrevolutionary state-building 
 What explains such uneven development of fiscal authority in the aftermath of 
revolutionary civil war? Responding to Mann’s call to take seriously who builds the state, for 
whom, and how (2012, 359), I argue that the structure of conflict between insiders and outsiders 
to the political coalition that reconstructed the state is a key explanatory factor. Institutional 
reconstruction took place in a highly fragmented social and cultural landscape, without external 
threats or other unifying factors inducing internal cohesion or generating broad societal 
                                                 
45
 See for example Rath (2013) for a recent revisionist account that demonstrates the continuous reliance on military 
deployment to control the countryside, especially in parts of the center-south. 
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agreement around state-building measures. The Revolution, of course, promoted a specific 
politics, in fact a deeply contentious project. Mexican society quickly re-polarized into rival 
revolutionary-versus counterrevolutionary camps, each of which carried broad popular support. 
Issues of religion were foremost in the reorganization of political oppositions. Anchoring one 
side of a sharp cleavage, the anticlerical state—like its French counterpart had done—set out to 
uproot Catholicism in a predominantly Catholic country, remake citizens, and subordinate a 
powerful Catholic Church.  
 The receptiveness to the new state would thus markedly across territory, depending on 
the sociocultural characteristics of communities and the distribution of political attachments. 
Factors like the relative strength of the Catholic Church across territory and the degree of 
popular religiosity, which were largely out of the control of state-builders in the early period of 
state formation, greatly shaped their ability to link with society and legitimize state rule. This 
uneven record at generating societal compliance during the state’s formative period set off 
different trajectories of institutional development. 
 The politics of the Mexican postrevolutionary state were determined by the outcome of 
civil war. After winning the Revolution, a coalition dominated by warring elites from northern 
Mexico set out to reestablish political order and transform society through a more powerful state. 
In a pattern reminiscent of the Italian experience of national unification (Tarrow 1996; Ziblatt 
2006), the victorious Northerners conquered regions that had either supported rival revolutionary 
factions or remained quiescent. In many central and southern areas, they were perceived as an 
occupying force, “as foreign as American troops” (Womack 1969, 258). However, the coalition 
in control of the emerging state was “keen to incorporate the benighted, provincial south” 
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(Knight 1986, 236–37) into the revolutionary project, whose core components were state 
anticlericalism, agrarian redistribution, and federal schooling.46 
As I argued in chapter 1, it is crucial to understand the cleavages that structured domestic 
politics during state-building, and this requires attention to the political interests, views, and 
motivations that dominated the state-building coalition. Though often portrayed as a “petty 
bourgeoisie” in socioeconomic interpretations of the Revolution (Córdova 1978), more than 
purely material class interests divided northern state-builders and their social bases from other 
segments of society. To be sure, many of their political preferences reflected their rising middle-
class status, which pitted them against the old, landed Porfirian oligarchy and pushed them into 
pragmatic alliances with mobilized peasants and workers to establish political control. However, 
their stance is best understood as resulting from “a bundle of cultural attributes” which, though 
linked to class, “relate to education, religion, place of origin, and location within the 
revolutionary process” (Knight 1986, 230).  
Indeed, northern revolutionaries, influenced by American capitalism and Protestant ideas, 
shared a more urban, entrepreneurial, developmentalist, and secular—when not outright 
anticlerical—political outlook than was typical in other  regions of Mexico, where the force of 
tradition was stronger and the Catholic Church had exerted greater influence since colonial times 
(Aguilar Camín 1999; Blancarte 1992; Butler 2007).  The middle-class status, national 
aspirations, and inclination for bureaucratic rule of northern revolutionary elites, for example, 
contrasted with the lower-class and more parochial character of southern agrarian movements.  
 Yet the deepest political opposition of the postrevolutionary period was with what new 
state elites saw as a backward traditional culture dominated by Catholic “fanaticism.” Key 
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 I join Fallaw and others in considering these three as the distinctive components of the postrevolutionary state’s 
project, as opposed to governance objectives pursued by states in general (Fallaw 2013, 4).      
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figures in the state-building coalition blamed social and economic backwardness on habits, 
views, and attachments intrinsically linked to Catholic belief (Bantjes 1998; Becker 1995). In 
this interpretation, with ideological roots in the Enlightenment and the battles of nineteenth-
century Liberals, the Church’s pervasive influence was responsible for maintaining the masses in 
a state of ignorance, fostering their subordination to oppressive landlords, and instilling a poor 
work ethic that stood in the way of modernization and development.47 Military victory during the 
Revolution only reinforced the sense of cultural superiority among new state elites. 
Their antipathy toward Catholicism and the Church further deepened over the course of 
the Revolution and its aftermath, as the Church had sided with the old regime and, not 
unfoundedly, was seen as trying to undermine the new state (Knight 2007). Through this 
combination of factors, anticlericalism became a staple feature of postrevolutionay state-
building. What followed was a highly polarizing, dialectical struggle between church and state 
for institutional supremacy and social control, fought during the 1920s and 1930s both in the 
battlefield and through non-violent forms of contestation.  
 State-builders’ anticlerical, modernizing ideology led to the adoption of stringent 
restrictions on religious practice, as well as outright persecution and harassment of priests and 
Catholic militants. As I explore in more detail in chapter 4, their worldview also shaped state 
activity in a range of policy domains, notably education and agrarian reform. Federal teachers 
were deployed as a revolutionary vanguard, in charge of transforming the countryside, 
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 The postrevolutionary regime sought to insert itself in a long lineage of patriotic, popular Liberalism (historically 
articulated against the clerical-conservative camp) and explicitly claimed the legacy of nineteenth-century Liberals, 
who had separated church and state after their victory over Conservatives in the War of the Reform (1857-1860) and 
the Second Franco-Mexican War (1861-1867). Tensions between church and state thus ran deep in Mexican history, 
but the conflict acquired new levels of polarization and intensity in the postrevolutionary period for various reasons. 
First, many revolutionary anticlericals, in contrast to classic Liberals, did not simply want to confine religion to the 
private sphere, but to eradicate Catholic belief; second, both church and state now engaged in mass politics; third, 
the revolutionary state penetrated territory and engaged with civil society more deeply than its predecessors. Its 
anticlericalism was thus much more disruptive of local life, and it represented a more serious challenge to the 
Church’s social control. See Knight (2010); and the essays in Butler (2007). 
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“extirpating fanaticism,” and replacing priests as the regulators of local life.48 Like in other 
revolutions, the new regime thus aspired to ignite a thorough cultural transformation of society 
and remake its subjects, replacing religion with new civic rituals, recasting identities, and 
transferring citizen loyalty and obedience from the Church to the state (Bantjes 1997). 
In several parts of the territory, these efforts at social engineering clashed with 
entrenched values and were deeply disruptive of everyday life, thereby sowing distrust and 
precipitating strong defensive reactions (Fallaw 2013). For many Mexicans whose political 
preferences and lifestyles were premised on their Catholicism, noncompliance with a radically 
anticlerical state became close to a moral obligation. At the organizational level, anti-regime 
contention along the religious cleavage led to cycles of mobilization and counter-mobilization, 
becoming an importance force behind the unification of revolutionary elites into an official party 
in the late 1920s, the ancestor to the modern PRI (Knight 1992).49 Violence from Catholic 
militants against leading political figures (including the assassination of famous revolutionary 
general Álvaro Obregón in 1928, after having been reelected for a second presidential term) 
further reinforced the sense of threat among state-builders and their antagonism with the Church. 
 It was this cleavage, then, anchored in matters of religion and Church influence, that 
principally structured political life and loyalties during the formative decades of the 
postrevolutionary state. As historian Alan Knight writes, “as anticlericalism gathered strength, 
culminating in the Calles presidency (1924-8)...so the Catholic versus anticlerical, Cristero 
versus Callista, ‘reactionary’ versus revolutionary dichotomy came to dominate Mexican 
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 The phrase belongs to Emilio Portes Gil (1935, 5), president of Mexico from 1928 to 1930. See chapter 4 in this 
dissertation. 
49
 I further discuss the role of religious counter-revolutionary mobilization as a spur for party-building in chapter 4, 
section 4.3. As I explain there, this interpretation of the rise of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), although 
taken into account by some authors, is different from what the conventional wisdom suggests—namely, that the 
party emerged as an institutional solution to problems of elite circulation and factional dispute within the 
revolutionary camp. I argue that Catholic mobilization was critical for revolutionaries to coalesce.  
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politics...Mexican politics acquired a distinctly Manichaean dimension” (2010, 241–42). 
Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate the pervasive effects of this struggle on state 
development across territory. 
 
The Cristero War 
 The most prominent manifestation of the religious cleavage structuring postrevolutionary 
state formation came with the Catholic “Cristero” War (1926-1929), the last full-fledged civil 
war fought in Mexican territory and the single most important challenge to the new state’s rule.50 
Under Calles—architect of the Mexican party-state—and his handpicked successors, the central 
government and its regional allies imposed a series of Jacobin anticlerical measures that included 
restrictions on the number of priests, prohibitions on Catholic education, the registration of 
Church property, and direct state supervision over religious affairs (Bailey 1974; Butler 2004; J. 
Meyer 1994). The Church reacted by suspending religious service, prompting lay Catholics to 
rebellion. The conflict escalated into a three-year war that caused between 70,000 and 85,000 
battle deaths. Of these, some 60% were on the side of the federal army, despite its material 
superiority (J. Meyer 1995, 260–66).  
 The war involved massive displacement, aerial bombing of entire communities, and both 
major battles and irregular warfare. The federal army exploited deep-seated factional divisions 
between neighboring towns and relied upon local paramilitary groups to combat the Cristeros 
(see chapter 3), promising land in return. The epicenter of the insurgency was the pious and 
agriculturally productive Bajío region in the center-west, but armed conflict spread to other areas 
in north-central and southern Mexico. At its peak, around 50,000 Cristeros were up in arms 
                                                 
50  
To recall, the War owes its name to rebels’ battle cry of “Long live Christ the King!” 
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fighting the federal government, about half in large organized regiments and the rest in scattered 
rebel bands of various sizes (J. Meyer 1976, 49). The Cristero forces were deeply embedded in 
local society, forming “a federation of republics, of communities in arms” (J. Meyer 1995, 7). 
Broad popular support allowed rebels to successfully sustain guerrilla warfare, and they 
developed sophisticated governance institutions in areas of the center and center-west that fell 
out of state control.  
Religious violence provided an umbrella for other counterrevolutionary interests affected 
by state policy, especially by political centralization and agrarian reform. Most clearly in pockets 
of the south-west, conservative coalitions of landlords and displaced local political elites 
emerged to support the Church and lay believers, not necessarily out of pure religious conviction. 
Local vendettas and the peripheral violence typical of civil wars also played a role (Kalyvas 
2006; Purnell 1999). Even in these cases, however, grievances were codified in religious terms, 
an indication of the overriding salience of the religious divide and its mobilizing capacity. 
 Moreover, despite some class-based arguments that attribute the Cristero rebellion to 
landlord manipulation of the peasantry (an interpretation promoted by the authoritarian regime 
itself), there is a broad scholarly consensus that it was a genuinely grassroots, cross-class 
movement, fought by peasants in defense of local cultures that were deeply rooted in Catholic 
tradition (Bailey 1974; Butler 2004; Knight 1994b; J. Meyer 1994). Harsh repression by federal 
troops during the Cristero War reinforced hostility against the state among political Catholics, 
and recent qualitative studies indicate that vivid memories of the conflict have been passed down 
across generations in the families of those who experienced it (Young 2015; see footnote 31 in 
chapter 1). 
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The Cristero rebellion ended not by military defeat, but after a set of agreements between 
the state and the Church hierarchy that were opposed by grassroots Cristeros. Predictably, unrest 
and suspicion of the state did not disappear. In the 1930s, the implementation of “socialist” 
education during Cárdenas’s administration (1934-1940) reignited tensions, producing a second 
yet weaker and more fragmented wave of Catholic uprisings. Even as violent opposition 
subsided, however, Catholics continued to resent the state and engage in various forms of 
contention. These efforts were coordinated through church-based networks and more formal 
mass civil society organizations, which the Church had promoted in a type of “Catholic counter-
corporatism” that ultimately pushed the postrevolutionary state to moderate its Jacobinism 
(Fallaw 2013, 146).51 After the failure of violence, the Church promoted what Fallaw calls a 
“radial strategy” of decentralized resistance (6), focused on undermining the regime’s legitimacy 
over the long run.   
As discussed in the introductory chapter, areas of Catholic mobilization during the state’s 
formative period would also become strongholds of right-wing partisan opponents to the official 
party, most notably, but not exclusively, the National Action Party (PAN). The formation and 
survival of the PAN and other conservative social and political organizations under the 
inauspicious conditions created by the authoritarian regime is a testament to the deep roots of 
Catholic opposition the postrevolutionary party-state (Loaeza 1999). As this makes clear, the 
religious cleavage continued to shape attitudes and behaviors toward the new state, and I argue 
that it stunted the development of norms and habits of tax compliance during this crucial 
historical period when, given the unprecedented efforts to build an internal tax base, the Mexican 
population’s relationship with the fiscal state was taking form. 
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 Students of contentious politics have long noted the potential for Church structures, religious networks, and their 
associated ideologies to support social movements. As Tarrow writes, “with its sprawling structures and official 
dogma, the Catholic Church has long provided a home for...movements” (2011, 136). 
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In this way, the new Mexican state failed to elicit consent among a sizable bloc of 
Mexican society just as it was developing its core institutions, including fiscal ones. As I show 
below, this had lasting consequences for its ability to collect taxes across territory. Because the 
Cristero War was the most visible and systematic manifestation of Catholic opposition to state-
building, the analysis relies on a new dataset of the conflict to measure the religious cleavage. 
2.3.3 Data 
Federal fiscal capacity 
 The main type of data in the empirical analysis below are measures of fiscal capacity. 
Based on previously untapped historical documents, which I located in the archive of the 
Ministry of Finance, I assembled a territorially-disaggregated dataset on federal tax revenues and 
the distribution of the national fiscal bureaucracy for the postrevolutionary period.52 These 
documents have not been properly classified or described in archival catalogues. As explained 
above, neither had they been located or analyzed by historians or other students of Mexico’s 
authoritarian regime (see footnote 42). However, they contain valuable information about the 
construction and functioning of the fiscal apparatus in the crucial decades that followed the 
Mexican Revolution. My dataset is therefore an important contribution in and of itself, and it 
permits original empirical analysis of a key dimension of state-building.  
 The fiscal data for the federal government are the most important given my argument, 
which centrally concerns the formation of national state structures, and because the federal 
government collected the vast majority of taxes (Aboites 2003). In the models below, I rely on 
measures of federal fiscal capacity for 1940, about a decade after the end of the Cristero 
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 See footnote 40 above for detailed sources. 
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War.53As mentioned above, historians typically consider the 1920s and 1930s as the critical 
decades of state formation. From then on, institutional continuity and political stability under the 
dominant party authoritarian regime were the norm. 
 The unit of analysis in empirical tests of the national state’s fiscal strength throughout its 
territory is the tax office. Domestic federal taxes—including direct and indirect levies—were 
collected by tax offices located across the country. In 1940, there were a total of 59 offices in all 
of Mexico’s 32 states (including Mexico City with four offices). Each office was in charge of a 
given geographic area that sometimes crossed state boundaries and that typically spanned several 
municipalities. Tax offices are thus an intermediate level of analysis, above the municipality but 
below the state. The tax office is the lowest level at which tax collection figures were recorded 
by national fiscal authorities. 
 Because I collected other variables at the municipality level, to perform the analysis I 
first assigned each municipality to its corresponding federal tax office, using maps and other 
relevant information from official historical records (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
1939b). I then calculated relevant quantities of each variable at the tax office level. For example, 
the main explanatory variable in models of federal fiscal capacity is calculated as the share of 
municipalities within the area covered by each tax office that experienced insurgency during the 
Cristero War.  
 Although the sample size is relatively small, then, it should be noticed that this is the 
lowest possible level of disaggregation and that all other variables in the models contain detailed 
information about the municipalities within each tax office. For each unit, I calculated two main 
fiscal indicators: per capita domestic tax revenues and the number of tax personnel per 10,000 
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 I collected data through 1945. As I explain, I choose 1940 because for this year detailed information about the 
territorial jurisdiction of each tax office is available. However, the inter-temporal correlations (post-1940) are strong 
when data are aggregated at the state level, which suggests observed patterns tended to persist. 
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citizens, both for 1940. Per capita revenues are the best measure of the national state’s actual 
fiscal performance. The variable includes only taxes raised internally. Customs revenues were 
collected by a different set of offices in border cities and are not included in the analysis. The 
second indicator provides information on state elites’ intentions or level of extractive effort 
throughout the country. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis of the Mexican 
case can be found in Table 2.4 in the Appendix. 
 
Local fiscal capacity 
 In addition to testing the association between religious armed resistance and the national 
state’s fiscal capacity, I perform two additional empirical exercises. To investigate if Cristero 
insurgency is also associated with the extractive capacity of local governments, I estimate 
models with municipal fiscal performance as the dependent variable. Based on documents 
obtained during archival research in Mexico’s National Archive (AGN), I hand-coded, for each 
municipality, the local government’s revenue from different sources in 1945, including property 
tax revenues, indirect taxes, fees, transfers, and other types of revenue.54 To my knowledge, this 
is also the first comprehensive source of data on local government finances at the municipality 
level for this important historical period. I use these data to calculate two indicators: total per 
capita municipal government revenue, net of federal and state transfers; and per capita property 
tax revenue. A map displaying the variation in the first indicator appears as Figure 2.7 in the 
Appendix at the end of the chapter.  
                                                 
54
 The archival materials from which I obtained local revenues report data for municipalities in which total local 
government revenue exceeded MX $2,000 in 1945. This leaves out very small municipalities, mostly from the 
southern state of Oaxaca, whose revenues from all sources (including transfers) were below that figure. For 
reference, average municipal revenue in 1945 was MX $75,470. The data were obtained from the following archival 
records: AGN, Ávila Camacho, 522.1/1 ; AGN, Alemán Valdés, 522.1/1. The bad condition of the relevant archival 
materials made hand-coding the only possible way of recovering the data. 
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Long-term fiscal capacity 
 Finally, I investigate whether Catholic resistance to the postrevolutionary state is 
systematically correlated with national government fiscal performance in the contemporary 
period. Like with the historical data, this part of the analysis is conducted at the federal tax office 
level, which is the lowest layer at which fiscal data are compiled.55 I obtained data from the 
Mexican tax administration agency (Servicio de Administración Tributaria, SAT) to calculate 
two indicators of the national state’s capacity to fiscally penetrate society.56 
 The first is per capita income tax revenues, which is introduced into the models as a five-
year average starting in 2000. I use this year because it marks the end of the authoritarian regime 
born from the Revolution, with the defeat of the PRI in the presidential election to the right-wing 
PAN. The second measure is the number of people registered as individual taxpayers (“personas 
físicas”), as a share of the total population living within the area covered by a given tax office. 
This indicator is also calculated as a five-year average starting in 2008, which is the first 
available data point. It represents a good measure of the “cognitive” capabilities of the state in 
the basic function of registering citizens to collect taxes from them. 
 
Independent variable 
 Given that the religious cleavage manifested itself through violent insurgency between 
1926 and 1929, I capture the spatial distribution of this underlying divide using a new dataset on 
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 Tax collection offices in Mexico City (Centro DF, Norte DF, Oriente DF, Sur DF) are excluded from the analysis 
(see footnote 59 below). Three tax offices have territorial jurisdiction over the area covered by the municipality of 
Guadalajara, the country’s second largest city (Guadalajara, Guadalajara Sur, and Zapopan). This makes it 
impossible to assign the municipality of Guadalajara to a single tax office, which is a necessary step to calculate the 
relevant quantities for the independent variables. To avoid losing data or arbitrarily assigning the Guadalajara 
municipality to one of the three offices (which would induce large measurement error), I merged the three offices 
and their corresponding municipalities into a single observation. I followed the same procedure for the two federal 
tax collection offices in the state of Puebla (Puebla Norte and Puebla Sur), given that they both have jurisdiction 
over the state capital. 
56
 The data were obtained through freedom of information requests. 
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the incidence of rebellious activity in this period. The main measure is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if violent events related to the conflict took place in the municipality, local 
residents took up arms against the government, or if they actively provided support to the rebels. 
Municipalities where no violent events occurred, citizens did not participate in the insurgency, or 
rebels did not assert control, received the value of zero.  
 The data were hand-coded for each municipality using multiple secondary sources, 
starting with Meyer’s classic work (1994, 1995) and complementing it with over a dozen 
regional and local studies that provide information not originally covered by Meyer. A complete 
list of consulted sources appears in the Bibliography at the end of the study. Overall, insurgent 
activity could be traced in approximately a quarter of all municipalities existing at the time. 
 While quantifying a complex historical process with a dummy variable has obvious 
limitations, this approach nevertheless allows me to conduct systematic comparative analysis for 
units with and without insurgency and comprehensively test the connection with the 
development of fiscal capacity. The dataset is the most disaggregated and precisely identified 
source on the geographic distribution of the Cristero War to date. A map depicting the 
geographic distribution of insurgency at the municipality level appears below as Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3.  Geography of the Cristero War (1926-1929) 
 
Note: For clarity, municipal boundaries are not shown. Dark areas depict municipalities that experienced insurgency. Municipalities that did not exist at the time 
of the Cristero War appear in white.
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Other variables 
 In addition to these explanatory and dependent variables, I include other measures to 
control for possible confounders, that is, factors that could jointly determine fiscal capacity and 
the incidence of violence. The first is the level of socioeconomic development. As explained in 
the introductory chapter, economic development is itself a function of state capacity (Johnson 
and Koyama 2017). I nevertheless include it as a control in several specifications in order to 
isolate the direct effect of the religious cleavage on the ability to accumulate further tax capacity, 
and to show that negative associations between insurgency and fiscal extraction are not simply 
due to differences in economic wealth between regions. Notice, however, that any negative 
association between religious insurgency and development would make it harder to find a 
significant independent effect of insurgency. If the Cristero War variable remains significant 
after accounting for economic differences between regions, it will be a clear indication that 
levels of tax extraction were not simply a function of economic activity.  
 To account for differences in economic wealth across units, I use the share of the 
population in the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. I obtained data for each 
municipality from the 1940 census and then calculated the respective population share for each 
tax office. This measure is strongly correlated with available GDP estimates at the state level ( 
= 0.8, p<0.001), which confirms it is a very good proxy for development.57 
 I also consider the potential impact of population density and rough terrain, which as 
explained above, have been argued to influence both state outcomes and the probability of 
insurgency. Population density was calculated using the 1930 census and data on the surface area 
of municipalities, obtained from INEGI. To precisely assess the impact of geography, I collected 
                                                 
57
 There are no historical GDP data for municipalities. 
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data on the altitude of the city or town serving as the seat of government in each municipality, 
and then calculated the standard deviation for municipalities within each tax office. This 
indicator captures the difficulty posed by the terrain in a given area better than alternative 
measures, like average or maximum elevation, and also other relevant characteristics of the land 
like suitability for agriculture. In regressions run at the municipal level, the measure of terrain 
roughness is the standard deviation of the altitude of all population settlements existing within 
the municipality in 2010. 
 An important concern in estimating the relationship between armed resistance to 
postrevolutionary state efforts and fiscal power is that both variables might be determined by 
preexisting levels of state capacity, emerging from the historical development of the state up to 
the twentieth century. Several important works on Latin American state-building focus on the 
nineteenth century to explain long-term patterns of state strength (e.g. Soifer 2015). Following 
this logic, internal patterns of state capacity might have also been definitively established in this 
historical period. It is thus reasonable to worry that both the geography of insurgency and fiscal 
performance stem from this underlying, longstanding variation. 
 To address this concern about potential reverse causation, I obtained data on the number 
of government officials under the Porfirian dictatorship in each municipality, using the 1900 
census. As a measure of preexisting state capacity, I calculated the density of bureaucrats per 
1,000 people in the area covered by tax collection offices. This is a good indicator of the 
historical presence of the prerevolutionary state, and therefore it helps isolate the effect of 
religious conflict during state reconstruction from preexisting differences. 
 A final concern about potential endogeneity or selection is that variation in state fiscal 
capacity responded to prior and more consequential instances of violence or insurgency, which in 
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turn are also associated to the incidence of Cristero resistance to the postrevolutionary state. Dell 
shows a systematic negative association between insurgency in the period 1910-1918 and both 
long-run economic development and alternations in power between different parties (2012), 
which suggests that revolutionary violence itself might have had important implications for the 
development of state capacity. If violence also tended to recur in the same spatial locations, 
contention during the state-building period—as captured by my measure of Cristero 
insurgency—could be secondary to the effects of the armed phase of the Revolution. 
 To untangle the relationship between these two episodes of conflict and the 
psotrevolutionary state’s fiscal capacity, I include a binary indicator of whether the municipality 
experienced insurgent violence during the armed phase of the Revolution between 1910 and 
1917. I hand-coded this variable for 2,176 municipalities relying on multiple national, regional, 
and local histories of the Revolution.58 This dataset extends Dell’s coding of 217 municipalities 
(2012) to the entire country and represents the most complete and disaggregated quantitative 
source on the Mexican Revolution available to date. Because this is an important data 
contribution of this study, I include a map of this variable as Figure 2.8 in the chapter Appendix. 
                                                 
58
 Following Dell’s definition, a municipality was considered to have insurgent activity if “its citizens used violent 
force in a sustained attempt to subvert representatives of the Mexican government (i.e. local authorities and the 
military) or to confiscate others’ property” (2012).  
 Establishing the geography of historical revolutionary violence at this level of disaggregation of course entailed 
a number of significant challenges, and making informed judgment calls was inevitable. In the vast majority of 
cases, however, clearly identifying the municipalities that experienced insurgency in each state was possible by 
triangulating between different sources. Consulted sources included INAFED’s Encyclopedia of Mexican 
Municipalities (2010), canonical works on the Mexican Revolution, military histories, biographies, memoirs, and 
multiple secondary sources focused on specific states and regions.  
 I first used geographic references in the sources to code the location of insurrections and violent events, 
following conservative coding criteria. Municipalities were coded positively only when clear indication existed that 
it witnessed violent acts of resistance. For example, when an armed group passed through a municipality but no 
evidence existed that local inhabitants actively participated in insurgent activity, I did not code the municipality 
positively. After this initial step, I used municipalities’ names to conduct a comprehensive search of each 
municipality with missing data. 
 Ultimately, information could not be traced for approximately 200 of the current municipalities in the country 
(less than 10% of the total). For all other cases, a list with information for each municipality that experienced 
violence or insurgent activity, as well as the relevant source and page number that supports the coding, is available 
from the author. I thank Ana Paula Peñalva for her excellent research assistance with this part of the present study. 
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2.3.4 Results 
 I start the empirical analysis by estimating a series of ordinary-least-squares models of 
the form: 
                              
      , 
 
where revenuei is the natural log of per capita tax revenue in tax office i in 1940. insurgencyi 
measures the share of municipalities within office i where rebellion occurred during the Cristero 
War. Xi is a vector of control variables, and    is the coefficient of interest. 
 Table 2.1 presents the results. Models include all 55 federal tax offices in the country, 
with the exception of those in Mexico City.59 Column 1 reports the unconditional relationship 
between the share of municipalities that experienced insurgency during the Cristero War and 
state fiscal capacity a decade later. The coefficient is statistically different from zero at standard 
levels and indicates that, on average, tax revenues per head were lower in areas where rebellion 
had been more prevalent. In the next two columns, I include other covariates to check the 
robustness of this result. Column 2 adds the measures of socioeconomic development and the 
roughness of terrain. 
 Column 3 reports an extended specification that includes controls for population density, 
preexisting levels of state capacity as measured by the 1900 density of public employees, and the 
share of municipalities that experienced violence during the armed phase of the Revolution.
                                                 
59
 Mexico City was historically not administratively divided into municipalities and therefore data is unavailable for 
most of the explanatory variables. Since the argument concerns the reach of the state, focusing on extraction without 
considering the capital is also appropriate from a theoretical standpoint. That said, adding tax collection for the four 
offices in Mexico City and introducing it in the models as a single unit does not change the results. 
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Table 2.1.  Linear models of fiscal capacity in Mexico, 1940-2012 
 
Dependent variable: Ln per capita 
domestic federal tax revenues 1940  
DV: tax 
collectors per 
1,000 citizens 
1940 
 
DV: Ln per capita 
municipal 
 tax revenues 
1945 
 
DV: per capita 
mun property 
tax revenues 
1945 
  
DV: Average 
per capita 
income tax (log) 
(2000-04) 
  
DV: 
taxpayers, 
% pop 
(2008-2012) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Cristero insurgency
a
 -0.012* -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 
-0.008** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
-0.11*** 
 
-0.006* 
 
-0.06* 
 
(-2.39) (-4.26) (-3.86) (-2.72)  (-5.04)  (-8.98) (-2.05)  (-2.48) 
Pop industry and 
commerce (% 1940) 
 
0.36*** 0.35*** 
 
0.061 
 
0.08*** 
 
0.002 
 
0.17** 
 
1.65** 
 
(9.29) (7.24)  (1.18)  (10.39)  (0.67)  (3.15)  (3.30) 
Terrain roughness
b
 
 
-0.001* -0.001* 
 
-0.001
†
 
 
-0.0002* 
 
-0.00009* 
 
-0.0009
†
 
 
-0.009* 
  
(-2.57) (-2.16) 
 
(-1.76) 
 
(-2.48) 
 
(-1.97) 
 
(-1.89) 
 
(-2.31) 
Pop. density (1930) 
  
-0.006 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.00004 
 
0.0004
†
 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.03** 
  
 (-0.96)  (-1.4)  (-0. 23)  (1.92)  (-0.17)  (2.57) 
Bureaucrats per 1,000 
(1900) 
  
0.012 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.08*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.09 
  
(0.39)  (4.57)  (7.55)  (3.48)  (-0.88)  (-0.29) 
Revolution insurgency
a
 
  
-0.0002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.09** 
 
0.03
†
 
 
0.0004 
 
0.04 
   
(-0.07)  (-0.21)  (3.46)  (1.78)  (0.11)  (1.03) 
Constant 2.07*** 0.7* 0.78* 
 
1.71** 
 
0.65*** 
 
0.1*** 
 
6.79*** 
 
19.27*** 
 
(10.8) (2.49) (2.16) 
 
(3.4) 
 
(23.33) 
 
(5.87) 
 
(21.89) 
 
(5.38) 
R
2
 0.12 0.7 0.71 
 
0.53 
 
0.41 
 
0.13 
 
0.41 
 
0.65 
Observations 55 55 55 
 
55 
 
1, 247 
 
1, 246 
 
55 
 
56 
Each model is an OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The parentheses contain t statistics. 
a
 In models 1-4 and 7-8, Cristero insurgency is coded as the share of municipalities that experienced insurgency within the area covered by a federal tax collection office. In 
models 5 and 6 the unit of analysis is the municipality and the variable indicates whether the municipality experienced insurgency (binary). 
b
 In models 5 and 6 represents the standard deviation of localities within a municipality. In other columns, it is the standard deviation of the altitude of all towns serving as 
seats of municipal government within a tax office.  
†
 p<0.1,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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 Both the estimated coefficient for the Cristero insurgency variable and the standard error 
remain stable across specifications. The coefficient in column 3 implies that for every percentage 
point increase in the share of municipalities that experienced insurgency, national government 
revenues per head decrease by 1.1%.60 To help appreciate the substantive importance of this 
result, a one standard deviation increase in the measure of Cristero insurgency is associated with 
a reduction of approximately 35% in per capita tax revenues. Controlling for potential 
confounding factors does not change this conclusion.  
 In Figure 2.4 below, I show this core result graphically. The plot shows the partial 
correlation between the share of municipalities that rebelled during the Cristero War and per 
capita federal tax revenues in 1940, while holding constant socioeconomic development, levels 
of state presence before the Revolution, and all the other variables in column 3 of Table 2.1.61 
 
                                                 
60
 Given that I estimate log-level models, the exact percent change in the outcome variable for a one-unit change in 
the predictor is given by the formula:                                  
61
 The graph is constructed by computing residuals from regressing the outcome variable on the explanatory 
variables while omitting the variable of interest (in this case Cristero insurgency), and then plotting them against the 
residuals from regressing the target explanatory variable against the other explanatory variables. The axes in Figure 
2.4 include both negative and positive numbers because the residuals are centered at zero. 
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Figure 2.4.  Partial relationship between Cristero War insurgency (1926-
1929) and federal fiscal capacity in 1940 
 
Note: The plot shows the adjusted relationship between religious insurgency and per capita federal tax 
revenues, holding constant other determinants of fiscal capacity included in model 3 of Table 2.1. The 
axes include negative numbers because the plot is constructed by computing residuals that are centered 
at zero (see footnote 61).  
 
 The most consistently significant control variables are the levels of socioeconomic 
development and terrain roughness. As expected, the national state extracted more per head in 
wealthier regions. Difficult terrain is negatively associated with the state’s fiscal performance, 
which lends support to geographic arguments. The estimated coefficients for population density, 
levels of state capacity prior to the Revolution, and revolutionary insurgency are not statistically 
different from zero when federal tax intake is the outcome variable. 
 The results in columns 1-3 support the argument that patterns of popular resistance to the 
ideologies and policies of postrevolutionary state builders shaped the internal development of 
extractive capacity. However, as an output-based measure, per capita tax revenue reflects both 
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qualities of state infrastructure as well as society’s willingness to comply (Fukuyama 2013). 
From this result it is not possible to determine whether insurgency affected state investments in 
fiscal and administrative capabilities, or instead the state made uniform efforts throughout 
territory that resulted in uneven outcomes due to differences in tax compliance.  
 To gain more insight into the state’s intentions and allocation of infrastructural resources 
to implement tax policy, column 4 replicates the specification in column 3 but with the number 
of tax collectors per 10,000 citizens as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the prevalence 
of Cristero insurgency is negative and precisely estimated. A one standard deviation increase in 
this variable is associated with a decrease in the density of tax collectors per population of 0.27. 
This result lends support to the institutional mechanism outlined in section 1.2 of chapter 1, 
holding that the structure of political conflict in which state-builders are embedded leads them to 
make uneven investments in state infrastructure across territory. The central state appears to have 
deliberately maintained a thinner fiscal presence in areas where Catholic antipathy to the new 
state had spawned rebellion, possibly anticipating poorer returns to fiscal efforts and/or in an 
attempt to buy popular quiescence.  
 Notice, however, that this does not constitute evidence against the “bottom-up,” 
attitudinal mechanism that, in my theoretical framework, also connects sharp cleavages to 
subnational state capacity outcomes. To the contrary, state-builders appear to have incorporated 
political Catholics’ disinclination to cooperate with the postrevolutionary state into their very 
decisions about the allocation of institutional effort. Through these interrelated channels, the 
struggle between insiders and outsiders to the state-building coalition had strong fiscal effects. 
 Interestingly, the number of public employees per 1,000 in 1900 is positively correlated 
with the density of tax personnel in 1940, suggesting relative stability in patterns of bureaucratic 
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deployment between the pre- and postrevolutionary periods. Taking this continuity into account, 
however, does not alter the conclusion that the structure of political conflict after the Revolution 
had a substantial independent impact on the development of fiscal institutions. 
 Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2.1 examine the relationship between the Cristero Rebellion 
and local fiscal capacity in the mid-1940s. Municipal governments accounted for less than 5% of 
total government expenditures in 1945. Despite their poverty, they were responsible for 
important state functions, including public safety, sanitation, and other public goods. This part of 
the analysis tests if armed resistance shaped fiscal performance at the local level and serves as a 
robustness check. The sample size increases to some 1,250 observations for which it was 
possible to recover historical data from the archives (see footnote 54 above). The main 
independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the municipality 
experienced insurgency between 1926 and 1929.  
 The coefficients for both (log) municipal revenues per capita and (log) property tax 
revenues per head are negative and significant at conventional levels, after controlling for 
potential confounders. This suggests that local extractive capacity, like the national state’s, 
tended to lag behind in areas that experienced greater armed mobilization. The effects are large, 
as per capita municipal revenues were 13% lower on average in municipalities that participated 
in the Cristero War. 
 
Long-term effects 
 As a final exercise, I investigate whether historical patterns of religious contention, as 
captured by Cristero insurgency, are systematically associated with contemporary fiscal 
outcomes. Columns 7 and 8 in Table 2.1 test for this possibility. As before, the analysis is 
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conducted at the tax office level. The outcome variable in column 7 is the (log) per capita income 
tax revenue within each federal tax office, averaged from 2000 to 2004, the first five years after 
the end of the postrevolutionary authoritarian regime. Figures include business and personal 
income taxes. Focusing on the personal income tax exclusively would be a better measure of the 
ability to fiscally penetrate society, but data are not available. Nevertheless, the coefficient for 
the Cristero War indicator is negative and statistically significant. The relationship is 
substantively important, as one standard deviation increase in the share of municipalities with 
insurgency is associated with approximately 20% lower income tax revenues per person.62 A 
graphical representation of the partial correlation between these variables, holding the other 
factors included in model 7 constant, appears in the Appendix as Figure 2.6.   
 Column 8 reports results for the model with the average share of the total population that 
were registered as individual taxpayers between 2008 and 2012.63 This variable captures the 
extent to which citizens in a given geographical area “exist” for the state for fiscal purposes, and 
therefore it is a good indicator of state strength. The Cristero War coefficient is negative and 
precisely estimated, with a one standard deviation increase in the share of municipalities that 
experienced rebellion between 1926-1929 associated with a two percentage point decrease in the 
share of the population that are registered to pay taxes in the contemporary period. Although the 
exact mechanism cannot be investigated from these data, the long-run correlation is suggestive of 
an entrenched culture of noncompliance with tax obligations in some regions, which dates back 
to political struggles during the formative years of the state. 
                                                 
62
 The exact percent change in the outcome variable is given by the formula:                   
 0.00633 4  2    
63
 As mentioned above, 2008 was the first available year from the Tax Administration Service (SAT). 
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 Overall, these empirical results are consistent with the argument that the cleavages 
structuring postrevolutionary state-building, and in particular spatial patterns of societal 
resistance to the anticlerical policies of the state-building coalition, had important implications 
for the state’s capacity to generate fiscal income. The next section examines subnational patterns 
of fiscal capacity development in Colombia to show that in that case, too, historical hegemonic 
struggles played an important role. 
2.4 Partisan Conflict and Uneven State Formation in Colombia 
2.4.1 The Uneven Fiscal State in Colombia 
 A profound transformation in the ability of the state to penetrate society for fiscal 
purposes took place during the 1930s and 1940s in Colombia, decisively changing the structure 
of taxation. Even to a greater extent than in Mexico, customs duties remained the main source of 
public funds for the Colombian state all throughout the nineteenth century, exposing it to the 
fluctuations of world markets and maintaining it far removed from its own society (Deas 1982). 
But Colombia’s trade volume was also comparatively lower and the economy poorer than in 
Mexico, and the country experienced no parallel to Porfirian state-building. As a result, the state 
possessed very limited spending capacities during the first century after independence.64 As 
several scholars have argued, there was little in the way of a state in Colombia at the end of the 
nineteenth century (Saylor 2014; Soifer 2015). 
The weak Colombian state’s heavy dependence on taxes on foreign trade, and hence its 
almost nil engagement with society, only began to change in the 1930s.  The structure of fiscal 
                                                 
64
 Absolute per capita fiscal revenues in 1871 were one-third those of Mexico and were estimated to represent only 
2% of the national product (Deas 1982). By comparison, the best available data indicate a tax-to-GDP ratio of 3.3% 
for Mexico in 1877 (INEGI 2015). 
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revenue and the relative capacities of the state in fact changed dramatically. The 1930 elections, 
held in the context of the Great Depression, put an end to almost half a century of Conservative 
Party hegemony and initiated a decisive historical era known as the “Liberal Republic” (1930-
46). Liberal administrations implemented a series of state-building measures that substantially 
strengthened the Colombian state and expanded its weight in social life (Roldán 2002; Safford 
and Palacios 2002). The main increase in fiscal capacity initiated in the mid-1930s, when the 
more radical Liberal administration of Alfonso López Pumarejo introduced reforms to 
consolidate the income tax—adopted in 1918—and other direct taxes on property and income 
(Junguito and Rincón 2007). 
It is difficult to overstate the expansion of infrastructural power signaled by the ensuing 
shift in the structure of taxation. Figure 2.5 shows the dramatic increase in the share of national 
government revenue derived from internal taxes during the Liberal Republic, and the 
concomitant decrease in the relative importance of customs duties. The graph shows the structure 
of state finances over four decades starting in 1923, the first year for which systematic data are 
available. As is clear, during the four Liberal administrations between 1930 and 1946 internal 
taxes decisively became the main source of government revenue. This signals a significant 
change in the territorial reach of the Colombian state and in state-society relations—indeed the 
establishment, for the first time, of something resembling a fiscal contract. 
 Importantly, a significant portion of the increase in internal taxation came from direct 
taxes, especially the income tax. On average, direct taxes represented less than 7% of national 
government revenues between 1923 and 1934; by the mid-1940s, they comprised more than half 
of fiscal state resources.65 In other words, the Colombian state overturned more than a century of 
                                                 
65
 See Figure 2.5 for sources. 
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fiscal history in just a decade, going from an almost complete reliance on customs duties to 
deriving the majority of its income from direct taxes, the most visible, politically sensitive, and 
administratively demanding.66 
 
Figure 2.5.  Sources of national tax revenue in Colombia, 1923-1963 (five-
year moving averages) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Contraloría General de la República (1924, 1937, 1942, 1949, 
1951a), Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público (1930), and DANE (1999). Internal taxes include 
all direct and indirect taxes collected by the federal government. Five-year moving averages are 
shown to remove year-specific fluctuations. 
 
 
 Yet as in the case of Mexico, these aggregate national-level figures are insufficient to 
properly characterize the process of fiscal state-building, as they mask substantial territorial 
                                                 
66
 The tax burden as a share of GDP did not increase during the Liberal Republic. Between 1925 and 1929, it 
averaged 4.1%. In 1946, when Conservatives returned to power, it stood at 4.3% (see Figure 2.5 for sources). This 
was a low figure even by Latin American standards. However, the change in fiscal capacity relative to the past is 
clear from the state’s ability to almost fully reverse the proportion of those revenues that came from customs duties 
versus internal taxes, as well as to impose direct taxes on income and wealth. Moreover, the economy had also 
grown, and therefore the state had overall more resources to spend.  
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unevenness. Regional differences in stateness of course existed prior to this period (Acemoglu, 
García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015), but the overwhelming dominance of taxation on foreign 
trade reveals a pervasive inability of the central state to infrastructurally penetrate territory and 
society. With the sudden shift to internal taxation observed during twentieth-century state-
building, however, within-country variations deepened and became more substantially important.  
 By the end of the Liberal Republic in 1946, for example, direct national tax revenue per 
capita in the department of Cundinamarca (including the capital Bogotá) was 200 times larger 
than in the neighboring department of Boyacá. The income tax and other direct taxes produced 
50 times more per person in the department of Atlántico than in Huila or Cauca, 21 times more 
in Antioquia than in Magdalena, and 9 times more in Valle del Cauca than in Tolima. The 
average contribution in the country was 7.44 Colombian pesos, again considering only direct 
taxes; comparing departments yields a standard deviation of 8.26.67  
 To be sure, these differences reflect the fact that some regions were considerably 
wealthier. There are no disaggregated data on per capita GDP for this historical period, but as I 
emphasized in chapter 1, state capacity is itself a strong determinant of economic outcomes 
(Dincecco and Katz 2016). Moreover, below I show that the variation in tax collection across 
Colombia is not simply a byproduct of levels of economic development. Instead, political 
cleavage structures play an important independent role in explaining why the state gained greater 
ability to generate tax revenues in some places than in others. 
                                                 
67
 Own calculations based on Contraloría General de la República (1951, 59). Population figures for 1946 were 
obtained by linearly interpolating data from the two most proximate censuses (1938 and 1951). 
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2.4.2 Fiscal State Building under Exclusionary Partisan Cultures 
 I argue that, as in the Mexican postrevolutionary experience, political alignments vis-à-
vis the state-building coalition had important implications for the fiscal reach of the Colombian 
state. In this case, the main cleavage pitted Liberals against Conservatives, two camps that at the 
time of the Liberal Republic had struggled for hegemony for almost a century. The War of the 
Thousand Days (1899-1902) was the last and most murderous of the nine major civil wars 
between these political formations during the nineteenth century (Deas 2015).  The partisan wars, 
rooted in elite disputes about federalism and the role of the Church had enduring consequences 
for the country’s political system. Importantly, they prematurely divided the masses along 
sharply defined party lines, before state structures consolidated.  
 In addition to armed mobilization and the grievances produced during civil wars, intense 
competition during electoral contests contributed to the precocious politicization of Colombian 
society (Bushnell 1993; Safford and Palacios 2002). Throughout its independent history, 
Colombia maintained a long tradition of competitive elections that played a key role in the 
reproduction of partisan divides and, as I examine in chapter 5, had important consequences for 
the formation of state institutions in domains like education. 
Early on, then, Colombian society became fractured into well-defined partisan camps 
contesting for power and willing to engage in violence to subordinate the opponent. The vast 
majority of Colombians “were born Liberal or Conservative” (Oquist 1980), and in any given 
locality one of the parties tended to exercise hegemony across elections (Pinzón de Lewin 1989). 
The depth of sectarian partisan “subcultures” (Hartlyn 1988; Pécaut 2001) made the oligarchic 
two-party system extraordinarily resilient, and indeed due to the strength of partisan identities 
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popular pressures associated to the “social question” did not lead to party system transformation 
in the twentieth century, unlike in most countries in Latin America (Roberts 2014).  
To an important degree, the intensity of partisan animosity in the population at large 
stemmed from the deeply sectarian use of the state apparatus in which both parties engaged 
while in power. Below the national level, the parties functioned as a set of loosely connected 
clientelistic machines, sustained by local officeholders through the distribution of patronage to 
co-partisans and committed to “exterminating the contrary party.”68 Electoral defeat had major 
consequences on the life chances of citizens aligned with the losing party (Dix 1987; Stoller 
1995), as the winner completely locked them out from state services, subjected them to 
systematic intimidation and harassment, and often used the state apparatus to forcibly convert 
them to the right cause, in order to achieve electoral dominance. The unitary nature of the 
political system raised the stakes of electoral competition and the winner-take-all character of 
electoral contests, as the president appointed departmental governors and these appointed 
mayors. The governing apparatus could thus turn monolithically Liberal or Conservative. When 
the opposing party managed to gain access to power, party affiliates set out to avenge the 
accumulated grievances, reinforcing partisan resentments and producing high levels of political 
violence. 
 In this way, the Liberal-Conservative polarity evolved into a system of “hereditary 
hatreds” that organized not only politics but social life itself. Citizens were confined into 
exclusive clientelistic networks and tended to lead their lives in politically homogenous 
communities. Civil society institutions also tended to mirror the partisan fracture. Recreational 
and cultural associations, educational institutions, the media, and other institutions were typically 
                                                 
68
 Mariano Ospina, Conservative Party founder, quoted in Safford and Palacios (2002, 223). 
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associated with one side of the cleavage, reproducing at the social level the dialectical struggle 
between the parties themselves. 
As in Mexico, the mobilizing force of the Liberal-Conservative antagonism came in large 
part from historical struggles about the influence of the Church, which had put down deep roots 
in both countries. Partisan loyalties would absorb the characteristic intensity of disputes about 
religion, always retaining quasi-religious overtones (Pécaut 2013).69 The importance of religion 
is also patent in the establishment of partisan alignments. In general, Conservatives tended to 
carry more support where the Catholic Church had been stronger since colonial times (mostly in 
the Andean highlands), whereas Liberals drew more support from coastal and historically 
peripheral areas (Safford and Palacios 2002). As I discuss in chapter 5, the Catholic Church 
acted as an openly partisan force since the formation of the party system. 
However, there are multiple exceptions to these broad patterns, and Colombian parties 
were not simple expressions of underlying societal divides (Dix 1987; Safford and Palacios 
2002). Both parties mobilized support from diverse cross-sections of Colombian society, and 
culturally, socioeconomically, and regionally equivalent towns or municipalities could fall on 
any side of the partisan divide. Historically, highly idiosyncratic factors had an impact in the 
determining the allegiance of any given locality at a given juncture, and from then on 
partisanship shaped its political future. Weinert’s point, although perhaps overstated, is well-
taken: 
Liberal and Conservative strength varied between states [departments] and within states, but the 
identification of a town with one or the other party was probably accidental. It perhaps began 
with the association of a patron in the 19th century with one party, which implied the association 
of his peons with the same party…By the early 20th century, the original reasons for the 
                                                 
69
 The words of Alfonso López Michelsen, President of Colombia from 1974 to 1978 and son of López Pumarejo 
are revealing: “In this country there didn’t exist political parties properly speaking, but religious sects, closed 
churches into which one was born and died without real convictions, in the same way as one inherits a religious 
creed which...must be defended ardently unto death.” Quoted in (Weinert 1966, 344). 
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association had died, but the association persisted, stimulated occasionally by strife along party 
lines and partial mobilization for elections (1966, 344). 
 
Thus the partisan antagonism acquired autonomous weight as an organizing political 
boundary during the struggles of the nineteenth century, and it was sufficient to shape attitudes 
and behavior without reference to other categories. The point is worth stressing because 
throughout this dissertation I attribute explanatory power to Liberal-Conservative alignments, 
and therefore it is key to isolate this variable both conceptually and empirically from other 
potentially confounding factors. 
The expansion of the state’s fiscal capacities in the 1930s took place in this context of 
deeply entrenched partisan loyalties. In the 1930 elections, Conservatives (and the Church) failed 
to coordinate around a single candidate and Liberals captured the presidency. In general, given 
the venality of the state and the fusion of state and party when any of the two political forces was 
in power, the party in opposition only succeeded in presidential contests when the radical and 
moderate wings inside the parties failed to coordinate. This was again the case in 1946, when 
Liberals divided and Conservatives recaptured the presidency.70  
The return of the Liberals after several decades of exclusion from national power 
coincided with the Great Depression, which reduced the possibility of relying on international 
markets to generate economic growth and state revenues. Liberals thus embarked in a process of 
reform that expanded the state’s fiscal powers, as well as its social and economic role. The 
deepest period of reform came after the more radical faction of the party won the 1934 elections. 
Under the so-called “Revolution on the March” during President López Pumarejo’s first 
administration (1934-1938), Liberals encouraged labor organization, adopted measures to 
                                                 
70
 For a fuller discussion, see chapter 5 in this dissertation. 
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facilitate peasant access to land, and strengthened the state’s role as an arbiter of socioeconomic 
relations. Although the reach of this process of popular class incorporation was modest compared 
to other countries in Latin America, it nevertheless reignited partisan polarization and triggered 
considerable resistance from Conservative economic and political elites.   
 Moreover, Liberal administrations revealed “a formidable centralizing tendency” 
(Safford and Palacios 2002, 289) that, in the fiscal arena, materialized in efforts to increase 
national tax revenues. Immediately after taking power, López Pumarejo created new taxes on 
wealth and excess profits and introduced measures to consolidate the income tax (Junguito and 
Rincón 2007). As shown above, this produced a sudden and decisive shift in the structure of 
taxation, itself reflective of an unprecedented strengthening of the fiscal state.  
 However, the country’s deep partisan cleavage conditioned the success of fiscal state-
building across territory, depending on partisan alignments. Excluded from power and fearing 
the consolidation of Liberal dominance, Conservatives generally resisted the (Liberal) state’s 
attempts at asserting greater fiscal authority. In the city of Medellín, for example, the capital of 
the predominantly Conservative department of Antioquia, powerful industrial interests aligned 
with the Conservative Party organized massive demonstrations to resist tax reform. In other 
departments, like Boyacá, Santander, and Norte Santander, Conservatives complained that 
Liberals were using the power of the state to persecute Conservative supporters (Guerrero 1991). 
Indeed, given the characteristics of the political system, supporters of the party in 
opposition perceived the state as an openly partisan force, rather than a shared set of institutions 
that were entitled to be obeyed. When Liberals built the fiscal state and seriously introduced 
domestic taxation for the first time in the country’s history, they were setting the terms of the 
fiscal contract. By virtue of the intense partisan antagonism that permeated society, however, 
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they were unable to forge a homogenous agreement with society. The state failed to elicit 
compliance with its new fiscal demands among a significant social bloc, and thus to develop 
fiscal institutions and norms of tax compliance uniformly across Colombia. Despite controlling 
some of the traditionally more developed areas of the country, notably in the department of 
Antioquia, Conservatives refused to assume greater tax obligations. In areas where they held 
sway, unwillingness to pay instead became the norm. This pattern of behavior, as I will show 
below, became a lasting feature of Colombian political life, with important consequences for the 
state’s overall capacities. The results I present document that, as in the case of Mexico, the 
political struggles surrounding the state-building process shaped internal patterns of state 
institutional development. 
2.4.3 Data 
Central state fiscal capacity 
 To measure the national state’s extractive capacity throughout territory, I constructed a 
novel historical dataset on its fiscal performance across territory, using sources collected through 
extensive archival research. My data allow precise measurement of central authorities’ fiscal 
powers in each Colombian municipality, for a key historical period. I construct my main capacity 
measure as the per capita income tax contribution in a municipality in 1950. As explained above, 
direct taxes like the income tax are the best measure of a state’s ability to fiscally penetrate 
society, as they visibly and directly take private resources and turn them into the state’s. They 
require capacity to register citizens and assess wealth, as well as to elicit compliance and 
exercise power over economic elites. 
This variable was hand-coded using the reports of the Comptroller General (Contraloría 
General de la República 1951b, 1951a). I choose 1950 for questions of data availability, but it is 
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also an appropriate time to assess the internal patterns of state capacity that emerged from the 
crucial period of fiscal state-building under the Liberal Party. By 1950, the share of direct taxes 
had stabilized after the major expansion of the previous decades, the presidency was under the 
control of the most doctrinaire wing of the Conservative Party, and the relative stability of the 
first half of the century had turned into high levels of violence and significant political turmoil. 
 I choose the income tax as my main indicator because it was also the main source behind 
the increase in direct taxation and, being a very visible and progressive tax, it is a good proxy for 
the depth of the national state’s authority in each municipality. To calculate the per capita 
revenues, population figures for 1950 were obtained by linearly interpolating data from the two 
most proximate censuses (1938 and 1951). A map showing the variation in per capita income tax 
revenues across Colombian municipalities appears as Figure 2.10 in the Appendix. 
 That said, I also compiled other indicators of the central state’s fiscal performance in the 
municipalities to examine the robustness of the results. In addition to per capita income tax 
revenues, I use total domestic national tax revenues per head as an alternative that includes all 
direct and indirect taxes levied by the national government in a given municipality. Data were 
also hand-coded using the reports of the Comptroller General. This is the same indicator used 
above to capture national government fiscal capacity in the Mexican case. Table 2.5 in the 
Appendix shows descriptive statistics for all the variables in the dataset of fiscal capacity in 
Colombian municipalities used in this chapter.  
 
Local fiscal capacity 
 I also investigate whether partisan allegiances affected the development of local fiscal 
institutions, in addition to the national government’s ability to collect taxes in the municipalities. 
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Given the partisan coherence of the state apparatus at the central and local levels in Colombia’s 
historical unitary system, it is likely that we could observe consistent effects across levels of 
government. As a measure of local fiscal capacity, I use per capita municipal tax revenues, which 
I also calculated using historical documents obtained during archival research (Contraloría 
General de la República 1941b, 1941a, 1951b, 1951a).  
 Municipal governments collected several indirect taxes and the property tax, which has 
traditionally been resisted by the country’s landed elites. Municipal taxes amounted to 
approximately 10% of total fiscal intake in the country. Unlike national government tax 
revenues, data on municipal public finances are also available before 1950. This offers an 
opportunity to evaluate whether the empirical results are robust to the adoption of a different 
year to measure fiscal performance. I therefore estimate two models of local fiscal capacity, with 
data for 1940 and 1950.  
 The specification that employs data for 1940 also helps address the concern that, 
whatever the patterns of state capacity developed under Liberal state-building, the results for 
1950 are driven by the fact that at the time Conservatives were again in power. It is reasonable to 
worry, for example, that tax enforcement under Conservative governments was stronger in 
Liberal municipalities. Observed differences could reflect contingent partisan calculations rather 
than the underlying strength of state institutions responsible for ensuring compliance with tax 
obligations. Looking at municipal tax revenues in 1940, when the Liberal Party was still in 
power and the state-building process was already on its way, is the best available strategy to 
address this concern, given data availability. 
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Long-term fiscal capacity 
 To evaluate whether historical conflict along partisan lines is associated with long-run 
variation in the capacity to extract, I also run models with contemporary measures of the 
dependent variable. The relevant indicators are municipal tax revenues and property tax 
revenues, which were obtained from the database compiled by the Center of Economic 
Development Studies (CEDE) at the Universidad de los Andes. Both are measured per capita in 
2005. 
 
Independent variable 
 Colombia’s exceptional democratic tradition in Latin America offers an opportunity to 
employ electoral data to analyze how the participation or exclusion of different social and 
political interests in the state-building coalition during crucial historical moments affect 
subsequent patterns of state fiscal strength. In this case, the relevant cleavage found clear 
expression in the electoral arena. The main independent variable in the models below is thus a 
measure of political support for the Conservative Party at the municipality level, which I 
calculated as the proportion of the vote for Conservative candidates in the 1930 and 1946 
presidential elections. Data come from (Oquist 1973). For 1930, I aggregate the vote share for 
the two conservative candidates that competed against the Liberal Enrique Olaya. A map of the 
variation in Conservative Party support across municipalities is provided in Figure 2.9 in the 
Appendix. 
 I focus on these two elections for several reasons. First, 1930 and 1946 mark the 
beginning and end of the relevant period of state-building under the Liberal Party. Second, there 
were no allegations of fraud in any of the two elections. Third, they are the only two presidential 
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elections contested by both parties in the period. As mentioned, parties’ factional use of the state 
apparatus allowed them to skew the playing field and often led the opposition party to abstain 
from presidential elections. The Conservative Party abstained from running a candidate in the 
1934, 1938, and 1942 elections. Similarly, the Liberal Party refused to participate in 1926, while 
the 1922 elections were full of irregularities (Posada-Carbó 1997). Thus, as also argued by 
Oquist (1973), averaging the 1930 and 1946 elections is the best available alternative to 
accurately capture the historical, underlying level of support for each of the parties in each 
municipality. 
 As mentioned above, partisan attachments and hence spatial patterns of electoral support 
were highly persistent. The correlation coefficient between the 1930 and 1946 Conservative 
Party vote shares is strong (= 0.75, p<0.001). Moreover in the majority of the country’s 
municipalities one of the parties was electorally dominant. In 1930, for instance, Liberals or 
Conservatives obtained more than 70 percent of the vote in 422 of the 687 municipalities for 
which data are available. 
  
Other variables 
 My inclusion of control variables is guided by the concern that both the distribution of 
political support for the parties and fiscal capacity could be driven by factors whose omission 
would bias the estimated relationship. As in the Mexican case, I control for differences in 
socioeconomic development, geographic and demographic factors, and historical levels state 
capacity to address potential issues of selection and confounding. GDP estimates for the period 
are not available below the national level. To capture relevant socioeconomic factors, I therefore 
rely on two measures: the proportion of the municipal population living in urban areas, and the 
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literacy rate, which are available from the 1951 census and I obtained from Chacón, Robinson, 
and Torvik (2011). My geographic measure is the proportion of municipal land that is classified 
as mountainous. This indicator is from the Colombian National Geographic Institute and was 
obtained from Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015). 
 Unfortunately, indicators of state capacity at the municipal level are not available for the 
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. Failing to control for preexisting differences in state 
capacity would be problematic if these determined both partisanship and the distribution of fiscal 
capacity at the end of the Liberal Republic. As I explained in the previous section, however, the 
distribution of support for the parties obeyed to multiple idiosyncratic factors, and municipalities 
with very similar characteristics could fall on any side of the cleavage. Drawing on the 
specialized literature, Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik make a similar case about the spatial 
patterns of support for the Colombian parties (2011). Moreover, as also explained above, the 
early politicization of the masses in Colombia meant that party identification in some sense 
preceded the development of state capacity. This suggests that, in my case, levels of support for 
the parties can be reasonably treated as independent of the preexisting distribution of state 
capacity at the local level. Yet to further address this concern, I control for a still deeper measure 
of state presence in the late colonial period. The relevant indicator is the total number of crown 
employees in the municipality. The data are originally from Durán y Díaz (1794) and are 
available from Acemoglu and his coauthors (2015).  
 As a final strategy to deal with potential endogeneity, some specifications below include 
departmental fixed effects. Historically, a varied and difficult geography—the Andes branch off 
into three different mountain ranges as they enter Colombian territory—was  a major obstacle to 
physical, economic, and cultural integration across regions (Safford and Palacios 2002). As a 
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result, Colombian departments developed many different features that could be responsible for 
the differences in fiscal capacity that I attribute to the structure of support for the parties. By 
adding fixed effects, coefficients are identified relying only on within-department variation 
across municipalities, which accounts for these broader geographic, economic, and cultural 
differences across Colombian regions. 
2.4.4 Results 
 I test whether partisan differences affected the outcomes of state-building by running a 
series of ordinary-least-squares regressions of the following form: 
                                
            , 
where revenuei represents the natural log of per capita fiscal revenues in municipality i. 
conservativei  measures the average proportion of the vote share won by Conservative candidates 
in the 1930 and 1946 elections in municipality i. Xi is a vector that contains control variables, and 
and       is a departmental fixed effect for municipality i located in department d.    is the 
coefficient of interest. 
 Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 present the results. The specifications in columns 1 to 4 of Table 
2.2 use the natural logarithm of per capita income tax revenues as the dependent variable. 
Column 1 is the baseline specification, where I include only the measure of Conservative Party 
support and a dummy variable indicating if the municipality is a department capital. Column 2 
adds controls for socioeconomic development and topography. Column 3 further includes 
population density and the measure of colonial state presence. Column 4 adds a full set of 
departmental fixed effects.
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 The main result is that support for the Conservative Party is negatively correlated with 
per capita income tax revenues. The result is consistent with the argument that the unprecedented 
development of national state extractive capacity in the 1930s and 1940s lagged behind in more 
Conservative municipalities. The coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels in 
all four specifications. Conditional on departmental fixed effects, preexisting state capacity, and 
geographic, socioeconomic, and demographic controls (model 4), a one standard deviation 
increase in the proportion of historical support for the Conservative Party is associated with a 
2.8% decrease in the revenues generated by the income tax, per person, in 1950. 
Table 2.2.  Linear models of central fiscal capacity in Colombia, 1950 
 
Dependent variable: per capita income tax 
revenues 1950 (log)  
DV: per capita 
national domestic 
tax revenues 1950 
(log) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
Conservative Party support -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.103** 
 
-0.17* 
 
 (-5.00) (-4.91) (-4.68) (-3.12) 
 
(-2.49) 
 
Department capital 1.72*** 1.37*** 1.02*** 0.88*** 
 
1.59*** 
 
 (6.74) (6.11) (6.48) (6.74) 
 
(11.27) 
 
Urbanization (1951) 
 
0.61*** 0.51*** 0.63*** 
 
1.12*** 
 
 
 
(4.59) (4.4) (5.21) 
 
(5.96) 
 
Literacy (1951) 
 
0.38*** 0.24** 0.066 
 
0.68*** 
 
 
 
(4.17) (2.65) (0.61) 
 
(4.13) 
 
Mountainous land 
 
0.057 0.039 -0.009 
 
0.12 
 
 
 
(1.21) (0.96) (-0.17) 
 
(1.57) 
 
Population density (1950) 
  
0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
 
  
(4.13) (4.96) 
 
(6.55) 
 
Crown employees (1794) 
  
0.0002 0.0002*** 
 
0.0002*** 
 
 
  
(1.59) (4.0) 
 
(4.7) 
 
Constant 0.25*** -0.13* -0.099* -0.07 
 
0.0001 
 
 (10.52) (-2.17) (-2.07) (-0.95) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Departmental fixed effects No No No Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R2 0.49 0.59 0.66 0.73 
 
0.7 
 
Observations 641 634 634 634   689   
All models are OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The parentheses contain t statistics.  
†
 p<0.1,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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 As could be expected, higher levels of socioeconomic development, and particularly 
higher urbanization rates, are positively associated with extraction. Municipalities located in 
more mountainous land, however, are not systematically different from others in terms of the 
ability of the national government to raise taxes. 
 Column 5 in Table 2.2 looks at the relationship between Conservative Party support and 
collection of all types of national domestic taxes. The results are consistent with those related to 
the income tax. The relevant coefficient is statistically significant and its magnitude substantive. 
After accounting for potential confounders and department-specific effects, a one standard 
deviation increase in average support for the Conservative Party is associated with a 4.6 percent 
decrease in per capita tax revenues. 
Turning to Table 2.3 below, columns 1 and 2 examine whether the relationship is also 
present with local government’s fiscal capacity, measured in 1950 and alternatively in 1940. 
Regardless of the party holding national power, Conservative Party support is consistently 
correlated with lower per capita tax contributions. The magnitude of the effects is similar to 
those observed for the national government. 
Lastly, columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.3 show that the historical cleavage prevalent during 
the expansion of state capacity in the first half of the twentieth century remains associated with 
patterns of local fiscal performance in the contemporary period. Although the coefficients 
decrease in size compared to previous models, they remain statistically significant at 
conventional levels and indicate that local fiscal institutions are weaker on average where the 
Conservative Party was stronger. According to the coefficient in model 8, a one standard 
deviation increase in historical Conservative support is associated with approximately 0.6% less 
municipal tax collection per person in 2005. 
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Table 2.3.  Linear models of local fiscal capacity in Colombia, 1940-2005   
 
 
DV: per capita 
municipal tax 
revenues 1950 
(log) 
 
DV: per capita 
municipal tax 
revenues 1940 
(log) 
 
DV: per 
capital 
municipal tax 
revenues 
2005 (log) 
 DV: per 
capital 
property tax 
revenues 2005 
(log) 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
Conservative Party support 
 
-0.18*** 
 
-0.19*** 
 
-0.02**  -0.01** 
  
(-3.59) 
 
(-6.68) 
 
(-2.92)  (-2.76) 
Department capital 
 
0.48*** 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.02*  0.01* 
  
(4.42) 
 
(3.72) 
 
(2.18)  (2.07) 
Urbanization (1951) 
 
0.76*** 
 
0.46*** 
 
0.01  0.005 
  
(5.68) 
 
(5.7) 
 
(0.69)  (0.81) 
Literacy (1951) 
 
0.76*** 
 
0.39*** 
 
0.14***  0.04*** 
  
(5.13) 
 
(4.9) 
 
(5.63)  (4.26) 
Mountainous land 
 
-0.14* 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.05***  -0.008 
  
(-2.28) 
 
(-1.59) 
 
(-3.59)  (-1.49) 
Population density (1950) 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.0001*  0.00002
†
 
  
(5.23) 
 
(8.46) 
 
(2.41)  (1.9) 
Crown employees (1794) 
 
0.0002*** 
 
0.00002 
 
0.00002***  0.00002*** 
  
(4.1) 
 
(0.76) 
 
(7.15)  (11.04) 
Constant 
 
0.52*** 
 
0.28*** 
 
0.04***  0.01
†
 
  
(7.91) 
 
(5.37) 
 
(2.82)  (1.96) 
Departmental fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
R2 
 
0.63 
 
0.7 
 
0.35  0.32 
Observations   702 
 
701 
 
721  721 
All models are OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The parentheses contain t statistics.   
†
 p<0.1,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 
  These results uncover important new empirical patterns in the relationship between 
political conflict and the development of state capacity in Colombia. The econometric results 
complement my historical analysis and support the argument that state-building efforts achieved 
varying degrees of success as a result of the political cleavages that split society and structured 
Colombian politics at the time. Although the state’s ability to penetrate society and impose 
domestic taxes on its population clearly expanded beginning in the 1930s, the results suggests 
that deep partisan polarization during a decisive historically period yielded territorially uneven 
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patterns of institutional development that durably limited what the state could accomplish, and 
who bore, in practice, the fiscal burden. 
2.5 Conclusions 
 This chapter presents new evidence about the historical sources of within-country 
variation in fiscal capacity. I introduce new, comprehensive, and territorially-disaggregated 
historical datasets on the development of fiscal institutions in Mexico and Colombia, drawn from 
previously untapped archival sources. Within-case historical analyses and statistical results 
suggest that patterns of political contention and societal support for the state-building coalition 
during formative historical periods had important and enduring effects on state development. 
Despite important differences between the two countries, in both cases the state’s ability to raise 
tax revenues across territory reflected deep-seated cleavages that divided societies as state 
infrastructures were being built. 
 In Mexico, postrevolutionary state-building efforts triggered strong defensive reactions 
along a sharp religious cleavage. The most salient of these political responses was the Catholic 
insurgency that emerged to contest state anticlericalism in the late 1920s. Drawing on novel, 
hand-coded data on the incidence of conflict, I presented evidence that popular resistance to state 
projects along this social fracture enduringly undermined the state’s ability to cultivate fiscal 
compliance and extract tax revenue. Having failed to develop homogenous fiscal institutions and 
a sense of obligation among the citizenry during a key historical juncture, the Mexican state’s 
overall fiscal powers would continue to suffer, limiting its governing capacities in other realms. 
 In Colombia, a coalition dominated by the Liberal Party embarked on an unprecedented 
project of state-building in the 1930s, expanding the state’s scope and making direct taxes the 
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main source of fiscal revenues, all in a country where governments had historically depended on 
external revenues and lacked meaningful territorial presence. For the first time, the Colombian 
state established a relationship with citizens as taxpayers. As in Mexico, however, state-building 
efforts unfolded over the basis of a deep political fracture. The sectarian partisan political culture 
that permeated society had important implications for the geography of fiscal capacity. Indeed, 
support for the Conservative Party during the period of Liberal state-building correlated 
negatively with the state’s subsequent fiscal performance. 
 These findings have important implications for our understanding of the origins and 
preconditions of extractive capacity, as well as the effects of cleavages on the nature of the fiscal 
contract. The formation of states lacking the institutional means to regularly extend their fiscal 
authority over territory is an important puzzle in the study of political development. My 
theoretical argument traces the territorially uneven ability of states to link with their societies for 
the purposes of extraction to historical state-building projects characterized by intense 
factionalism and, relatedly, to the deep-seated political divisions that often underlay the rise of 
states in Latin America and beyond. Depending on who builds the fiscal state, we may observe 
substantial and enduring differences on where, and who, can governments tax. 
 My argument thus moves beyond structural and geographic explanations to highlight the 
political roots of within-country variation in the ability of the state to elicit tax compliance and 
perform one of the core functions of any modern state. The findings suggest that political power 
configurations during critical periods of state formation are crucial to understand the uneven 
effectiveness of fiscal institutions. They also indicate that in the absence of sustained external 
pressures—like the ones faced by Western European states—or other sources of internal 
cohesion, domestic political oppositions are likely to create sharp variation in state development 
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across a national territory. Finally, the evidence I provide suggests that states’ fiscal strength is 
inherently relational, as it depends on the interplay between states and the societies they rule. In 
such interaction, cleavage politics plays a large role.
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2.6 Appendix 
 
Table 2.4.  Descriptive statistics. Dataset on religious insurgency and fiscal capacity in Mexico 
    Obs M SD Min Max 
Models for federal fiscal capacity in 1940, tax-office level     
 
Per capita federal tax revenues (1940) 55 9.9 12.67 0.77 73.21 
 
Tax collectors per 1,000 citizens (1940) 55 1.77 1.14 0.46 6.19 
 
Cristero War insurgency, % of municipalities 55 27.82 32.04 0 100 
 
Population in industry and commerce (1940), % 55 4.9 1.99 1.67 9.95 
 
Terrain roughness (std. dev. of municipal altitudes) 55 352 216 10.22 803 
 
Population density (1930) 55 15.39 14.63 0.5 54.92 
 
Bureaucrats per 1,000 citizens (1900) 55 2.32 2.36 0.43 15.69 
 
Mexican Revolution insurgency, % of municipalities 55 44.71 25.92 4.17 100 
       Models for local fiscal capacity in 1945, municipal level 
    
 
Per capita municipal government tax revenues (1945) 1,247 2.56 7.35 0 186.99 
 
Per capita property tax revenues (1945) 1,246 0.19 0.53 0 7.94 
 
Cristero War insurgency, (binary) 1,247 0.3 0.46 0 1 
 
Population in industry and commerce (1940), % 1,247 3.36 3.09 0 22.3 
 
Terrain roughness (std. dev. of localities' altitudes) 1,247 181.57 157.08 0.33 1,086 
 
Population density (1930) 1,247 33.4 74.88 0.16 1,538 
 
Bureaucrats per 1,000 citizens (1900) 1,247 1.54 2.25 0 25.05 
 
Mexican Revolution insurgency, (binary) 1,247 0.38 0.49 0 1 
       Models for federal fiscal capacity in 2000s, tax-office level 
    
 
Per capita income tax revenues (average 2000-04) 55 1,878 1,988 167.98 11,666 
 
Taxpayers, % of total population (average 2008-2012) 55 25.54 9.53 12.62 68.7 
 
Cristero War insurgency, % of municipalities 55 27.71 33.41 0 100 
 
Population in industry and commerce (1940), % 55 5.35 2.57 1.88 15.9 
 
Terrain roughness (std. dev. of municipal altitudes) 55 5.35 2.57 1.88 15.9 
 
Population density (1930) 55 21.84 57.1 0.14 424.56 
 
Bureaucrats per 1,000 citizens (1900) 55 3.4 4.44 0.55 19.93 
  Mexican Revolution insurgency, % of municipalities 55 44.86 30.56 0 100 
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Table 2.5.  Descriptive statistics. Dataset on partisan cleavages and fiscal capacity in 
Colombia 
    Obs M SD Min Max 
Dependent variables 
     
 
Per capita income tax revenues (1950) 645 0.62 4.51 0 93.64 
 
Per capita national government tax revenues (1950) 700 2.69 11.79 0 199.8 
 
Per capita municipal govt tax revenues (1940) 712 0.61 0.7 0 8.27 
 
Per capita municipal govt tax revenues (1950) 714 2.08 2.73 0 29.17 
 
Per capital municipal tax revenues (2005) 1,096 0.06 0.7 0 0.65 
 
Per capital property tax revenues (2005) 1,096 0.021 0.03 0 0.5 
       Independent variables 
     
 
Conservative Party support (average vote share, 
1930 and 1946) 816 0.47 0.27 0 1 
 
Urbanization rate (1951) 756 0.24 0.21 0 1 
 
Literacy rate (1951) 756 0.49 0.15 0.02 0.89 
 
Land classified as mountain (proportion) 1,004 0.68 0.4 0 1 
 
Population density (1950) 730 57.72 97.86 0.34 1,626 
  Total crown employees (1794) 1,019 5.69 122.86 0 3,844 
 
 
 
 116 
 
Figure 2.6.  Partial relationship between Cristero War insurgency (1926-1929) and income 
tax revenues per capita (average 2000-2004) 
 
 
Note: The plot shows the adjusted relationship between religious insurgency and per capita income tax 
revenues, holding constant other determinants of fiscal capacity included in model 7 of Table 2.1. The 
axes include negative numbers because the plot is constructed by computing residuals that are centered at 
zero (see footnote 61 above).  
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Figure 2.7.  Per capita municipal tax revenues in Mexican municipalities, 1945 
 
 
Note: Data were grouped in deciles to color the map. Darker areas represent municipalities with higher local tax revenues per capita in 1945. Figures were 
calculated using archival materials and include all municipalities whose total revenue exceeded MX $2,000 at the time. Municipalities with missing data and 
those that did not exist in 1945 appear in white. See footnote 54 for details. 
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Figure 2.8.  Municipalities with insurgency during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917)   
 
 
Note: For clarity, municipal boundaries are not shown. Dark areas depict municipalities that experienced insurgency during the armed phase of the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1917). Municipalities that did not exist or have missing values appear in white. Data were hand-coded using a vast range of secondary sources. 
See footnote 58 and text for details. 
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Figure 2.9.  Average vote share for the Conservative Party in Colombian municipalities, 1930 and 1946 presidential elections 
 
 
Note: Data were grouped in quintiles to color the map and come from (Oquist 1973). Darker areas represent municipalities with higher average support for the 
Conservative Party. The large area in white contained less than 5% of the population and was not subdivided in municipalities, so data are not available. Other 
municipalities that were created after 1946 also appear in white.   
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Figure 2.10.  Fiscal capacity in Colombia. Per capita income tax revenues in 1950 
 
 
Note: Data were grouped in deciles to color the map. Darker areas represent municipalities with higher per capita income tax revenues in 1950. The large area in 
white contained less than 5% of the population and was not subdivided in municipalities, so data are not available. Other municipalities that were created after 
1946 or have missing values also appear in white. Data were coded from sources collected during archival research. See text for details.
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3 SHARING THE MEANS OF VIOLENCE: LOCAL MILITIAS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW IN MEXICO 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter advances two main arguments: first, it suggests that deep-seated cleavages push 
emerging national states to relinquish a strict monopoly of violence at the local level. Second, 
while local armed groups may effectively assist the state in countering societal resistance and 
maintaining local order, collaboration between the national state and local militias inhibits the 
development of security and justice institutions in the long run. I provide empirical support for 
both arguments using original, hand-collected data on over 1,700 state-sanctioned rural militia 
forces in postrevolutionary Mexico, drawn from archival sources. I show that the cleavages that 
dominated politics during the era of state formation—associated with anticlericalism and 
agrarian reform—shaped the distribution of rural defense forces across Mexico’s territory. In 
turn, areas with a higher concentration of rural militias in the past today have weaker law 
enforcement and justice institutions, higher homicide rates, and are more likely to have vigilante 
organizations. These associations are not driven by prior levels of state capacity, geographic 
conditions, socioeconomic factors, or other potential confounders. The findings shed light on the 
historical origins of state institutional weakness and advance our understanding of a crucial 
aspect of political development—the concentration of physical force in formal apparatuses with 
control over territory and clearly differentiated from society. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 The organization and use of physical violence in a given territory is the essence of the 
modern state (M. Weber 1978). State coercion plays a crucial role in the deterrence of private 
violence and the provision of order and protection—the foremost justifications for political rule. 
The development of institutions capable of exerting coercion across territory is therefore at the 
core of any process of state formation and accumulation of state capacity. 
 This chapter examines internal cleavages and the uneven development of coercive 
institutions across postrevolutionary Mexico, and relates this history to contemporary variation in 
the capacity of the state to provide routinized order and uphold the rule of law within its borders. 
My examination of the development of the state’s coercive apparatus centers on an under-studied 
but important topic: the rural militia units that were incorporated into the army in the early stages 
of state formation, and remained common instruments of central state power in localities across 
Mexico for much of the twentieth century. I argue that by focusing on their origins, functions, 
and long-run effects, we can gain insight into the formation and capacities of the state’s law and 
order institutions more generally.  
 The analysis proceeds in two main steps. I first argue that the cleavages that structured 
politics during the formative years of the state following the Revolution (1910-1917) shaped 
postrevolutionary governments’ responses to the twin challenges of concentrating the means of 
violence and institutionalizing coercion. Specifically, the religious cleavage that spawned a 
major Catholic rebellion in the late 1920s, along with redistributive socioeconomic conflict 
associated with the state’s project of agrarian reform, pushed state elites to delegate coercive 
capacity to semi-legal armed groups, in order to maintain local control in vast areas of the 
country.  
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 Using a new, hand-collected, geo-coded dataset constructed from archival sources and 
covering the crucial period of institutionalization of the armed forces after the Revolution, I 
show that these historical fault lines mapped onto the presence and activity of state-sanctioned 
rural militias across territory. Where opposition to the anticlerical and land reform projects of the 
state-building coalition was historically stronger, the central state made use of locally-based 
armed groups—formally subordinated to the army but lying outside the state apparatus proper—
to enforce domestic order and counter resistance. Consistent with my general theoretical 
argument that the structure of cleavages exerts a strong influence on processes of state formation 
and shapes spatial patterns of state capacity development, I find that the state was more likely to 
maintain rural militia units in municipalities that had joined the religious Cristero Rebellion 
(1926-1929), and in those where it implemented deeper agrarian redistribution. In short, the 
geography of state coercive capacity mirrored the country’s cleavage geography. 
 The political underpinnings of the state-building project—as Mann put it, “who this 
Leviathan is: Who controls it? Who is doing what to whom?” (Mann 2012, 359)—had profound 
implications for the institutional organization of physical violence. The type and intensity of 
coercive power deployed by the state over its territory followed the fault lines between the state-
building coalition, commanded by anticlerical modernizers in strategic alliance with mobilized 
lower-class groups, and the politically excluded sectors of society that resisted the new state, 
including lay Catholics, the institutional Church, landowners, conservative sectors of the middle 
class, and displaced local elites. 
 I then examine the effects of the postrevolutionary state’s reliance on local armed groups 
formally commanded by the army on the Mexican government’s ability to provide law and order 
through formal and ordinary means. I argue that this form of building and exercising coercive 
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power stunted the development of civilian law enforcement apparatuses, along with other regular 
tools and mechanisms to manage social conflict and maintain local order. Put differently, it 
curtailed the institutional resources at the disposal of local governments—legally responsible for 
public security—in the long run. I find a robust negative correlation between the presence of 
rural militias historically and various current measures of capacity to uphold the rule of law 
down to the municipality level, including the strength of civilian law enforcement agencies, the 
supply of jueces cívicos (roughly, justices of the peace), the homicide rate, and the emergence of 
self-defense forces and community policing groups. 
 Taken together, these two findings establish a fine-grained empirical connection between 
historical experience and the contemporary fragilities of the Mexican state in maintaining peace 
and protecting citizens. The findings support the argument that the cleavage structures of the era 
of state formation conditioned the postrevolutionary state’s strategies with respect to the 
organization of physical force across the territory; in doing so, they shaped the development of 
law and order institutions, with serious consequences for the long-run ability of local 
governments to provide public order through regular institutional structures. Especially in some 
parts of the territory, then, Mexican democracy has inherited feeble institutional foundations for 
the rule of law. This institutional context has incubated high levels of criminal violence and 
serves as an enabling condition for the vicious cycles of ineffective state authority and criminal 
state capture observed today. 
 To my knowledge, this is also the first systematic municipal-level analysis of the 
historical factors behind the structural weakness of local civil police forces in Mexico. This 
weakness is widely recognized to be one of the root causes of the state’s poor record in the 
provision of security and the heavy dependence on military intervention for internal order, with 
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its severe consequences on human rights, state-society relations, and social life more generally. 
More than 40,000 soldiers deployed across the country to enforce legality and perform policing 
duties over the past decade make understanding the (mal)formation of the state apparatus an 
important task.  
 The chapter makes three additional contributions. First, it provides a historically 
grounded and contextualized explanation for the emergence and persistence of “brown areas,” 
spaces where the state exerts little infrastructural power and formal rights and rules lack 
substance. O’Donnell linked this deficit of institutional capacity in parts of a country’s territory 
to several social and political pathologies, including weak democratic citizenship, exceptional 
despotic interventions by public authorities, and highly arbitrary forms of private domination 
(1993, 2004). 
 In this sense, the formation of states lacking the institutional means to regularly extend 
their legality over territory is an important—and largely unresolved—puzzle in the study of 
political development. My theoretical argument traces the territorially uneven capacity of states 
to enforce law and order to historical state-building projects characterized by intense 
factionalism and, relatedly, to the deep-seated political divisions that often underlay the rise of 
states in Latin America and beyond. Such cleavages affected the popular legitimacy of the state 
and receptiveness to its authority across space during state formation, spawning uneven 
trajectories of institutional development and accumulation of infrastructural power. Although the 
empirical evidence in this chapter concerns a specific country, these theoretical ideas and the 
analysis of the political mechanisms affecting the process of reorganization of violence during 
state formation are broadly relevant to our understanding of the determinants of institutional 
capacity in the primary dimension of the state. 
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 Secondly, the chapter informs the vast literature on civil conflict. The spatial reach and 
coherence of state institutions, particularly security forces, are associated with the emergence and 
success of insurgency and revolutionary movements (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goodwin 2001; 
Skocpol 1979). My analysis helps elucidate the conditions leading to the varying degrees of 
stateness across territory that scholars have linked to these outcomes. In this sense, it links 
empirical studies of subnational conflict to the mature literature on the historical foundations of 
the modern state. 
 Thirdly, this chapter offers new empirical evidence on the role of civil militias or 
paramilitaries in civil war and post-conflict settings (Staniland 2015), and advances our 
understanding of their implications for state-building and long-term governance. The reliance on 
popular militias to police the countryside, assist in military operations, and buttress state power 
in the face of societal resistance has been a staple feature of many ideologically-committed 
revolutionary regimes (Perry 2006). Yet in part due to data limitations, rigorous analysis of the 
origins, endurance, and effects of these armed actors remains rare. The dataset presented in this 
chapter, constructed on the basis of over 1,700 archival records, allows for systematic 
investigation into these questions. More generally, it serves as a rich empirical basis to elucidate 
the conditions under which central states cooperate with irregular armed groups instead of 
establishing a full Weberian monopoly over the use of violence, a foundational question of 
political development (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013).   
 The rest is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the history of rural 
militias in postrevolutionary state-building and outlines their connections to the Church-state 
conflict and agrarian reform. Section 3.3 discusses my original data on these armed forces. 
Section 3.4 presents municipal-level evidence that the incidence of militia activity indeed 
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reflected the geographies of the Cristero War and the state’s project of land redistribution. 
Section 3.5 turns this distribution of coercive capacity during the formative period of the state 
into an explanatory factor; it documents a negative relationship between the historical role of the 
militias and various contemporary measures of the capacity of civil institutions to provide 
routinized law and order. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Irregular Armed Forces And Postrevolutionary State-Building 
 In the decades that followed the armed phase of the Revolution (1910-1917), Mexico 
underwent a profound process of reorganization and concentration of coercion typical of state 
formation (Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002; Tilly 1992). The form and reach of this process, 
however, were deeply conditioned by the sharp cleavages that characterized postrevolutionary 
politics, most prominently those pitting political Catholics against anticlerical revolutionaries, 
and mobilized peasants against opponents of agrarian redistribution.  
 These social fractures shaped the reorganization of armed force, leaving a strong imprint 
on the state’s coercive apparatus and its relation with armed groups in society. A vast network of 
rural civil militias, increasingly subordinated to the army without being fully assimilated into 
regular forces, survived as a valuable resource for the national government to enforce local order 
and exercise coercive power. This particular development would exert an important influence on 
subsequent outcomes. 
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3.2.1 Rural Militias from the Mexican Revolution to the Present 
 Private violence remained widespread in the aftermath of the Revolution, with fluid 
boundaries between irregular groups and state forces.71 The collapse of the central state had left a 
multiplicity of armed groups of various sizes and political leanings operating throughout the 
territory. In villages and communities, elites and ordinary citizens had mounted self-defense 
organizations to confront pervasive banditry and civil war violence (Guerra Manzo 2002, 33; 
Plasencia 2010, 261). A tradition of local organizing existed at least since the 19th century due to 
the constant breakdown of order before Diaz’s dictatorship, now reinforced by a decade of 
popular rebellion.72 These local vigilante groups—frequently referred to as defensas sociales73—
participated in pacification campaigns, performed policing functions, and served as a 
springboard for local political office. 
 Moreover, recalcitrant state governors and local bosses drew on armed groups to 
maintain regional protection rackets and reproduce their base of support.74 Peasant militias 
formed by agraristas (land grant petitioners and recipients), many of which had roots in the 
popular rebellions of the revolutionary period, defended their lands and pressured for agrarian 
reform, sometimes in alliance with radical state governors. Landlords organized paramilitary 
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 The discussion on local armed groups in these paragraphs draws on secondary sources and my own archival 
research. Relevant works include Arellano Cruz (1950); Hernández Chávez (2012); Meyer (1976); Plasencia (2010); 
Rath (2013); Rocha (1988). Relevant archival materials include: Reportes de desarme de defensas sociales, Archivo 
General de la Nación (hereafter AGN), Obregón-Calles, 818/A/114; Circulares defensas civiles, AGN, Obregón-
Calles, 104-D-9; Estudio relacionado con el funcionamiento de las Defensas Rurales, AGN, Ávila Camacho, 550/24. 
72
 Irregular forces and militias proliferated since Independence under the influence of classic republican ideas about 
local self-governance and citizen armed service, and given the incapacity of the central state to maintain regular 
troops throughout the territory (Guardino 1996, 88). 
73
 Local armed groups received different names across time and space, but they are most commonly referred to as 
defensas sociales, defensas civiles, acordadas, cuerpos auxiliares, and defensas rurales in archival materials and the 
historical literature. The sheer variety of terms is a testament to the dispersed control over coercion in this period. 
Formal designations emerge once local armed groups were incorporated into the army, as explained below. 
74
 Under the new Constitution of 1917, Congress could authorize state governors to organize troops in their states. 
Several governors formed security forces to combat remaining rebel groups and consolidate power, often with little 
respect for the numbers authorized by the Congress (Plasencia 2010, 261–73).  
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groups known as guardias blancas to resist, which often operated in collusion with conservative 
military officers and other state officials.75 Meanwhile, central elites struggled to control and 
downsize a large and undisciplined army commanded by semi-autonomous generals. 
 In this context, national governments implemented measures throughout the 1920s, 
1930s, and 1940s to regain control over coercion and institutionalize the new army (Lieuwen 
1968). By the mid-twentieth century, a more disciplined and professionalized military exercised 
firmer vertical control over physical force, under a corporate authoritarian state led by civilians.76 
Crucially, however, civil defense forces would maintain a role in this structure, attached to the 
state’s central apparatus of coercion.  
 We can roughly distinguish two main periods in the history of irregular armed groups in 
the postrevolutionary era. In the early years, such forces were largely under the orbit of 
strongman governors and local bosses, whose control over coercion allowed them to hold off the 
central government.77 Naturally, national elites and the military hierarchy viewed the fragmented 
control over armed groups with distrust and, when circumstanced permitted, made selective 
attempts to eliminate militia units (Plasencia 2010, 271).78  
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 Self-defense groups under the terms defensas sociales and defensas civiles were often sponsored by landowners. 
Carta dirigida por el General Jesús Ferreira al Presidente de la República, April 27, 1921, AGN, Obregón-Calles, 
104/D/10. See also (Rath 2013, 36). 
76
 Increased discipline does not mean the political and military spheres became fully differentiated. Large scale 
barracks uprisings ceased and civilians controlled the executive, but the military continued to play a crucial and  
until recently underemphasized role in maintaining social order and authoritarian stability, as revisionist studies have 
argued (Fallaw and Rugeley 2012). 
77
 Governors Francisco Múgica of Michoacán (Boyer 2003), Adalberto Tejeda of Veracruz (Fowler-Salamini 1978), 
and Saturnino Cedillo of San Luis Potosí (Ankerson 1984) are the most prominent examples. 
78
 Skepticism of irregular forces ran deep among the military. In the early 1920s, they recognized that these groups 
had collaborated with regular troops and described them as a “necessary evil,” whose existence responded to “the 
impossibility on the part of legal authorities to provide protection to individual and general interests.” However, the 
military hierarchy warned the president that “their attacks, abuses, and disorders” were numerous, and the country 
“could find itself with two armies: one within Right, disciplined, organized, with well-defined responsibilities...the 
other, a numerous collection of armed men, without clear attributions or faculties, uncoordinated, and uncontrolled 
by responsible authorities.” Oficio de la Secretaría de Guerra y Marina para el C. Presidente de la República, AGN, 
Obregón-Calles, 104/D/9.   
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 Yet these efforts were undermined by central governments’ own reliance on popular 
militias when major armed challenges threatened to derail the process of state consolidation. In 
1923, a member of the governing coalition defected and led a barracks uprising involving a third 
of army generals and at least half of the troops. Another military revolt in 1929 garnered the 
support of a third of the army. Most importantly, between 1926 and 1929 the revolutionary army 
found itself fighting a powerful Catholic insurgency throughout the West during the Cristero 
War, which caused some 45,000 deaths within its ranks (J. Meyer 1995, 260–66). Continuing 
opposition to the core of the revolutionary project—state anticlericalism, land redistribution, and 
federal education79—also generated the Segunda, a second and much weaker wave of Catholic 
guerrilla warfare that peaked in 1935. 
 In each of these conflicts, local militias operating alongside the central security apparatus 
played a decisive role. As a situational response, national leaders forged agreements with 
regional warlords to mobilize existing irregular forces in defense of the revolutionary regime. 
Offering agrarian reform in return, they actively supported the arming of the peasantry. In 
addition to land, pro-government combatants also received budgetary side-payments and a blind 
eye to their numerous abuses. Although limited by the fragmentary nature of the evidence, 
historians agree that the participation of agraristas and paramilitary forces more generally 
weighed heavily on conflict outcomes, allowing the regime to prevail over its challengers 
(Wasserman 1993). 
 Under the influence of these historical experiences, central elites recognized both the 
impossibility of dispensing with the militias and their potential contribution to the construction 
of political order, especially where societal opposition ran deeper. National governments thus 
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 I join Fallaw and others in considering these three as the distinctive components of the postrevolutionary state’s 
project, as opposed to governance objectives pursued by states in general (Fallaw 2013, 4).      
 131 
 
settled upon a strategy of linking militia units directly with the central apparatus of rule, instead 
of pursuing their elimination. The selective disarmament of specific irregular forces continued 
out of political expediency, but the thrust of state policy was directed to bringing them under 
tighter central control. At the same time, however, they were to remain socially-embedded and 
distinct from regular state security forces—in short, an extensive network of armed actors in 
society reinforcing the coercive capacity of the central state from below. 
 Such strategy of subordinating local armed groups to the national coercive apparatus, 
without full assimilation,80 opened a second phase in the history of irregular forces, one in which 
they increasingly became part of the institutional arsenal of the central state while retaining roots 
in local society. The reorganization of militia violence constituted one of the centerpieces of the 
broader process of concentration of authority that unfolded in the two decades after the 
Revolution; yet its dynamics and spatial patterns were strongly shaped by the main cleavages of 
the time. 
 The first steps to attach the militias directly to the central state took place in 1929, in the 
wake of the Cristero War. According to the classic work on the conflict, some 25,000 militia 
members served as auxiliary troops to the Federal army, who “made use of them but despised 
them.” The agraristas “were not, perhaps, very good soldiers,” and “they took advantage of the 
situation to settle private feuds.” Undisciplined and underprepared for combat, they were used as 
cannon fodder. However, they were a vital source of information to engage in counter-guerrilla 
warfare, given their superior knowledge of local terrain and society: “Although they lacked 
enthusiasm, they were considered as formidable enemies by the Cristeros, because like them they 
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 In a recent article, Staniland distinguishes between four strategies that states can pursue toward militias: 
suppression, containment, collusion, and incorporation (Staniland 2015). The Mexican state adopted different 
strategies across time and space during the early period of postrevolutionary state formation, ultimately settling upon 
a mix of collusion and incorporation. 
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were peasants and knew the country and its inhabitants…they were the best placed to exercise 
surveillance” (J. Meyer 1976). 
 As the civil war came to an end, new regulations formalized the peasant militia units and 
their ties to the national state. Now sanctioned by the central state, the defensas rurales were 
recognized as “factors of order” that would act as “the vanguard of the legion that will defend 
revolutionary postulates...making public tranquility prevail in the country.” These unsalaried 
forces were to be recruited among the local peasantry and collaborate with civilian authorities in 
routine policing and the protection of their communities; however, they would be under direct 
command of military officials in the region, receive military instruction, and assist the army as 
local “guides” and “explorers,” providing them with intelligence about local conditions and 
threats to public order. The national government also reserved the right to disarm the militias 
when their cooperation was no longer believed to be necessary (Secretaría de Guerra y Marina 
1929). 
 Important sectors of the army, fearing that the dispersed control over the means of 
violence could backfire, remained reluctant about the militias throughout the 1930s. Policing and 
public safety were formal and exclusive responsibilities of municipal governments, which called 
into question the legality of rural defense units. Moreover, abuses were widespread, the defensas 
often proved to be unreliable allies,81 and their actual numbers were uncertain. Army generals in 
1936 feared that irregulars outnumbered regular soldiers (Piñeyro 1985, 54). According to 
archival records from the American military, this was indeed this case. These records indicate 
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 See, for example, (Fallaw 2013, 172). 
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that members of civil defense forces approximated 69,000 at the time, compared to around 
58,000 regular soldiers (Plasencia 2010, 280).82 
 These numbers, however, were in large part a product of the state’s own efforts and 
proceedings. Indeed, President Lázaro Cárdenas’s administration (1934-1940) actively engaged 
in rural militia-building as a means to support its ambitious program of agrarian reform, 
counterbalance conservative elements inside the army, and more generally assert the institutional 
and ideological supremacy of the state over priest and landlord. During this most radical phase, 
Cardenistas attempted to assign the coercive institutions of the state—including the civil defense 
forces—a decisive role in the cultural and socioeconomic transformation of society (Rath 
2012).83 New regulations were issued mandating members of the peasant militias to be 
ejidatarios (communal land reform beneficiaries) who “identified with revolutionary principles.” 
Along with land and socialist education, peasants would receive rifles and military training to 
protect their ejidos and, when needed, engage in service to the state.  
 In this sense, the defensas rurales were to become key sites for the construction of 
revolutionary citizenship and the interlocking of state and society. This aspect of Cárdenas’s 
project has parallels to those of later revolutionary movements led by Leninist vanguard parties 
(Perry 2006), which organized militias with the objective of raising revolutionary conscience and 
thoroughly mobilizing society, while simultaneously controlling it at the grassroots. Ultimately, 
as happened in other areas of state policy, the radical ambitions of Cardenismo concerning the 
defensas were hobbled by fiscal weakness, significant societal opposition, and lack of 
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 Hernández Chávez reports 81,656 rural militia members in 1937 and 53,200 in 1938 (2012).  
83
 For a study on the state’s efforts to “remake human beings” during Cardenismo and the grassroots resistance they 
generated, see Becker (1995). Cardenista state agents frequently misinterpreted peasant views, demands, and 
traditions, reducing genuine forms of popular conservatism to crude class-based interpretations of false 
consciousness. 
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collaboration from more conservative interests within the state apparatus itself.84 Militias 
nevertheless multiplied under Cárdenas and would continue to play a role long after his 
presidency, if not the radical one that Cardenistas desired. 
 The central state’s embrace of irregular rural armed forces came with further measures to 
cement the military’s control over them. Rural militias were more formally organized as a 
reserve army into infantry battalions and cavalry regiments in each military zone, and a central 
office was established within the Secretariat of War to organize and oversee them. At the same 
time, the agrarian reservists, direct beneficiaries of Cardenismo’s impulse to land reform, served 
as a counterweight to opposing factions in the military hierarchy and the regular army 
(Hernández Chávez 2012; Lieuwen 1968, 122–23). 
 The trend of incorporating unsalaried rural militias into the national state’s instruments of 
coercive power consolidated with the authoritarian regime itself. The radical social and 
ideological meanings attached to peasant armed groups were abandoned as the regime veered 
rightward starting in the 1940s, but their use as semiofficial agents of surveillance and repression 
in the countryside was not. Governments kept them as an appendage to the central state 
machinery to help maintain rural order.85 The militias remained constantly implicated in rural 
violence, now with an increasingly conservative role. Their lax discipline, poor reliability, and 
excesses notwithstanding, they had emerged from the deep conflicts of the postrevolutionary 
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 On the failures of the Cardenista project for the militias, see Rath (2013). Efforts to impose strict criteria for 
membership in the militia units proved unsuccessful; high-ranking officials, skeptic of the militias and sometimes 
allied with conservative regional elites, dragged their feet; and the defensas often served as a cover for paramilitary 
groups that repressed peasants on behalf of landed interests.    
85
 A 1944 internal report on the operation of rural defense forces explained that their main functions were rural 
policing, especially in remote regions, and “collecting information about anything that could alter public order.” The 
report admitted that the militias’ performance was mediocre and that they often acted as instruments of local bosses, 
but since they were formed by volunteers they also made fiscal obligations less burdensome. Comandancia del 8° 
Cuerpo de Infantería al C. Secretario de la Defensa Nacional, AGN, Ávila Camacho, 550/24. 
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period as a low-cost and far-reaching system of intelligence and local policing that a fiscally-
strapped authoritarian state could not do away with. 
 Although the available evidence is quite limited and histories covering more recent 
decades remain to be written, the relative weight of rural defense forces in the state’s coercive 
apparatus and in rural police work seems to have waned in more recent decades, a trend likely 
aided by urbanization. Nevertheless, it is known that some 38,000 members existed by 1970 and 
that they collaborated with the army both in the repression of dissident popular movements in the 
1950s, and the “dirty war” counterinsurgency campaigns against rural guerrilla movements of 
the 60s and 70s (Piñeyro 1985, 83–108; Sierra Guzmán 2003).86 
 Gradually, by selectively dissolving defense units and tightening its control over the 
distribution of weapons, the military more clearly reduced the defensas to a secondary role as 
local guides and informants in strategic locations. Their numbers were down to 12,000 in the 
mid-2000s (about one-quarter the current size of the Federal Police), and they were present in 
two thirds of all states.87 A central department within the Secretariat of Defense remains in 
charge of rural militia forces to this day, but as before, they are not formal, salaried state 
employees. When local order collapsed in the central-western state of Michoacán in 2013 in the 
context of the drug war, with a wave of heavily-armed autodefensa (self-defense) organizations 
sweeping the state (Phillips 2016), the national government colluded with the autodefensas for 
intelligence purposes. Resurrecting the strategies of old, it also reached an agreement to 
incorporate them into the defensas rurales.88 
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 An example of militia collaboration in counterinsurgency can be found in AGN, SEDENA-Estado Mayor, caja 
208, exp. 846. 
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 “Paramilitares en México: Cuerpos de Defensas Rurales, de SEDENA,” Proceso, December 30, 2005, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/230941/paramilitares-en-mexico-cuerpos-de-defensas-rurales-de-sedena 
88
 “Acuerdo para el Apoyo Federal a la Seguridad en Michoacán.” http://www.gob.mx/segob/prensa/firman-los-
gobiernos-de-la-republica-y-de-michoacan-y-grupos-ciudadanos-acuerdo-para-integrarse-a-la-vida-institucional 
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3.2.2  Cleavages, State Legitimacy, And The Organization Of Violence 
 As the above discussion illustrates, the reorganization of armed force and its 
accumulation in central apparatuses—the crux of processes of state formation—revolved around 
the deep cleavages that split society in the aftermath of the Revolution. Control over physical 
force was reorganized in a context of sharp sociopolitical divisions over the influence of 
Catholicism and the distribution of agrarian property, which I argue profoundly shaped both 
coercive power across territory and its institutional forms. The location of armed force, spatially 
and socially, was a function of the religious and agrarian questions.89 
 In this sense, the characteristics and divisions of the social realm were built into the very 
structure of the state’s system of coercion. Institutional reconstruction took place in a highly 
variegated economic and cultural landscape, and as a result the receptiveness to anticlerical and 
redistributive policies varied sharply across territory.90 Such preexisting socioeconomic and 
cultural conditions were largely out of the control of state-builders in the early period of state 
formation, yet they greatly conditioned their ability to legitimize and reproduce state rule. This 
uneven record at inducing societal compliance influenced the ways that coercion was organized, 
outsourced, and distributed across physical and social space. Compelled by the intense societal 
resistance against core elements of their project in this decisive historical period, state elites 
complemented the capabilities of the formal government apparatus with a network of coercive 
actors that straddled the boundary between state and society.  
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 These cleavages overlapped to some extent, leading to the formation of conservative coalitions formed by political 
Catholics and landed interests. Yet Catholic resistance to state anticlericalism had a genuine popular, grassroots 
component that cut right across the class-based divide (Knight 1994b; J. Meyer 1994). 
90
 The economic and cultural profile of regions and localities was itself shaped by historical experience. The strength 
of the Catholic Church, which responded to colonization patterns and geographical variations in the Church’s efforts 
to regain social influence during the Porfirian dictatorship, ranks as the most important determinant of the 
sociocultural characteristics of communities (Fallaw 2013, 31–32; Knight 1994a).    
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 This form of organizing violence persisted for the rest of the century, even after the 
political divides that spawned it lost intensity. As a semi-formal, state-sanctioned coercive 
institution with deep social origins, the rural militia became part of the arrangement the state 
relied upon to maintain order and regulate social relations. Indeed, this network of coercion-
wielding agents, situated between the social and the formal-institutional realms, played an 
important role in the production of local order in much of the country. Abstracting from the 
specific case of Mexico, the relevant theoretical point is that the cleavage structures prevalent 
during decisive periods of state formation may exert a strong influence on two key political 
processes: the political reorganization of physical force and, by that means, the development of 
formal-institutional state capacity in the long run. 
3.3 A New Spatial Dataset On Rural Defense Forces 
 The irregular qualities of rural militia units have hindered historical and empirical work 
on the topic. Even concerning formal institutions, the “cognitive” capacity of the Mexican state 
was generally limited in matters of law and order: basic policing statistics were not computed, 
and historical crime statistics are unreliable. Accurate and sufficiently disaggregated indicators 
on the defensas rurales from secondary sources do not exist.91 In fact, historical studies tend to 
mention them only in passing. A few excellent, qualitative studies have recently documented the 
regular army’s permanent role in internal order and mentioned the widespread reliance on 
irregular forces; however, developing systematic measures on militia units from these studies is 
                                                 
91
 Hernández Chávez (2012) and Plasencia (2010) report official data on rural defense forces obtained from US 
military archives, but only at the state level and for one or two years in the 1930s. 
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not possible.92 Their focus is predominantly regional, and their inferences have been limited by 
the fragmentary nature of the available archival materials.  
 As for primary sources, these forces should have left a more consistent paper trail once 
they were attached to the army, but in practice data on their composition, distribution, and 
activities remains scattered and elusive. Access to military archives was tightly controlled during 
Mexico’s authoritarian regime, and even today remains limited. As a result, the militias and their 
role in postrevolutionary order are a seriously under-studied topic. 
 In order to build a comprehensive national picture of rural defense forces, I manually put 
together a new, village-level spatial database on the location of these units for the period 1932-
1946, using all relevant existing records in the presidential archives of the Archivo General de la 
Nación (AGN). The 1932-1946 period covers the administrations of presidents Abelardo 
Rodríguez, Lázaro Cárdenas, and Manuel Ávila Camacho. It is considered as a decisive period of 
institutionalization of the postrevolutionary state, after the defeat, with the collaboration of 
irregular forces, of the major rebellions of the 1920s. For reference, the dominant authoritarian 
party was founded in 1929 (the same year the defensas rurales were subordinated to the army), 
renamed in 1938 with the corporatist incorporation of popular sectors, and finally transformed 
into the modern PRI in 1946. 
 The presidential archives are the core collection of documents at the National Archive. 
They contain the universe of documents received and produced by the president’s office, 
including all types of reports, memorandums, petitions, and communications with officials and 
bureaus in the entire state apparatus, as well as with civil society organizations and ordinary 
citizens. Each archival record is associated with a physical index card, which contains the 
                                                 
92
 See especially Rath (2013) and the essays in Pansters (2012) and Fallaw and Rugeley (2012) . These studies also 
shed new light on the real extent of rural violence in postrevolutionary Mexico. 
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relevant reference number, date, basic identifying information of the person or institution 
associated with the record, state and locality if available, and sometimes a brief description of the 
documents it contains.  
 To construct the dataset, for each of the three presidential archives I hand-coded the 
information provided in all index cards under defensas sociales or defensas rurales, the terms 
used to classify documents concerning irregular forces. While these records address a variety of 
issues related to the defensas, a great many are complaints for their multiple abuses—including 
thefts, murders, unjustified detentions, harassment, and the like. Other types include petitions of 
armament or government support, notifications about the formation of a defensa, reports about 
their role in agrarian conflicts or combating banditry, and petitions by local officials or citizens 
to disarm the local militia.  
 Regardless of the specific content of the underlying record, however, the information 
available from the index card points to the existence of a rural defense unit in a given locality. 
This constitutes the essential piece of information I draw upon in the empirical sections below. 
By covering a relatively long period of time of three presidential administrations, I am able to 
generate an accurate map of the distribution of these forces in the territory in the formative years 
of the Mexican state. 
 In total, I recorded the information of 2,151 index cards, which correspond to an equal 
number of archival records. Of these, 49 correspond to records containing documents generally 
related to the militias, but without reference to a specific location. The remaining 2,102 concern 
a rural defense unit in a given town or locality. To illustrate, the following is an example of the 
data I recorded from an index card: 
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10/16/1933. Hidalgo [state]. Gandhó [locality]. Complaint against the Defensa. 
Residents complain that the Chiefs of the Defensa Social are the supreme authorities, 
since they are the ones who decide who is to be punished and how. They cite concrete 
cases and ask for the Defensa’s replacement.93  
 
 I then used INEGI’s geostatistical database of Mexico, which details the localities 
existing at the time of each census starting in 1900, and assigns them a unique code that is 
associated to spatial information, to identify each locality in my dataset of rural defense forces. 
This exercise was conducted manually, on a one-by-one basis. Ultimately, I was able to match 
1,711 entries to INEGI’s directory of Mexican localities, or 81.4% of the total. In the remaining 
cases, two or more homonymous localities existed in the state to which the locality in the card 
belonged to, and no other information was available to discriminate between them; therefore, it 
was impossible to determine the relevant geostatistical code.  
 Based on the available information, however, this loss of observations is not a major 
concern. No evidence suggests that localities that could not be identified are systematically 
different from those in the final sample in any respect, other than the fact that they happen to 
have more common or repeated names. As could be expected, the distribution of militia units 
across Mexican states is almost identical for observations in and out of the sample. In other 
words, observation loss is relatively minor (391 out of 2,102 cases) and in all likelihood random. 
To the best of my knowledge, then, it is not a source of bias in the statistical tests conducted 
below, nor does it result in an inaccurate picture of rural defense units. 
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 The translation is mine. Index cards for the presidential administration of Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934) 
provide more detailed description of the associated archival records than Cárdenas’ (1934-1940) or Ávila 
Camacho’s (1940-1946). In all cases, however, basic geographic information is provided. The original entry in the 
example reads: “Queja en su contra. Se quejan de que los Jefes de las Defensas Sociales son las Autoridades 
Supremas, pues son ellos los que dicen a quiénes y cómo debe castigarse. Citan casos concretos. Piden su cambio.” 
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 As in any study based on archival sources, the possibility remains that militias were 
active in some localities but left no paper trace in the presidential archives. This would be 
problematic if militias for which records do not exist were systematically different from those 
that did leave a paper trace. The variety in the type of documents concerning the militias found in 
the AGN, and the construction of the dataset on the basis of documents spanning a long period of 
fifteen years, partially allay this concern.  
 To further address the concern of potential selection bias, I accessed records of the 
American Military Intelligence Division, located in the National Archives of the United States, 
that list the 141 towns and cities that served as seats for militia battalions and regiments in 
Mexico in 1938.94 By this time, each specific militia unit in a given locality was affiliated with a 
larger battalion or regiment. The information available from these records is considerably more 
aggregated than my locality-level data, but spans the universe of militia forces. The distribution 
of battalions and regiments across Mexican states according to this source resembles the one that 
emerges from my locality-level data, which provides further assurance that selection is not a 
major concern. While I cannot categorically affirm there are no selection issues, the approach 
followed here opens new empirical ground and is the most exhaustive possible way to 
comprehensively study this crucial topic.  
 The resulting dataset represents the most comprehensive and disaggregated source on the 
existence and territorial distribution of paramilitary forces in Mexico collected to date. Overall, 
the more than 1,700 entries in the dataset indicate that 843 municipalities (36% of the total at the 
time) had a rural defense unit operating in at least one of its localities between 1932 and 1946. In 
comparison, in 1952 the army had 650 squads of an average of 14 troops stationed throughout 
                                                 
94
 Report No. 8679, October 7, 1938, “Quasi-Military Organizations. Reserves in various Military Zones.” Records 
of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), Military Intelligence Division, Security Classified 
Correspondence and Reports, 1917-1941 (Entry A1-65), box 686, file number 2025-259/671.  
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the country “to perform functions proper of the police and cooperate with civilian authorities.”95 
Assuming each squad was located in a different municipality, Rath estimates this corresponds to 
about one squad in every fifth municipality (2013, 117). A map depicting the exact location of 
rural militias appears below as Figure 3.1. 
 States like Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Puebla, and Veracruz show a high 
concentration of militia presence. As a first approximation, these states correspond to former 
rebel strongholds during the religious Cristero War (the center-west) and areas of deep agrarian 
conflict, the two main cleavages dominating politics during state formation. In the next section, I 
subject this connection to systematic empirical testing.
                                                 
95
 “Estadística de prestaciones sociales que el Ejército ha dado a otras dependencias oficiales y a elementos civiles 
del país, durante el año de 1952.” February 28, 1953. AGN, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, 550/24. 
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Figure 3.1.  Rural defense militias in postrevolutionary Mexico, 1932-1946 
 
Note: Each dot in the map represents a locality (population settlement) with a rural militia unit, according to archival records. See section 3.3 above for details.
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3.4 Religious Conflict, Agrarian Reform, and the Persistence of Paramilitarism 
3.4.1 Outcome variable 
 In order to probe the relationship between the two most contentious components of the 
state project—anticlericalism and agrarian reform—and the presence of rural defense forces, I 
estimate a series of regression models at the municipality level. I construct the dependent 
variable as the total number of localities (villages, ejidos, or any type of settlement) 
within a given municipality in which a militia existed in the period 1932-1946, based on the 
dataset described above. This constitutes an accurate measure of the extent to which the Mexican 
state relied on irregular armed groups for social control across the country’s municipalities. The 
results below are robust to specifying the dependent variable as a binary variable indicating 
whether a militia existed in the municipality or not. Descriptive statistics for all variables used 
throughout the present chapter appear in Table 3.4 in the Appendix. 
3.4.2 Other Variables 
Religious cleavage 
 As explained above, the religious cleavage that set apart political Catholics and 
anticlerical state elites manifested itself through violent insurgency during the Cristero War 
(1926-29). I therefore capture the spatial distribution of this underlying divide using a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if violent events related to the conflict took place in the 
municipality, local residents took up arms against the government, or if they actively provided 
support to the rebels. Municipalities where no violent events occurred, citizens did not 
participate in the insurgency, or rebels did not assert control received the value of zero. As 
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explained in chapter 2, the data were hand-coded for each municipality using multiple secondary 
sources, starting with Meyer’s pioneering work (1994, 1995) and complementing it with over a 
dozen regional and local studies that provide information not originally covered by Meyer. A list 
of consulted sources appears in the Bibliography. Overall, insurgent activity could be traced in 
approximately a quarter of all municipalities existing at the time. A map indicating the 
municipalities affected by insurgency based on this new dataset appeared in chapter 2 as Figure 
2.3. 
 
Agrarian reform 
 The second important dimension of contestation around the postrevolutionary state’s 
project relates to the redistributive conflicts linked to agrarian reform, which I measure using 
official data on land allocations from the Registro Agrario Nacional.96 As explained above, the 
protection of the agrarian rights acquired by communities became the official justification for the 
spread of militias, especially during Cárdenas’s presidency (Arellano Cruz 1950). To capture the 
intensity of agrarian reform in the municipality, I use all land allocations between 1916—the first 
year agrarian reform was implemented—and 1946, the last year included in the dataset on militia 
units. The relevant indicator is the total number of citizens benefitted by land grant decisions 
during these three decades, as a percentage of the population living in the municipality at the end 
of the period (1946).97 
 
                                                 
96
 The data were obtained through freedom of information requests. 
97
 To estimate the municipal population in 1946, I linearly interpolated data from the 1940 and 1950 censuses. 
Results are robust to using the percentage of municipalities’ area surface allocated via agrarian reform as an 
indicator. I use the number of beneficiaries to avoid overestimating the scope of land reform, since my measure of 
total surface area corresponds to the contemporary period but some municipalities have been subdivided since the 
1930s. 
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Insurgency in the Mexican Revolution 
 In addition to these key explanatory variables, I use a range of variables to address 
potential problems of selection or confounding. I include a binary indicator of whether the 
municipality experienced insurgent violence during the armed phase of the Revolution between 
1910 and 1917. As detailed in chapter 2, I hand-coded this variable for 2,176 municipalities 
relying on the vast historiography on the topic, in order to extend Dell’s dataset of 217 
municipalities and cover the entire country (2012).98 Introducing this control into the model is 
important because scholars have argued that agrarian reform responded to patterns of 
revolutionary insurgency, and the latter is also likely associated with the probability of observing 
citizen militias later on. Controlling for revolutionary violence is also important to disentangle 
the potential effects of religious resistance during the Cristero War from those of prior episodes 
of violent conflict. 
 
Preexisting state capacity 
 Another important concern is that spatial patterns of religious mobilization and agrarian 
reform, on the one hand, and the devolution of coercive capacity to rural defense militias, on the 
other, are all reflective of antecedent levels of state capacity that were rooted in the historical 
development of the state up to the twentieth century. Several important works on Latin American 
state-building focus on the nineteenth century to explain long-term patterns of state strength 
(Soifer 2015). To control for the possibility that deeper institutional conditions correlate with the 
explanatory factors and themselves shaped the postrevolutionary organization of coercion, I 
include the total number of state officials per 1,000 people in each municipality in 1900, 
                                                 
98
 Information could not be traced for approximately 200 municipalities. See footnote 58 in chapter 2. 
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obtained from the census. Results are robust to using the total number of police per 1,000 people 
in 1900 as an alternative measure of state penetration across municipalities, specific to the 
coercive apparatus.99 
 
Geography and remoteness 
 I also include a group of exogenous geographic variables that capture important features 
of municipalities. Several scholars argue that a difficult geography creates friction for state 
projects (Herbst 2000; Scott 2009). Conflict studies also link geographic conditions to the 
effective reach of the state, and specifically of its regular security forces (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). I use three different variables to comprehensively account for the potential influence of 
geography on both explanatory factors and the incidence of militia activity. The first is a measure 
of the roughness of terrain, which I calculate as the standard deviation of the altitude of all 
localities existing in the municipality according to the 2010 census. This measure precisely 
captures the difficulty posed by the terrain within each municipality and also other relevant 
characteristics of the land, like suitability for agriculture. 
 In addition, I include two measures of remoteness that could potentially influence 
patterns of religious insurgency and agrarian reform, as well as the state’s reliance on rural 
defense forces for local order. Distance from the centers of power has been shown to affect state 
development in other contexts (Herbst 2000). Using latitude and longitude data, I calculated the 
geodesic distance (“as the crow flies”) between the town serving as seat of government in each 
municipality and Mexico City in kilometers. The other measure is the geodesic distance between 
the seat of municipal government and the state capital. 
                                                 
99
 I use the number of bureaucrats because this variable has fewer missing values in the 1900 census. 
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Socioeconomic factors and state-specific characteristics 
 To further control for possibly confounding factors, extended model specifications 
include the percentage of the population living in rural areas in the municipality, the percentage 
employed in industry and commerce, the literacy rate, total population (log), and population 
density.100 All these variables are calculated using the 1930 census, and they capture 
socioeconomic conditions before the period covered by the dependent variable (1932-1946). 
Including these variables measured at the middle of the period (1940) instead of 1930 produces 
the same conclusions. 
 Finally, in some specifications I use state-level fixed effects to account for potentially 
relevant factors that distinguish municipalities located across different states. Mexican states are 
known to have many different economic, political, and cultural features that could conceivably 
influence the explanatory variables and the incidence of irregular armed groups. Including state 
fixed effects allows me to control for unobserved factors operating at this level. 
3.4.3  Results 
 Table 3.1 presents results for a series of cross-sectional ordinary-least-squares (OLS) 
regressions of the following form: 
 
                                                                           
 
 Rural militiasi is the number of localities in municipality i in which a militia unit 
operated between 1932 and 1946. Cristero insurgencyi is the dummy variable capturing 
                                                 
100
 Settlements of less than 2,500 people are considered rural. The share of the population working in industry and 
commerce is a good indicator of development, as it is strongly correlated with GDP per capita estimates at the state 
level. The literacy rate is calculated as the number of people of 10 years of age or more that knew how to read and 
write, divided by total population.  Although positively correlated, correlation coefficients between these 
socioeconomic variables are below 0.3, which suggests they each capture independent information. 
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resistance to state anticlericalism during the Cristero War, agrarian reformi is the percentage of 
the population in the municipality benefitted by agrarian reform up to 1946, Xi is the vector of 
controls, and       is a state fixed effect for municipality i located in state s. 
The baseline specification in column 1 includes only measures for the two key 
explanatory factors. The extended specification in column 2 adds controls for insurgency during 
the Revolution, preexisting state capacity, and the range of geographic and socioeconomic 
factors. Column 3 also includes all controls and adds a full set of state fixed effects. Standard 
errors in all regressions throughout the chapter are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
 In all specifications, the relationships of interest are in the expected direction and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. When all controls and fixed effects are included 
(column 3), the coefficient on the Cristero War dummy indicates that, on average, municipalities 
that participated in the religious rebellion had 0.5 more state-sanctioned militia units within their 
borders in the following decades.  
 This systematic association supports the argument that the state was more likely to 
perpetuate an irregular coercive apparatus in areas of deep Catholic opposition, where its early 
anticlericalism had resulted in a deficit of basic legitimacy. The finding suggests that such kind 
of resistance to state authority can create incentives for central states to engage in long-lasting 
cooperation with coercive actors in society, rather than monopolizing violence. Rural militias not 
only collaborated with the state during the rebellion, as historical studies have found. They 
continued to play a role in the surveillance of communities where, given the clash between the 
state project and entrenched local values, unwillingness to comply had become the norm.
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Table 3.1.  Linear models of rural militia activity between 1932 and 1946  
 
Dependent variable: number of rural 
militias in the municipality 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Cristero War insurgency 0.67*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 
 
(9.47) (5.99) (5.63) 
% agrarian reform beneficiaries (1916-1946) 0.004* 0.007** 0.01*** 
 
(2.08) (3.22) (4.31) 
Revolution insurgency 
 
0.19*** 0.12* 
  
(3.38) (2.09) 
State officials per 1,000 (1900) 
 
0.01 -0.01 
  
(0.93) (-0.80) 
Terrain roughness 
 
0.001** 0.001** 
  
(3.29) (2.72) 
Distance to Mex City 
 
-0.0004*** -0.0005 
  
(-5.94) (-1.72) 
Distance to state capital 
 
0.001* 0.001 
  
(2.34) (1.71) 
% rural pop (1930) 
 
0.005*** 0.005*** 
  
(4.45) (5.26) 
% in industry and commerce (1930) 
 
-0.006 -0.006 
  
(-0.88) (-0.87) 
% literate (1930) 
 
-0.003 0.01*** 
  
(-1.38) (3.52) 
Log population (1930) 
 
0.47*** 0.53*** 
  
(14.06) (12.87) 
Population density (1930) 
 
-0.001** -0.001*** 
  
(-3.28) (-3.62) 
Constant 0.41*** -3.88*** -5.63*** 
 
(13.78) (-12.18) (-10.19) 
State fixed effects No No Yes 
    
R
2
 0.06 0.26 0.38 
N 2,217 1,880 1,880 
Each model is an OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. t statistics in parentheses. The 
number of observations in models 2 and 3 drops due to the lower number of municipalities in 1900 and missing 
values in the control variables.  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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 Turning to the relationship between agrarian reform and irregular militias, the results also 
show a positive and significant association after controlling for potential confounding factors. 
Based on the estimation in column 3, a ten percentage point increase in the beneficiaries of land 
reform is associated to 0.1 more militia units operating in the villages within a municipality, on 
average. Interestingly, the coefficient on Cristero insurgency is more substantial. This suggests 
that the religious cleavage was of overriding importance in the investing of coercive power in 
militias, contrary to conventional class-based interpretations both in state discourse and the 
historiography. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with state-builders surrendering strict 
control over coercion in order to impose agrarian reform, another highly contentious aspect of 
the revolutionary project. As mentioned, different combinations of political expediency and 
ideological commitment to lower-class interests likely lay behind this strategy, with the latter 
reaching its peak under Cardenismo. 
 This particular interpretation of the result, however, should be taken with caution. 
Agrarian reform may be endogenous to the presence of rural defense forces; in the absence of an 
instrument for agrarian reform, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the observed 
relationship is driven by reverse causality.  
 Similarly, given the contradictory roles played by the militias in local class struggles, a 
positive association does not constitute evidence that rural forces invariably worked as bulwarks 
of agrarian reform, as official state rhetoric would have it. To the contrary, archival and 
secondary sources indicate that in many instances they acted on behalf of propertied interests 
allied with conservative military officers, harassing land petitioners and restricting access to 
granted lands. In this sense, their relatively greater presence in municipalities with more land 
reform beneficiaries could reflect a defensive strategy adopted by these interests. Any 
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generalization about the political role of militias in agrarian conflicts and the objectives pursued 
by the state in this domain would mask considerable variation.   
 Yet these issues aside, this result makes clear that class conflict in the countryside, as the 
religious divide, mapped onto the distribution of state-sanctioned militia forces. The empirical 
analysis thus lends support to my argument that deep social divisions concerning the role of 
religion and the distribution of property conditioned the new state’s ability to secure consent 
among broad segments of society, and crystallized in the exercise of coercive power through 
civil society itself. 
 The control variables indicate that militias tended to be more prevalent in municipalities 
characterized by rougher terrain and in rural areas, consistent with the qualitative evidence on 
their policing functions in the periphery. Interestingly, municipalities that experienced violence 
or insurgency during the armed phase of the Revolution also appear to have more irregular forces 
on average. Patterns of revolutionary mobilization thus seem to have had an impact on the social 
and spatial distribution of the means of coercion in subsequent decades. 
 In sum, these results indicate that the most divisive elements of the postrevolutionary 
project shaped the territorial organization of coercion, as well as state strategies toward 
paramilitarism. The reliance on civilian armed actors linked to the military became a staple 
feature of Mexico’s authoritarian regime during the twentieth century. To an extent that had been 
difficult to fully appreciate and document, order in the countryside was maintained through an 
informal coercive-institutional structure that transgressed the formal boundaries of the state. The 
results in this section trace the historical roots of this mode of exercising power to the religious 
and class cleavages that structured political loyalties and attitudes toward the new state in its 
 153 
 
formative period. The next section examines the implications of this reliance on militia forces for 
the development of security and justice institutions in the long run.  
3.5 Historical Paramilitarism and the Underdevelopment of Security and Justice 
Institutions 
 
 Qualitative archival evidence points to an extensive role of rural militias in maintaining 
order, mediating local conflicts, and transmitting information upwards to the military. As 
explained in section 3.2, their territorial coverage and influence on local life seems to have 
decreased over time. The army increasingly restricted control over coercive power by deciding 
which groups to arm and disarm. However, it is telling that rural defense forces continue to exist 
to this day as non-professional agents of order rooted in local society. Under the oversight of the 
military, they have long served as tools of repression, mediation, and surveillance operating 
within society itself. Yet formally, policing and the administration of justice were historically 
responsibilities of civilian authorities in the states and municipalities, as they continue to be 
today.  
 I argue that the constant meddling of militias in local affairs, and their unwillingness to 
surrender the informal power they possessed, inhibited the development of institutional capacity 
by regular state structures in charge of law and order. The mechanisms linking the historical 
presence of rural defense forces to fragile local state institutions are straightforward, and below I 
discuss qualitative evidence in their support. First, they served as a substitute for the construction 
of a civil apparatus capable of enforcing rules, solving conflicts, and maintaining order. Second, 
the military, as the principal to whom militias had to respond, and the militias themselves, had 
incentives to obstruct that process. The development of a capable local apparatus, with effective 
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civil police forces and other formal institutions, would have weakened their social control and 
forced them to share, if not surrender, control over the local use of coercion. 
 This section thus turns the presence of militia forces from a product of the struggles of 
the formative period of the state, into an explanatory variable. I estimate a series of regression 
models to systematically examine the relationship between this historical factor and the law 
enforcement capacities of the civil governmental apparatus in the contemporary period. To check 
the robustness of this association, I examine a variety of relevant law and order outcomes.  
 My focus is on the ability of the state to penetrate territory and society through formal 
and professional institutions, with the purpose of deterring crime and keeping the peace in a 
routinized, regular, legal-rational way. This contrasts with exceptional methods to restore or 
impose order, including emergency interventions by the center and the deployment of military 
troops to perform conventional public security functions. 
3.5.1 Outcome variables 
Local police strength 
 As a first entry into the regular law and order capabilities of the state in the contemporary 
period, I examine the strength of municipal police forces. Under Mexico’s legal system, local 
police forces are the primary institutions responsible for public security. Their structural 
weakness is widely considered to be an underlying cause of the lasting militarization of security 
in several parts of the country, not only for counterdrug operations but even basic policing. 
According to a 2014 bill proposed by the executive to reform the country’s police system, some 
24% of municipalities in the country lacked an organized police force due to “political or 
budgetary reasons,” and only 14 of 31 states had one in all of their municipalities. Among 
existing local police bodies, 86% were composed of less than 100 officers; the bottom 45% 
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averaged only 12, and low salaries and a lack of professionalization were the norm. Municipal 
police forces thus “lack the material and human resources required to correctly perform their 
functions, or even cover the territory effectively.”101 
 I argue that the central state’s historical alliance with citizen militias, operated via the 
military, is an important factor behind contemporary police weakness. Already in the early 
1920s, a bill in Congress considered irregular forces to be “a threat hanging over local 
governments” and called for their disarmament in order to “restore municipalities’ constitutional 
right to command their own police.”102 Some of the complaints and petitions to disarm the 
militias found in the presidential archives came from mayors themselves.103 In one case, the 
defensa was accused of attacking the local police and obstructing the government’s operation.104 
 More frequently, the state relied upon the army and the militias to deal with banditry, 
petty crime, and agrarian discontent. For the federal government, this worked as a strategy to 
subordinate local authorities. Although fragmentary, the evidence of rural defense forces and 
regular military troops substituting local governments in domestic policing is overwhelming 
(Rath 2013). Where historical circumstances had made them the dominant coercion-wielding 
actors, then, civilian authorities lacked the need or the opportunity to build their own capacities. 
 To evaluate the generalizability of this claim and assess whether the potential 
consequences are still observable, I use two measures of local police strength. The first is the 
ratio of police per hundred thousand citizens in each municipality. The information comes from 
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 Iniciativa de Decreto por el que se reforman los artículos 21, 73, 104, 105, 115, 116 y 123 de la Constitución 
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Available at: 
http://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/justicia/docs/Audiencias_Seg_Justicia/Iniciativa_Poder_Ejecutivo.pdf 
102
 Proyecto de decreto por el que se derogan autorizaciones concedidas a gobiernos de los estados para organizar 
fuerzas de seguridad, AGN, Obregón-Calles, 104-D-9. 
103
 For example, AGN, Abelardo Rodríguez, 541.51/53; Lázaro Cárdenas, 542.1/2646. 
104
 Queja en contra de la Defensa Rural de Cacalutla, Atoyac de Álvarez, AGN, Abelardo Rodríguez, 541.5/63-5. 
 156 
 
INEGI and is available biennially starting in 2008.105 I average the four available data points, but 
results are robust to using any of the years. Police per capita rates do not capture several 
important dimensions of police professionalization and development, including responsiveness, 
political neutrality, and accountability. However, it is a measure of the institutional resources 
available to municipal governments, of particular relevance in the Mexican context. 
 As a second measure of police capacity, I use the number of police stations, posts, 
booths, or similar infrastructures per thousand square kilometers in 2014, which I calculated 
using data from INEGI. The latter is a measure of the extent to which the police has physically 
penetrated the local territory, as well as its ability to perform its functions beyond the municipal 
seat. 
 
Municipal justice institutions 
 In addition to the development of the police, I investigate if the presence of rural militias 
in the past is systematically related to the strength of local justice and conflict-resolution 
institutions. The majority of civil and criminal cases in the country are handled by state level 
public ministries (prosecutors) and judicial systems. However, the power to administer justice 
concerning basic public order regulations, settle minor controversies, and intervene in local 
incidents to prevent the commission of crimes lies with the jueces cívicos (civic judges) in the 
municipality.  
 These local authorities handle petty offenses, mediate in disputes between residents, and 
serve as links with legally competent authorities when a crime is committed. They can impose 
fines and other sanctions, as well as authorize short-term arrests. In this sense, civic judges can 
                                                 
105
 Tellingly, the number of local police officers was unknown before the first census implemented by INEGI in 
2009. 
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play an important role in maintaining local order and preventing the escalation of private 
conflicts or minor infractions. 
 Qualitative evidence again provides reason to believe that the informal power invested in 
the militias and the army, as a result of early political conflicts, stunted the development of 
municipal justice and conflict-solving institutions. In the example provided above to explain the 
coding of the dataset, residents of a locality in the state of Hidalgo complained in 1933 that 
members of the local militia decided “who was to be punished and how.” Many of the 
observations in the dataset originate in demands for justice for crimes and abuses committed by 
members of the militia, addressed to the central state. This pattern again points to the ability of 
rural forces to subdue formal local institutions. Later, in the context of the counterinsurgency 
campaigns of the 1970s, conducted with the collaboration of militias, army publications 
emphasized the intervention of members of the armed forces as “Solomonic judges” in rural 
areas, to “establish norms of justice” and “reconcile collective sentiments.”106 
 To test for the existence of long-run effects, I draw on data on local justice institutions 
available from INEGI. The relevant indicator is the number of jueces cívicos per hundred 
thousand citizens in each municipality. 
 
Homicides 
 The above measures rely on the human and physical resources of state agencies to 
capture the contemporary strength of the state. These resources are expected to directly influence 
the actual ability of the state to regulate social life and logistically implement decisions (Mann 
2012). An alternative operationalization strategy consists in capturing state capacity by proxy, 
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 Revista del Ejército y la Fuerza Aérea, December 1972, 56. 
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using output-based indicators. This strategy has the disadvantage that the purported measures of 
stateness may also be reflecting a host of other factors in addition to the underlying capacity to 
enforce (Fukuyama 2013; Soifer 2016b); however, it reveals the actual performance of the state 
in relevant functions. 
 The primary evidence from archival documents suggests that the militias contributed to 
high levels of violence in the countryside, at least during the 1930s and 1940s when a lack of 
professionalization and weak command structures were the norm. They were directly implicated 
in local feuds, and to the extent that their presence interfered with the consolidation of stronger 
security and justice institutions, they might also be associated with more violence in the long run. 
To evaluate this possibility, I use the average homicide rate in each municipality from 2000 to 
2015. I use the average to capture the structural level of violence independent of short-term 
fluctuations, but the same results are obtained using other shorter or longer time frames. 
 
Vigilantism 
 As a final test of the effects of the central state’s symbiotic relationship with rural militias 
on the strength of civil institutions and the rule of law, I examine whether this historical variable 
is systematically associated with the emergence of vigilante organizations in recent years. This 
part of the analysis draws heavily on recent work by Philips (2016), who defines vigilante 
organizations as “sustained associations of private citizens voluntarily seeking to illegally control 
crime or other social infractions in a planned, premeditated way, involving force or the threat of 
force.” Philips examines the Mexican case and argues that inequality favors the rise of these 
groups.    
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 The privatization of security provision has intensified in the context of the Mexican war 
of drugs. In 2013, heavily-armed autodefensa (self-defense) groups emerged in several 
municipalities, most notably in the state of Michoacán. Generalizing about these groups is 
difficult. It is clear that some tapped into reservoirs of genuine social support. However, as 
archetypical racketeers (Tilly 1985), they were accused of gross human rights abuses, having 
links to outright criminal organizations, and preying upon the populations they claimed to 
defend. The wave of vigilantism spread to other areas; it also reinforced preexisting traditions of 
grassroots community policing in other states. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the federal 
government responded by deploying the military and central bureaucrats to Michoacán, 
colluding with the vigilantes against organized crime, and finally enlisting them in the army’s 
long-existing defensas rurales, mimicking the developments of the 1920s. 
 A history of existence of rural defense groups may be associated with the emergence of 
modern vigilantism given its weakening effects on formal state institutions. In addition to this 
institutional mechanism, the cultural (Nunn 2012) and organizational (Daly 2012) legacies of 
past armed mobilization are a second possible, complementary path. Residents of municipalities 
where rural defense units were prevalent in the postrevolutionary period could draw upon a long-
standing tradition of local organizing to wield coercion and take law and order into their own 
hands. Inherited norms of behavior and social networks are likely important ingredients of such 
traditions favorable to collective action.  
 At this time, the dearth of information on Mexican rural militias, which this study starts 
to remedy, makes it impossible to carry out detailed case studies and longitudinal analyses to 
systematically test the mechanisms of historical persistence in this particular case. Anecdotally, 
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however, the very incorporation of the autodefensas into the corps of rural defense forces is 
revealing of the links between the two. 
 To test whether historical militia activity and the emergence of vigilantism today are 
systematically related, I rely on and extend Phillips original data on vigilante organizations. 
Phillips used media sources to identify municipalities where these groups operated in 2013. His 
dichotomous variable indicates that they emerged in 76 municipalities located across 13 of 32 
states. Following the same approach, I extended his database to cover subsequent years and 
complement it with information from new official reports on the topic, produced by the National 
Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos 2013, 2015). In total, 
the new dataset indicates that self-defense and community policing groups have operated in 145 
municipalities since 2013.107 Running the analysis on the data originally compiled by Phillips 
produces similar results.  
3.5.2 Other variables 
 The primary relationship of interest in the regressions below is between historical rural 
militia activity and contemporary law and order outcomes. Historical rural militia activity is 
coded as the total number of localities within a given municipality in which a rural defense force 
was active at some point between 1932 and 1946, based on my archival research. All results are 
consistent to instead coding it as a dichotomous variable. 
 The regressions reported below also include a vector of covariates that may jointly 
influence the presence of militias in the past and the dependent variables. These include levels of 
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 A list of sources supporting the coding for each municipality not originally included by Phillips is available from 
the author.  
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state capacity before the Revolution,108 the roughness of terrain within the municipality, distance 
to both the country’s and the state’s capitals, population density, the share of the population in 
rural areas, the literacy rate, and the percentage employed in industry or commerce (a proxy for 
economic development). As in section 3.4 above, to minimize endogeneity problems, all these 
variables enter the models as of 1930—before the first data point for the dependent variable and 
the major expansion of rural defense forces under Cardenismo. All OLS models also include 
state fixed effects to account for potential unobserved confounders at the state level.109 
 For all outcome variables, I also run a second set of regressions that include more recent 
covariates. Models for the strength of police and justice institutions include municipal tax 
revenues per capita to control for governments’ financial resources, and the homicide rate to 
address the possibility of crime levels driving institutional investments. Both of these variables 
enter the models as an average from 2000 to 2007, whereas measures for the dependent variables 
start in 2008 or later.  
 An extended specification on vigilantism includes the average number of police per 
capita from 2008 to 2012 and the average homicide rate from 2010 to 2012 as predictors. The 
dataset on vigilante groups coded information from 2013 onwards. These variables are included 
to control for the possibility that any potential association between historical militia activity and 
contemporary vigilantism is driven by state institutional features or crime rates. Additionally, all 
models in this second set include the Gini coefficient of economic inequality and (log) per capita 
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 I report results using the number of state officials per capita in 1900 as a measure of pre-revolutionary state 
capacity in the municipality, but results for all models are robust to instead using data on police per capita. Although 
the latter is more directly connected to law and order, it contains more missing values in the 1900 census. 
109
 I use logistic regression to estimate models with presence of vigilante groups as the dependent variable. Potential 
state-level effects are not taken into account in these models because the dependent variable does not vary within the 
majority of states. 
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GDP in 2010 (in 2005 US dollars). The sources are the National Council of Evaluation of Social 
Development Policy and the United Nations Development Programme, respectively. 
 Naturally, these post-treatment confounders may introduce bias in the estimated 
relationships. Variables introduced as controls in this second set of models may themselves be—
in fact, in some cases are expected to be—directly affected by historical militia presence. Notice, 
however, that adding these covariates to the models is more likely to bias the effects of 
“treatment” (historical militia presence) downwards, rather than the opposite. Their inclusion 
serves as a demanding robustness check and may indirectly speak to the underlying mechanisms 
driving the observed associations. 
3.5.3 Results 
 Table 3.2 presents results for OLS regressions with municipal police strength and judicial 
capacity as dependent variables. Results for homicide rates and vigilantism appear in Table 3.3. 
In models for vigilantism I use logistic regression, given the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable. 
  Overall, a strong negative association exists between the reliance on state-sanctioned 
rural militias during the state’s formative period, and the strength of civil law and order 
institutions in the long run. Results are statistically significant at conventional levels and in the 
expected direction for all of the multiple outcome variables used, whether direct measures of 
state institutional resources or output-based indicators of stateness. Importantly, these 
associations do not appear to be driven by levels of state capacity prior to the Revolution, 
geography, remoteness, socioeconomic structure, or other potential confounders. 
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Table 3.2.  Linear models of state capacity for law and order, 2008-2014 
 
DV: local police per capita, average 
2008-14 
DV: police stations per 
1,000 km
2
, 2014 
DV: civic judges per capita, 2014 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
# of localities with rural militia (1932-46) -38.5*** -28.1*** -20.9*** -2.03*** -2.88*** -6.21*** -4.99*** -3.22** 
 
(-7.35) (-5.11) (-3.91) (-3.44) (-4.39) (-6.43) (-5.34) (-3.27) 
State officials per 1,000 (1900) 
 
-12.8* -9.99 -1.71 -1.70 
 
-1.92* -1.71* 
  
(-2.27) (-1.87) (-1.60) (-1.62) 
 
(-2.34) (-2.20) 
Terrain roughness 
 
-0.24** -0.16* -0.04*** -0.03** 
 
-0.05*** -0.04** 
  
(-3.18) (-2.39) (-4.83) (-3.15) 
 
(-3.74) (-3.05) 
Distance to Mex City 
 
-0.15 -0.17 0.01 0.01 
 
-0.16*** -0.16*** 
  
(-0.85) (-0.94) (0.87) (0.74) 
 
(-5.01) (-5.20) 
Distance to state capital 
 
-0.74** -0.54* -0.06* -0.04 
 
0.052 0.07 
  
(-3.21) (-2.47) (-2.35) (-1.79) 
 
(1.63) (1.83) 
% rural pop (1930) 
 
2.97*** 2.62*** 0.2** 0.27*** 
 
0.43*** 0.29*** 
  
(6.60) (5.46) (3.04) (3.62) 
 
(7.20) (4.61) 
% in industry and commerce (1930) 
 
9.39 9.96 -0.08 -0.34 
 
0.66 0.96 
  
(0.97) (1.01) (-0.20) (-0.85) 
 
(0.65) (0.94) 
% literate (1930) 
 
6.62** 5.13** 0.86*** 0.33 
 
1.31*** 1.22** 
  
(3.18) (2.58) (4.06) (1.27) 
 
(3.58) (3.27) 
Population density (1930) 
 
-0.08 -0.02 0.38** 0.37** 
 
-0.050 -0.04 
  
(-0.32) (-0.10) (3.11) (3.08) 
 
(-1.83) (-1.42) 
Homicide rate (avg 2000-07) 
  
-2.39 
 
-0.01 
  
0.22 
   
(-1.66) 
 
(-0.09) 
  
(0.52) 
Municipal taxes per capita (avg 2000-07) 
  
0.01 
 
-0.03 
  
0.04 
   
(0.07) 
 
(-0.96) 
  
(1.89) 
Inequality (2010 Gini) 
  
-18.2*** 
 
-0.08 
  
-4.69*** 
   
(-4.46) 
 
(-0.25) 
  
(-5.36) 
Log GDP per capita (2010) 
  
17.1 
 
31.5*** 
  
-6.88 
   
(0.29) 
 
(3.44) 
  
(-0.86) 
Constant 184.6*** -126.6 496.5 -40.3*** -319.4*** 6.21*** 12.6 270.7*** 
 
(9.76) (-1.40) (0.89) (-3.52) (-3.48) (4.66) (0.92) (3.68) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         R
2
 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.21 0.26 0.29 
N 2,331 1,912 1,899 1,784 1,771 1,836 1,836 1,823 
Each model is an OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. t statistics in parentheses.  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.3.  Models of strength of law and order, 2000-2016  
 
Dependent variable: homicide 
rate, average 2000-15 
Dependent variable: presence 
of vigilante group, 2013-16 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# localities rural militia (1932-46) 0.99*** 0.78** 0.89*** 0.50*** 0.41*** 0.27*** 
 
(4.00) (3.29) (3.61) (9.86) (7.26) (4.45) 
State officials per 1,000 (1900) 
 
0.33* 0.33* 
 
0.10* 0.092 
  
(2.49) (2.53) 
 
(2.41) (1.83) 
Terrain roughness 
 
0.02*** 0.01*** 
 
0.002*** 0.002** 
  
(6.49) (5.56) 
 
(4.14) (2.69) 
Distance to Mex City 
 
0.02** 0.02** 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
  
(3.15) (3.23) 
 
(-1.20) (-1.49) 
Distance to state capital 
 
0.04*** 0.03*** 
 
0.003 0.008 
  
(6.17) (5.29) 
 
(1.53) (0.41) 
% rural pop (1930) 
 
0.028** 0.016 
 
-0.01** -0.009 
  
(2.69) (1.52) 
 
(-2.83) (-1.87) 
% in industry and commerce (1930) 
 
-0.17* -0.12 
 
0.032 0.042 
  
(-2.43) (-1.72) 
 
(1.14) (1.24) 
% literate (1930) 
 
-0.094* 0.015 
 
-0.04*** -0.05* 
  
(-2.10) (0.31) 
 
(-3.34) (-2.50) 
Population density (1930) 
 
0.0041 0.006 
 
-0.007 -0.01* 
  
(1.33) (1.79) 
 
(-1.65) (-1.96) 
Inequality (2010 Gini) 
  
0.15 
  
0.16*** 
   
(1.56) 
  
(5.81) 
Log GDP per capita (2010) 
  
-5.66*** 
  
0.28 
   
(-4.83) 
  
(0.70) 
Police per capita (avg 2008-12) 
     
-0.002* 
      
(-1.98) 
Homicide rate (avg 2010-12) 
     
0.007* 
      
(2.34) 
Constant 2.94*** -7.84* 36.6*** -3.28*** -1.93*** -10.7** 
 
(8.62) (-2.08) (3.45) (-28.83) (-3.36) (-2.99) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
       R2 0.36 0.42 0.42 
   
N 2,349 1,917 1,915 2,349 1,917 1,909 
Columns 1 to 3 show OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and t statistics in parentheses. 
Columns 4 to 6 show logistic regression estimates with z statistics in parentheses. 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Columns 1-3 in Table 3.2 indicate that the more rural militia units operated in a 
municipality historically, the fewer police officers per capita exist today. Columns 4 and 5 show 
that this historical factor is also negatively related to the number of police stations relative to 
territory. These results are consistent with irregular militia forces carrying out local social control 
functions under the military’s purview, thereby inhibiting police development in the long run. 
Based on columns 2 and 4, for every additional locality with an organized militia unit, the 
municipality has, on average, 28 less law enforcement agents per hundred thousand citizens 
today, and 2 police stations less per thousand square kilometers. 
Columns 6 to 8 in Table 3.2 indicate that local justice and conflict-resolution institutions 
across Mexican municipalities are also weaker on average where the defensas rurales were more 
prevalent. After controlling for potential confounders, column 7 reports 5 less civic judges per 
hundred thousand citizens for every additional militia unit in the municipality. The contemporary 
weakness of formal law and order institutions, then, is deeply associated with the central state’s 
historical willingness to tolerate and ally with local paramilitary forces to maintain order. The 
central state’s connivance, as analyzed in section 3.4, was in turn determined by the strong 
political polarization and resistance surrounding the revolutionary state-building project. 
 Turning to the output-based measures of the strength of law and order institutions, 
columns 1 to 3 in Table 3.3 shows a strong negative relationship between the reliance on militias 
and the current capacity of the state to perform its core function of preventing violent death. For 
every additional locality in which a militia unit operated in the 1930s and 1940s, the average 
homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants from 2000 to 2015 is about one unit higher. 
 Columns 4 to 6 in Table 3.3 indicate that the presence of state-sanctioned rural militias 
historically is also strongly associated with the presence of vigilante organizations today, even 
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after accounting for a number of potential confounders like geography and socioeconomic 
structure. Using the results presented in column 5 and holding all other variables constant at their 
means, the predicted probability of contemporary vigilantism goes from 0.03 in municipalities 
with no evidence of historical militia activity, to 0.65 when the number of rural militia units in 
the municipality takes its highest value in the sample (10). To illustrate this result graphically, 
Figure 3.2 below shows the predicted probability that a vigilante group operated in a 
municipality between 2013 and 2016 as a function of the number of organized rural militia 
groups present in the localities of that same municipality between 1932 and 1946, according to 
my historical dataset. To generate the predicted probabilities, all other variables in model 5 of 
Table 3.3 were held at their means. 
 
Figure 3.2.  Predicted probability of vigilantism in municipalities between 
2013 and 2016, at different values of the historical rural militias variable 
and with other variables at their means 
 
Note: Probabilities calculated based on the logistic regression results presented in column 
5 of Table 3.3. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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 The coefficient decreases in size but remains statistically significant if the contemporary 
capabilities of local state agencies—as measured by local police per capita—are introduced as a 
control. This suggests that while the mechanisms linking historical paramilitarism to the recent 
emergence of vigilante groups partially operate at the level of state institutions, the effects also 
run through cultural and organizational channels within society. Consistent with Philips’s 
findings (2016), column 6 shows that economic inequality is positively associated with vigilante 
mobilization. However, the negative coefficient on police per capita in the same model contrasts 
with his conclusion that state capacity is not systematically related to vigilantism. Most likely, 
this difference emerges from the fact that his measures of the state (GDP per capita and libraries 
per capita) are not directly linked to law enforcement. 
 Overall, the results presented in this section point to a strong connection between patterns 
of reorganization and distribution of coercion during the period of state formation, and the 
contemporary weakness of security and justice institutions. The reliance on irregular, village-
based armed groups to maintain local order and counter societal resistance stabilized the 
postrevolutionary state; paradoxically, however, it held back the development of formal civil 
institutions capable of upholding the rule of law in the long run. 
3.6 Conclusions 
 This chapter carried out two main tasks: first, it examined how bitter political conflict and 
high levels of political polarization shaped the process of rebuilding a state with control over 
physical force after revolutionary collapse; second, it traced long-term local-level variation in the 
strength of civil security and justice institutions to variations in that historical process. 
Understanding why, when, and where central states succeed or fail at concentrating coercion into 
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regular security apparatuses is a fundamental question of political development. I argued that 
during processes of state formation characterized by strong factionalism and sharp cleavages, the 
central state may relinquish a strict monopoly and delegate violence to social actors, in order to 
enforce compliance and supplement a lack of legitimacy.  
 For emerging states with a contentious political agenda, the alliance with local armed 
groups in the social realm may help in producing order in peripheral areas, breaking resistance 
among social sectors excluded from the state-building coalition, and pushing through their 
political project. Such strategies, adopted out of ideological commitment and political 
expediency, may have fateful consequences for state development in the long run. To the extent 
that control over coercion remains loose and social control rests on semi-formal actors, the path 
to strong civil security and justice institutions is closed off. 
 My analysis identifies historical continuity in spatial patterns of institutional weakness 
across Mexico’s territory, which defies simple characterizations of the current security and 
human rights crisis as a product of modern organized crime and drug trafficking. It also sheds 
new light on the long history of paramilitarism, rural violence, and military intervention in 
domestic security in Mexico, which has been minimized by the conventional narrative of a 
hegemonic, stable, and only occasionally repressive authoritarian regime. The evidence I present 
suggests that the contemporary reliance on the military for domestic security is not simply a 
consequence of the weakness of civil security institutions, but rather that the role played by the 
military and its semiofficial militia apparatus historically contributed to that very 
underdevelopment. The chapter thus provides a historically-grounded understanding of the poor 
shape of crucial institutions and suggests that this weakness is associated with the ways in which 
coercion was historically organized to deal with resistance to the state.  
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 From a strictly Weberian standard, the importance of rural defense forces for the 
postrevolutionary order, and their century-old persistence, represent symptoms of a defective, 
incomplete process of state formation. Deep-seated societal disagreement and contention around 
the political project advanced by state-builders in the aftermath of civil war can be said to have 
arrested the process of monopolization of violence by formal security forces, bound by strict 
rules and clearly differentiated from society. This insight may be potentially exportable to other 
experiences of state formation fraught with internal dissension.  
 However, the reliance on coercive actors outside the realm of formal institutions should 
not be readily conflated with state “weakness.” Despite the multiple principal-agent problems in 
the relationship between states and rural defense forces, the latter played a fundamental role in 
the reproduction of state rule and the enforcement of social order. Their durability presupposed 
the state’s tacit even if reluctant consent, and they allowed the military to deeply embed itself in 
local society at a low financial cost. In this sense, militia units stabilized the state and augmented 
its power, rather than being unambiguous signs of weakness.
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3.7 Appendix 
Table 3.4.  Descriptive statistics. Dataset on rural militias and the rule of law in Mexico 
    Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables 
     
 
Number of localities with rural militia (1932-46) 2,349 0.61 1.16 0 10 
 
Municipal police per 100,000 people (average 2008-14) 2,434 372.68 588 0 7,641 
 
Municipal police stations per km
2 
(2014) 2,277 25.25 67.22 0 939.4 
 
Civic judges per 100,000 people (2014) 2,339 37.63 96.8 0 1,389 
 
Homicides per 100,000 people (average 2000-15) 2,457 14.21 16.81 0 253.1 
 
Vigilante organization (binary) (2013-16) 2,457 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Independent variables 
     
 
Cristero War insurgency (binary) (1926-29) 2,303 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 
Agrarian reform beneficiaries (1916-1946, % 1946 pop) 2,268 9.76 9.93 0 80.15 
 
Mexican Revolution insurgency (binary) (1910-1917) 2,264 0.34 0.47 0 1 
 
State officials per 1,000 people (1900) 1,983 1.21 2.15 0 25.10 
 
Terrain roughness (Std. Dev. altitude within mun.) 2,425 171.73 156.65 0 1,108 
 
Distance to Mexico City (km from municipal head) 2,457 455.65 374.36 2.21 2,299 
 
Distance to state capital (km from municipal head) 2,457 100.35 70.67 0 524.2 
 
Rural population (% 1930) 2,223 87.54 24.84 0 100 
 
Population in industry and commerce (% 1930) 2,233 2.90 3.77 0 60.31 
 
Literacy (% 1930) 2,233 20.62 12.23 0 65.33 
 
Population (1930, logged) 2,233 8.26 1.06 5.32 12.13 
 
Population density (1930) 2,199 33.57 65.96 0 1,538 
 
Homicides per 100,000 people (average 2000-07) 2,454 11.33 13.71 0 151.4 
 
Municipal taxes per capita (pesos, average 2000-07) 2,424 61.61 124.98 0.003 2,193 
 
Economic inequality (Gini, 2010) 2,454 41.20 3.90 28.6 59.10 
 
GDP per capita (2010, in 2005 US dollars, logged) 2,456 8.96 0.45 7.79 10.76 
 
Municipal police per 100,000 people (average 2008-12) 2,433 361.44 572.11 0 7,079 
  Homicides per 1000,000 people (average 2010-12) 2,456 20.17 34.55 0 566.9 
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4 THE “EXTIRPATION OF FANATICISM”: AGRARIAN REFORM, MASS 
EDUCATION, AND CITIZEN REGISTRATION IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY 
MEXICO110 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Rather than external warfare, turning the state into a more powerful vehicle for partisan interests 
within society is frequently the engine for state-building. Because partisan goals are pursued, 
elite incentives to build state capacity vary across territory, as does citizens’ willingness to 
comply with the state. Institutions in polarized political systems thus develop unevenly, and state 
capacity across territory comes to reflect underlying cleavages. I examine the implications of this 
argument for the development of non-coercive state institutions of social control across territory. 
Using novel historical data on the extension of mass primary education, agrarian reform, and the 
construction of the civil registry in postrevolutionary Mexico, where a sharp clerical-anticlerical 
cleavage was salient during the era of state-building, I show that state elites made heavier 
institutional investments in parts of the country where the Church was historically stronger and 
Catholics had rebelled in response to state anticlericalism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
110
 The quote in the title is from Emilio Portes Gil, president of Mexico from 1928 to 1930. As an Attorney General 
after his presidency, he published The Conflict between the Civil Power and the Clergy, an essay distributed in 
English to reach an international audience. There, Portes Gil wrote: “The stand taken by the Catholic clergy, and its 
seditious, visionary and unpatriotic activities, induce it to believe that it will thereby achieve the restoration of 
inordinate power like that wielded by it in the past, and it fails to take into account the fact that it has at the present 
day broken down in the presence of the new organization of the modern state…which has set for itself as one of its 
specific objects, the extirpation of fanaticism” (1935, 5). 
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4.1 Introduction 
 Why do states develop stronger institutions for social control and provide more public 
goods in some areas of their territory than in others? Although coercion and taxation have 
historically constituted the core dimensions of the state, today states extend their action to a wide 
range of regulatory, cultural, and welfare functions (Lindert 2004; Mann 2012). In Latin 
America, the twentieth century brought major transformations in the scope and depth of public 
authority (Whitehead 1994), despite the comparatively mediocre achievements of states in the 
region (Centeno 2002). The spread of mass public education and other social services, 
improvements in administration and census taking, the construction of infrastructure, and similar 
undertakings vastly expanded the knowledge available to states about society and their capacity 
to shape citizens’ everyday behavior and life prospects. As in other dimensions, however, 
considerable unevenness characterized the development of state institutions within each 
country’s borders. 
 This chapter thus goes beyond the analysis of coercive and fiscal capabilities to examine 
spatial and temporal variation in the historical development of other state institutions and 
mechanisms of social control beyond the use of force, using evidence from Mexico. For the 
purposes of the chapter, institutions of social control are understood as those that are employed 
to “control society from within” (Tarrow 2015, 5). Although these vary with context, as I discuss 
below, the definition is intended to capture institutions that enhance the state’s ability to govern 
by constraining contention and inducing attitudinal change among citizens, without resorting to 
physical coercion. The paradox is that some of these mechanisms, while cementing state control 
over social life, can also be carriers of rights and valued goods, as is perhaps most clear with 
education. 
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 Consistent with the rest of this dissertation, the theoretical focus is on how political 
contestation between insiders and outsiders to state-building coalitions shapes institutional 
development across territory. The argument in this chapter is that during processes of state 
building characterized by high levels of political polarization, governing elites invest more 
heavily in the state’s capacity to regulate social life and transform society where opponents along 
salient domestic cleavages are stronger, precisely in order to counter their strength. As a result of 
these investments during formative periods, long-run institutional outcomes thus reflect 
historical patterns of political conflict.  
 I substantiate this general argument empirically by evaluating the impact of the religious 
cleavage that pitted the emerging anticlerical state against political Catholics after the Mexican 
Revolution on the spatial configuration of the state, specifically its institutions to penetrate and 
regulate society. During the 1920s and 1930s, postrevolutionary governments centralized 
political power, crafted a revolutionary myth, and implemented a number of state- and nation-
building policies that brought the central state into direct and routine contact with the population 
in many domains of their lives. At the core of this project were agrarian reform and schooling, 
conceived as instruments to transform the social structure, generate social stability, and mold a 
new kind of modern citizen who would embrace the revolutionary state as the legitimate political 
authority.  
 I draw on newly compiled municipal level data on agrarian reform, educational 
outcomes, and the construction of a civil registration system, to probe the relationship between 
religious conflict and the development of the state in these domains. Rather than drawing 
conclusions from a single indicator or policy domain, these highly disaggregated historical data 
allow for systematic and comprehensive examination of various forms of deploying 
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infrastructural power to “control civil society from within.” My analysis thus broadly covers 
state efforts to penetrate society and constrain contention through access to land, schooling, and 
the development of administrative capacities to register citizens and keep record of basic events 
in their lives. 
 First, using a difference-in-differences design, I find that land allocations under the 
program of agrarian reform—which bolstered central state control at the local level—increased 
disproportionately in municipalities that experienced insurgency during the religious Cristero 
War (1926-1929). I also find that municipalities with a heavier Church presence at the onset of 
the 20th century, prior to the Revolution, experienced greater increases in literacy during the 
crucial period of expansion of mass education under the anticlerical state, and had higher school 
enrollment rates by 1950. The positive association between the Church’s historical strength and 
educational attainment persists to this day, as measured by average years of schooling across 
municipalities, which is suggestive of long-term differences in state educational infrastructure. 
Finally, I document a positive relationship between religious insurgency and the subsequent 
expansion of state registration capabilities through the civil registry in the 1930s.  
 I argue that these findings emerge because in order to implement its ideological 
commitment to curb the social and cultural influence of the Catholic Church and dampen 
religious resistance, the anticlerical political coalition that rebuilt the Mexican state made 
comparatively heavier investments in institutions of social control in more religious areas. State 
attempts at social engineering did not necessarily produce the intended secularizing 
consequences, as staunchly Catholic communities selectively appropriated the state project and, 
in an interactive process, actively renegotiated its most radical elements. However, institutional 
outcomes in postrevolutionary Mexico would reflect early efforts by the anticlerical state to 
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cement control and remake society in areas of historical Church strength and violent religious 
mobilization. Hence, considering who builds the state and for what ends helps account for 
uneven patterns of institutional development.  
 Importantly, the statistical associations just described are not an obvious product of 
selection or reverse causality. They are robust to accounting for historical, pre-revolutionary 
differences in the strength and presence of state institutions across municipalities, as well as a 
wide range of potential confounders. This is consistent with the view that the conflict between 
Church and state in the period under study had an independent effect on the type of institutional 
development that occurred in different parts of Mexico in the twentieth century, with legacies 
that extend to the present time.  
 To further inform and substantiate these quantitative results, I also discuss qualitative 
historical evidence that supports the interpretation that a commitment to secularize society and, 
after the large rebellion of the late 1920s, to moderate opposition among the Catholic population, 
weighed heavily in elite decisions about the construction of political institutions. These 
complementary pieces of evidence document that governing elites during the formative period of 
the postrevolutionary state indeed consciously conceived the extension of social regulatory 
institutions as part of a struggle with religion and the institutional Church, and thus support the 
argument that the religious cleavage motivated decisions about institution-building.  
 I draw this supplementary evidence from archival sources, elites’ personal papers and 
speeches, and an extensive review of the secondary historical literature on the policies analyzed 
here. Existing historical studies, however, have not jointly examined different state institutions 
for social control, taken a long-term view extending to the present, or exploited the extensive 
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quantitative data compiled for this chapter, which allows for a more systematic treatment and 
yields novel and more generalizable insights. 
 Beyond the statistical findings, the causal importance of the religious cleavage in shaping 
the spatial outcomes of postrevolutionary state formation, independent from prior differences in 
state capacity and other factors, is also asserted on historical-analytical grounds. Despite the 
state-building projects of the late nineteenth century (Saylor 2014; Soifer 2015), in Latin 
America the emergence of states with extensive domestic infrastructures, entering into routine 
and direct contact with ordinary citizens, mobilizing the majority of their revenue internally, and 
broadly providing services like schooling to a majority of the population is a phenomenon of the 
twentieth century. Spatial variation in state capacity was not fully predetermined or simply 
inherited from the pre-revolutionary past, but took form as twentieth-century state-builders dealt 
with political contention and sought to assert the power of the state in politically polarized 
societies. In the case of Mexico, different beliefs about the proper role of Catholicism in political 
and social life were important determinants of such polarization in the decades following the 
Revolution, when fundamental decisions about state institutions were made.111 
 More generally, the range of evidence in this chapter provides further support for my 
argument that the political conflicts prevalent during formative periods of state building can 
spawn lasting and uneven legacies across territory, particularly when such state-building 
episodes are marked by high levels of political polarization that shape institutional investments. 
The argument and results thus inform how political opposition to central states influences 
incentives to provide public goods and build regulatory and administrative institutions. In the 
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 Expert historians share the view that Church-state conflict in the early twentieth century marks a crucial moment 
in the development of the state. In his classic work on the Mexican Revolution, Knight writes that “revolutionary 
anti-clericalism...was not simply a cyclical revival of the old liberal conscience; above all, it marked the beginning 
of another story—that of the new state’s struggle for its supposed birthright” (1986, 505). See also (Fallaw 2013). 
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case of public education, the analysis also provides insight into the cultural aspects of revolution 
and processes of nation-building, specifically into how states allocate efforts to shape attitudes 
and cultivate attachment and obedience to the nation-state through mass schooling.  
 Moreover, my findings caution against lumping together different components of state 
capacity, analytically or empirically. An important conclusion that I draw from this study is that 
the various institutional dimensions of the state may respond differently to political contestation. 
In Mexico, although religious opposition during the state’s formative period led to persistent 
fiscal weakness and the articulation of the state with local armed militias to exercise coercion, as 
I have shown in previous chapters, it also produced stronger investments in other dimensions of 
statecraft, including education, the redistribution of agrarian property, and institutions to register 
and regulate civil society. 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the general argument 
that state-building elites have greater incentives to develop state institutions with capacity to 
penetrate, regulate, and transform civil society in parts of the territory where opposition along a 
salient political cleavage is more intense. Section 4.3 turns to the Mexican case. It discusses how 
the concern among governing elites with counteracting the power of the Church and constraining 
Catholic mass resistance served as a spur for institution-building—thus potentially shaping state 
capacity outcomes across territory. Section 4.4 analyzes the impact of the Cristero War on 
agrarian reform at the municipality level, using a difference-in-differences design. Sections 4.5 
and 4.6 provide evidence of the relationship between the religious cleavage and the development 
of social regulatory capacity through schooling and the civil registry, respectively. Section 4.7 
concludes.  
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4.2 Domestic Cleavages and Institutions of Social Control 
 How do governments in emerging states allocate resources to build political institutions, 
in particular those that help induce citizen compliance and regulate social life without resorting 
to the use of coercion? In accordance with the theoretical framework presented in this 
dissertation, this chapter posits that internal patterns of investment in state institutions of social 
control respond to the structure of political conflict faced by state-builders as they seek to 
consolidate power. Varying domestic institutional legacies emerge from the antagonism between 
rival political camps during state formation. 
 Although state-building projects may under some circumstances be supported by a broad 
social consensus, most prominently when common external threats generate national cohesion 
(Darden and Mylonas 2016; Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth 2015), they often take place in 
politically polarized and fragmented societies where specific parties or groups seek to impose 
their preferred policies and achieve supremacy through a stronger state. Rather than external 
warfare, turning the state into a more powerful instrument of partisan interests within society is 
frequently the engine for state-building. In these cases, processes of state development become 
tightly connected to particular interests, values, and ideological positions that give political 
content to the state project and confront other cross-sections of society. 
 Such conceptions of how the political order should be, I argue, inform decisions about 
how and where to concentrate state efforts to develop institutions and government capacities for 
social regulation, with potentially long-lasting consequences. Moreover, where groups excluded 
from the state-building coalition manage to coordinate and organize resistance that threatens 
stability, governing elites have further incentives to implement measures that solidify the state’s 
infrastructural control and diffuse opposition, without constant recourse to costly violence. In 
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short, the incentives to build state institutions of social control across territory vary along 
domestic political cleavage lines. Regions and groups situated in opposition to the state-building 
coalition are likely to become preferred targets of state measures to purchase stability, alter 
loyalties and beliefs, and induce compliance. As a result of these politically-motivated 
investments, medium- and long-run institutional outcomes related to the state social regulatory 
functions may come to reflect the history of domestic conflict. 
 The repertoire of measures that state elites can implement to constrain contention and 
manufacture basic compliance among dissident social groups ranges from material inducements 
and access to desired services, to the adoption of techniques that make territory and society more 
legible and accessible for state officials (Scott 1998).112 More complex ideological and cultural 
strategies to secure consent by directly shaping attitudes and beliefs can also be put into practice. 
Although to different degrees, all modern states seek to secure and justify their rule by shaping 
identities and beliefs. They construct historical narratives, design school curricula, erect statues 
and monuments, establish civic calendars, rename streets—they wrap themselves in a set of 
rituals and rhetorical practices in the hope of obtaining compliance and recognition of their 
claims to legitimate authority. 
 Ultimately, the particular combination of deployed strategies is likely to vary with the 
technological and material resources available to state-builders, as well as their ideologically-
constructed interpretations of the sources of resistance. In any case, all the above mechanisms to 
regulate civil society demand an institutional apparatus, whose development will respond to the 
nature and depth of internal political antagonisms during state-building. 
 
                                                 
112
 The choice set, of course, also includes the use of coercion. I have analyzed coercive institutions in a separate 
chapter. 
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4.3 Anticlericalism and Institution-building in Mexico 
 The empirical sections below analyze three different sets of policies adopted by state 
elites to enhance state social control in the context of postrevolutionary Mexico: agrarian reform, 
mass schooling, and the construction of the civil registry. The implementation and design of 
these measures were rooted in a particular diagnosis of the problems of Mexican society, itself 
reflective of the identity of leaders in the new governing coalition and articulated over the course 
of revolutionary struggle.113 For state-builders, both opposition to the emerging regime and social 
and economic backwardness stemmed from the domination that the Catholic Church and allied 
landlord interests exerted over vast segments of the population.  
 State capacity building in all three institutional arenas reflected the commitment among 
new governing elites to counteract clerical power, and hence the dynamics of conflict along the 
religious cleavage. Although the conflict over the role of the Church had deep antecedents in the 
Liberal-Conservative divide of the nineteenth century, it acquired unprecedented salience and 
intensity with the victory of dogmatically anticlerical revolutionaries in the early twentieth 
century. At this time, there was a “quantum leap” in the reach and scope of the state in Latin 
America (Whitehead 1994, 91). States were considerably expanding their social and territorial 
reach and starting to play much broader regulatory and welfare functions. Traditionally elitist 
governing structures were brought into routine contact with mass constituencies. This process 
thus gave conflicts with domestic rivals over social control a new scope and intensity. 
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 The postrevolutionary state elite, as explained in chapter 2, was dominated by rising middle-class men from 
Northern Mexico, who shared a more secular and developmentalist culture influenced by American and Protestant 
values. They also tended to be whiter than the rest of the Mexican population. For a discussion of the distinctive 
characteristics of these Northern elites and the reinforcement of anticlerical attitudes during the Revolution, see 
(Knight 1986, 203–8, 236, 500–504). 
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 Historical accounts and direct evidence from speeches, elites’ personal papers, and 
similar documents reveal that leading figures in the state-building coalition saw the relationship 
between Church and state as a zero-sum game, in which national progress and their very hold on 
power and survival were at stake. Beyond their own social identity and ideology, elite beliefs 
were also grounded in factual events, particularly Victoriano Huerta’s overthrow of President 
Francisco I. Madero (1911-1913) in a coup seen as backed by the Church (Knight 1986, 203) and 
president-elect Álvaro Obregón’s assassination by a Catholic militant in 1928.114 
 President Plutarco Elías Calles, a quintessential state-builder and architect of the National 
Revolutionary Party (PNR) that would mutate into the modern PRI, understood Mexican history 
in “apocalyptic terms: it involved a century-long struggle between a benighted clergy, the gift of 
gachupín [Spanish] colonialism, and progressive forces, now represented by the revolutionary 
state” (Knight 2010, 242). As explained previously in this study, religious persecution and 
anticlerical legislation under his rule sparked the massive Catholic ‘Cristero’ rebellion of 1926-
1929.115 
 As the war proceeded and Obregón’s assassination aggravated the political crisis, Calles 
orchestrated the elite settlement of 1928-1929 that gave birth to the PNR (Garrido 1982). His call 
for the articulation of revolutionary factions under a single party was tightly connected to the 
religious armed conflict and, more generally, the challenge posed by the Church and affiliated 
conservative interests, now clearly capable of mobilizing mass resistance. Calles considered the 
formation of an official party as necessary to stop strongman uprisings and revolutionary in-
                                                 
114
 Obregón had served as president between 1920 and 1924 and had been re-elected for a new term at the time of 
his assassination. Other events fueled the belief among political elites that controlling Catholic opposition could be a 
matter of life and death. In 1931, for example, the governor of the state of Veracruz suffered an assassination 
attempt by militant Catholic groups in response to anticlerical measures. Other lower level state officials were also 
targets of violence, as the assassination of teachers during the 1930s illustrates. 
115
 Calles’s governed as president from 1924 to 1928 and informally until 1934-35, when he broke with President 
Lázaro Cárdenas. Three different presidents held power under Calles’s control during the Maximato (1928-1934). 
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fighting, as most studies emphasize. However, he also saw the unification of revolutionary 
factions as necessary to protect the Revolution and a means to drive violent clerical opposition 
into institutional channels: it would serve to bring “groups representative of the reaction, even of 
the clerical reaction into the national representation” and take the fight “to the realm of ideas.”116  
 The organizing committee of the PNR echoed the concern with encouraging conservative 
interests to adopt peaceful institutional strategies, openly calling for them to establish a partisan 
vehicle: “we want the reaction to be our enemy…it is necessary for conservatives to frankly raise 
the flag of their principles and fight against us, the revolutionaries.”117 Thus, while several 
previous attempts at unifying revolutionary leaders and factions under a single party had failed, 
this time religious counter-mobilization provided a definitive impetus for party formation. 
 The conventional wisdom about the emergence of the PNR is that revolutionary elites 
formed the party to regulate access to power among themselves, given constant violent in-
fighting since the mid-1910s. This explanation is correct but also incomplete. It fails to account 
for the timing of party formation, and for why several previous explicit attempts to produce a 
similar elite settlement had failed, despite major uprisings and conflicts within the revolutionary 
camp. I argue that religious counter-mobilization played a definitive and perhaps 
underappreciated role. It is no coincidence that the PNR was finally formed in the crisis of the 
late 1920s, with mass religious resistance under way. As Knight argues, “the settlement and its 
institutional embodiment, the PNR, were seen as a dike against clericalism” (1992, 120). 
 This historical interpretation is consistent with both classic and more recent comparative 
studies that emphasize the role of deep political rivalries and even violence in party building 
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 The Constitution of 1917 banned confessional parties, which posed a legal impediment to the articulation of an 
openly religious party in the Christian Democratic tradition. Nevertheless, Catholic armed mobilization seems to 
have led revolutionary state elites to seriously contemplate the potential advantages of channeling conservative 
interests into a partisan outlet. 
117
 Luis L. León, General Secretary of the PNR’s Organizing Committee, cited in (Córdova 1994, 165). 
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(Levitsky et al. 2016; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The argument advanced here, however, is that 
intense polarization around the religious cleavage not only stimulated governing elites to party-
build, but also shaped decisions about where and how to state-build. In other words, my 
contention is that efforts to strengthen institutions in order to counter conservative opposition 
were not restricted to the realm of the party. They extended to the state itself, as elites strove to 
develop social regulatory capacities with particular intensity in areas of Church strength and 
Catholic resistance. Hence the development of state capacity is inseparable from cleavage 
politics.  
 Indeed, Catholic dissent and the influence of the Church remained salient concerns 
among state elites throughout the 1930s, when major expansions in state education, 
infrastructure, agrarian reform, and other public services took place. The regime negotiated an 
armistice with Church elites to put an end to the Cristero War in 1929—an agreement which 
rank-and-file Cristeros and lay Catholics opposed (J. Meyer 1976), but tensions continued as the 
conflict moved from the battlefield to the cultural and institutional realms. In a visit to the city of 
Guadalajara in 1934, a Catholic stronghold in the rebellious center-west, Calles famously 
declared that the regime needed to enter a new phase, “one that I would call the period of 
psychological revolution: we must enter and conquer the consciousness of the children, the 
consciousness of the youth, because they do, and must, belong to the Revolution...It would be a 
grave blunder, it would be criminal, for the men of the Revolution not to seize the youth from the 
claws of the clergy.”118 
 Such attempts to reshape civil society from within were a crucial component of the 
state’s project of “socialist” education and the intensification of agrarian reform under Cárdenas, 
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 “Palabras de Calles al Pueblo de Jalisco.” El Informador. July 21, 1934. Available at 
http://hemeroteca.informador.com.mx/ (accessed April 26, 2017). 
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Mexico’s other major state building figure. The anticlerical views of prior governments were 
now complemented by a stronger commitment to raising class-consciousness, a process in which 
the Church was seen as a major obstacle. Cárdenas’s program of “socialist” education and 
agrarian reform was met by various forms of Catholic resistance, including a second yet weaker 
wave of insurgency that peaked in the mid-1930s (Fallaw 2013). 
 Throughout this crucial state-building period, then, state rhetoric and elites’ own 
understanding of the political environment followed a dichotomous logic, captured in language 
that pitted class-conscious, rational, popular, and patriotic revolutionaries against fanaticism, 
backwardness, the landed oligarchy, and foreign interests. In the words of Portes Gil, president 
from 1928 to 1930, the Church represented “ignorance,” “sloth,” and the “moral and physical 
enslavement of the masses,” and thus the Revolution had set as its primary objective “the 
extirpation of fanaticism,” a precondition for progress in all spheres (1935, 4).119  
 Considering the importance that leaders in the governing coalition attributed to 
counteracting the influence of the Church and containing Catholic opposition, it is easy to see 
why these considerations guided policy implementation and investments in the state’s ability to 
penetrate and transform society. We should thus observe patterns of state capacity development 
across territory reflecting the country’s religious geography. The following sections present 
quantitative results concerning agrarian reform, education, and the construction of the civil 
registry that are consistent with this argument. I also discuss other evidence that state elites made 
decisions in each of these three specific policy domains prompted by the religious cleavage, 
which gives further credence to the argument that when political polarization around domestic 
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 Portes Gil presided over the end of the Cristero War as interim president, following Obregón assassination. As 
the Attorney General of the Republic from 1932 to 1934 he prepared criminal cases against—his words—“the evil 
Catholic clergy.” 
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cleavage lines is high during state-building, stronger institutions for social regulation emerge 
where opposition to governing coalitions is more profound. 
4.4 Catholic Insurgency and Agrarian Reform 
 A vast historical literature traces the Mexican postrevolutionary state’s massive agrarian 
reform program to peasant revolt during the armed phase of the Revolution (1910-1917), and to 
the grievances produced by an expanding landholding class during the Porfirian dictatorship 
(1884-1910) more generally (Sanderson 1984; Tannenbaum 1966). More recent quantitative 
studies confirm the empirical link between revolutionary insurgency and the incidence of land 
redistribution across Mexico (Dell 2012). Although land reform satisfied well-founded claims for 
redistributive justice (Saffon Sanin 2015), scholars argue that several implementation features 
served to consolidate the authoritarian regime by subordinating the peasantry to the state, thus 
retarding democratic turnover (Albertus et al. 2016; Hamilton 1982). A consensus has also 
emerged that land reform—which reached more than half of the country’s territory before its 
termination in 1992—hindered economic development in the long run, because notably 
incomplete property rights and collective ownership over grazing and forestry lands created 
inefficiencies in land use (Albertus et al. 2016; de Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997; de 
Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet 2014; Dell 2012).  
 I build on these works but provide new insight into the politics of agrarian reform by 
focusing on the impact of religious contention after the Revolution, rather than previous peasant 
uprisings or other motivations for the redistribution of land in the form of ejidos (a territorial unit 
constituting an agrarian reform community). I also introduce more fine-grained, disaggregated 
historical data than has previously been available. Previous work has typically relied on state-
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level data or convenient samples of municipalities. This study is among the first to analyze 
agrarian reform patterns at the municipality level for the country as a whole. I test the argument 
that given the ejido’s potential to bolster state social control and shift peasant allegiances away 
from perceived state enemies—most notably the Church and landed elites—and onto the central 
government, national state-builders allocated more land toward the construction of ejidos in 
municipalities that joined the insurgency during the Cristero War.  
 As the literature referenced above has argued, the institutional structure built around land 
reform made peasants dependent on the state for access to inputs, credits, and agricultural 
markets. Moreover, members of ejidos could not sell, rent, leave the land fallow, use it as a 
collateral, or inherit ejido rights beyond a single descendant (de Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 
1997). In short, through agrarian reform the state turned itself into the landlord, granted 
incomplete rights, and became the final arbiter in land disputes. Implementing the program in a 
given area thus came with the ability to condition access to land, the most important asset in an 
agricultural economy, on social acquiescence and continuing political support. Communities 
received land, but in exchange the state co-opted peasant movements and local leaders, who were 
turned into ejido authorities and intermediaries between the local community and the state. 
 Several organizational characteristics further served to make the ejido an instrument for 
state surveillance and control at the local level. Ejidos were administered by a community 
council affiliated with a large national corporatist organization that formed the backbone of the 
official party. In practice, members of the Comisariado Ejidal (the ejido’s executive committee) 
performed several social regulatory functions beyond strictly agrarian affairs. Ejido authorities 
helped state agencies to implement policy in a range of domains, register citizens, and interpret 
local demands. They also maintained order in the countryside. As noted in the chapter on the 
 187 
 
formation of Mexico’s coercive apparatus (chapter 3), ejido members were frequently organized 
into semi-official rural militias that acted as local surrogates of the central state and collaborated 
with the army in local policing. To this day, the defensas rurales are formed exclusively by 
agrarian reform beneficiaries that provide intelligence to the armed forces.  
 Through the organization of the ejido, then, national state elites found a channel to 
penetrate rural communities at the grass-roots and develop a network of supporters, whose 
loyalty was premised on the state’s ability to control access to land and necessary inputs. Beyond 
this linkage of material dependence, however, emphasized by Albertus et al. (2016) and others, 
central state-builders also conceived land reform as an instrument to induce social and cultural 
change in communities steeped in Catholic tradition, especially during Cárdenas’s presidency. 
Radical state officials saw churches as hotbeds of state subversion and blamed Catholicism for 
providing an ideological coverage to landlord domination (Becker 1995).  
 Economics and culture appeared tightly linked, as the material power of landlords was 
considered to be inseparable from the cultural power of the Church. In the understanding of 
national state elites, this marriage was at the root of popular hostility to the state. Agrarian 
reform would not only cement state supremacy materially through the control over land, but also 
ideologically by turning Catholic peons into autonomous revolutionary peasants. In combination 
with socialist education, it would liberate them from economic and cultural oppression and thus 
legitimize the state’s rule. 
 Taking this worldview into account is important because it clarifies how agrarian reform 
was conceived by the most radical members of the governing coalition as part of a broader 
struggle to undermine a clerical order, recast popular identities, and effect structural social 
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transformation.120 It also reveals how deeply grounded was the state-building process in cleavage 
politics. As I have argued, partisan goals and aspirations in a highly polarized political 
environment, not a national or broadly shared project, were at the basis of decisions to state-
build, what kind of state capacity, where, and for what ends.  
 In this sense, we can expect the Cristero War to have had a systematic impact on patterns 
of land reform during the 1930s, when redistribution peaked. During the war, the support of 
organized groups of armed agraristas (land reform petitioners and recipients) with local 
knowledge proved crucial for the army in combating the Cristeros (J. Meyer 1994). The promise 
of agrarian reform also served to cross-pressure Catholic peasants and thus fracture support for 
conservative coalitions of landlords, displaced local political elites, and clergy. Building 
institutions like the ejido that could cement the state’s control over society, and ultimately erode 
the sources of popular opposition, was of special importance in formerly rebellious areas. The 
threat of further episodes of insurgency was real; even though the agreements of 1929 put a 
formal end to the war, systematic resistance persisted below the surface and produced violent 
outbreaks during the ‘Second’ Cristiada in the mid-1930s.  
 By compensating supporters in areas of Cristero resistance and pushing agrarian reform, 
then, the central state could attempt to maintain a modicum of social stability and even reshuffle 
identities and loyalties to its favor. The empirical analysis below shows that Cristero areas 
indeed experienced a disproportionate increase in land allocations throughout the 1930s, 
consistent with my argument that investments in institutions of social control vary positively 
with societal opposition to state-building coalitions. 
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 As Fallaw writes, “There was more than land at stake...Cárdenas always saw agrarian reform as inseparable from 
a larger social, cultural, and even moral transformation” (2001, 13). 
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4.4.1 Data  
 There are two main types of data in the analysis below. The first is my original data set 
on the incidence of insurgency during the Cristero War at the municipality level, which is the 
main independent variable and was coded as described in previous chapters. The second is a 
time-series cross-sectional database of yearly land reform allocations in each municipality, from 
the beginning of reform in 1916 to 1940. Data were obtained from the Registro Agrario 
Nacional.121 I use this data to calculate the percentage of total surface area in the municipality 
distributed under the agrarian reform program every year. 
 In some specifications, I also use data to control for potentially relevant socioeconomic, 
geographic, and demographic characteristics of municipalities, as well as for levels of state 
capacity during the Porfirian dictatorship and patterns of insurgency during the Revolution 
(1910-1917). Geographic variables include the standard deviation of the altitude of all localities 
in a given municipality as a measure of the ruggedness of terrain, the geodesic distance between 
the municipal seat and the state capital, and the distance to Mexico City. Socioeconomic and 
demographic variables are the 1900 municipal population (logged), the percentage of the 
population working as peons in agriculture, and the percentage employed in industrial or 
commercial activities. All these variables were coded from the 1900 census. 
 To measure state capacity during the Pofiriato, I also calculate the percentage of people 
in the municipality employed as state officials in 1900, based on the census. Importantly, this 
variable captures the strength of the state across municipalities before the Revolution, and thus 
helps alleviate concerns that both the explanatory variable and the outcomes are predetermined 
by the development of the state in the nineteenth century. Finally, I also use the binary indicator 
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 The data were obtained through freedom of information requests. 
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of insurgency during the Revolution, whose construction has been explained in previous 
chapters.  
4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
 I evaluate whether municipalities that experienced insurgency during the Cristero War 
experienced a differential increase in agrarian reform after the conflict. The main concern in 
estimating the effect of religious insurgency on land redistribution is that factors that explain the 
occurrence of insurgency or its absence may also drive patterns of land reform. To deal with this 
inferential challenge, I implement a difference-in-differences strategy with fixed effects at the 
municipal level.  
 This approach estimates the effect of the Cristero War based exclusively on a comparison 
of the change in land reform levels before and after the conflict in rebel (treatment) versus 
peaceful (control) municipalities. In doing so, it removes biases in the estimated effect that could 
result from permanent differences between the two types of municipalities, while the fixed 
effects remove all time-invariant characteristics of municipalities that could simultaneously 
correlate with insurgency status and drive land reform outcomes. The identifying assumption is 
that the evolution of land reform in peaceful municipalities provides a valid counterfactual for 
those that experienced insurgency, after conditioning on constant characteristics of 
municipalities—in other words, that agrarian reform in insurgent units after 1929 would have 
mirrored the trend observed in peaceful ones had the conflict not occurred. 
 An important decision in modeling the effects of the Cristero War is defining the relevant 
pre- and post-treatment periods for comparison. Data on land reform are available on a yearly 
basis, but years themselves are an arbitrary form of slicing the data. The process of allocating 
land under the agrarian reform program involved multiple steps and could take a long period to 
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complete. Each case started with a petition filed by local residents and ended with a presidential 
decree, with state governments and the National Agrarian Commission playing roles in receiving 
petitions, mapping and measuring, granting provisional rights to land, studying the case, and 
presenting it to the president. In this sense, the effects of the Cristero Rebellion may not be 
observable immediately after the conflict, given that the data represent final allocation decisions.  
 More importantly, from an analytical perspective it is important to examine the Cárdenas 
presidency (1934-1940), when agrarian reform greatly accelerated. Evaluating the extent to 
which state elites employed land reform as a strategy to undercut resistance by political Catholics 
is of particular interest in this peak period of reform. It is well-documented that the religious 
cleavage remained salient under Cárdenas (Butler 2007; Fallaw 2013), and it is reasonable to 
expect that state elites were reacting to the religious armed conflict throughout the 1930s. For 
these reasons, in the analysis I examine land allocations until 1940.122 The post-treatment period 
therefore goes from 1930 (the first year after the Cristero War) to 1940 (the end of Cárdenas’s 
administration). To balance the periods, I set the baseline period to cover all allocations between 
1919 and 1929. As a consequence, the reported difference-in-differences estimates reflect 
relative increases in land reform from a decade before the conflict to the decade after.  
 Figure 4.1 shows the average percentage of land redistributed by year in the period under 
study, comparing municipalities coded as insurgent during the Cristero War and non-rebel ones. 
The graph shows that agrarian reform increased considerably in all types of municipalities 
around the mid-1930s, but those that experienced insurgency during the Cristero Rebellion saw 
larger increases, on average. For the 1920s, in contrast, the graph displays similar or slightly 
lower levels of land reform in the latter group. 
                                                 
122
 Stopping in 1940 is also sensible given the consensus in the historiography that the Cárdenas presidency marks 
the end of the main formative period of the postrevolutionary state. 
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Figure 4.1.  Average land redistribution in Mexican municipalities by 
insurgency status during the Cristero War, 1919-1940 
 
Source: Own calculations based on official data from the National Agrarian Registry (RAN) and 
Cristero War dataset. 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes this contrast with a simple difference-in-differences, based on the 
average percentage of land redistributed per year before and after the Cristero War in rebel and 
non-rebel municipalities. On average, municipalities that experienced insurgency had an extra 
increase in redistributed land of 0.54 percentage points per year in the period after the rebellion.  
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Table 4.1.  Average land redistributed per year, before and after the 
Cristero War (% of total municipal surface area) 
 Before 
(1919-1929) 
After 
(1930-1940) 
Difference 
Cristero municipalities 
(treatment) 
0.71 1.83 
1.12*** 
(0.1) 
Non-Cristero 
municipalities (control) 
0.9 1.48 
0.58*** 
(0.06) 
Difference 
-0.19* 
(0.09) 
0.35*** 
(0.084) 
0.54*** 
(0.119) 
* p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 The results I present below more formally examine this variation. The base difference-in-
differences estimating equation with fixed effects is given by: 
 
                                                                  
      , 
 
where               is the percentage of total surface area redistributed under agrarian reform 
in municipality i in period t;    is a municipality fixed effect;           is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity between 1926 and 1929;         
is an indicator variable for the post-Cristero War period (1930-1940);    
  is a vector of control 
variables employed in some specifications; and     is the error term. The difference-in-
differences estimate is given by   , which reflects the differential increase in land reform in 
Cristero municipalities after the conflict, relative to those that remained peaceful. I estimate the 
equation above via OLS and cluster the standard errors at the municipality level to account for 
correlation within units over time. 
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4.4.3 Results 
 Column 1 in Table 4.2 reports results for the baseline difference-in-differences 
specification with municipality fixed effects and no additional controls. To further address 
potential concerns about omitted variable bias, columns 2 to 4 add a range of controls. Since 
yearly measures of the control variables are not available, I interact them with the period dummy 
that equals one for the post-Cristero period. This allows me to rule out the possibility that the 
differential increase in land reform in Cristero municipalities that I attribute to the religious 
conflict is in fact driven by these variables impacting agrarian reform differently from the 1920s 
to 1930s for reasons unrelated to the war. 
The results in Table 4.2 lend support to the argument that state elites made 
disproportionate use of agrarian reform—an instrument to enhance social control—in 
municipalities that harbored insurgents during the Cristero War. Under the assumption that 
trends in land reform in peaceful and rebel municipalities would have mirrored each other had 
the conflict not occurred,123 the baseline coefficient in column 1 suggests that the rebellion added 
an extra 0.5 points to the percentage of land redistributed in a municipality per year throughout 
the 1930s. Considering the important long-run political, economic, and social consequences that 
scholars have associated with agrarian reform in Mexico (e.g. Albertus et al. 2016), this is a 
meaningful result.
                                                 
123
 Also known as the “parallel trends assumption.” 
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 Table 4.2.  Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the Cristero War on 
agrarian reform, 1919-1940 
 
Dependent variable: % redistributed land 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cristero War × period 0.495*** 0.499*** 0.484*** 0.273* 
 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.115) 
Period 0.488*** 0.136 0.110 -2.329*** 
 
(0.060) (0.133) (0.136) (0.360) 
Distance to state capital  period 
 
0.293*** 0.257*** 0.289*** 
  
(0.075) (0.075) (0.078) 
Distance to Mex City × period 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Terrain ruggedness × period 
 
0.359 0.261 0.090 
  
(0.306) (0.308) (0.307) 
% state officials 1900 × period 
  
0.219 -0.084 
   
(0.229) (0.242) 
Revolution insurgency × period 
  
0.204
†
 0.040 
   
(0.108) (0.112) 
% industry or commerce 1900 × period 
   
0.034 
    
(0.046) 
% peons 1900 × period 
   
-0.011* 
    
(0.005) 
Log pop 1900 × period 
   
0.341*** 
    
(0.047) 
Constant 0.900*** 0.905*** 0.721*** 0.726*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 43,811 43,481 41,696 40,926 
Parentheses contain standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipality level.  
†
 p<0.1, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 
  For my purposes, given that the ejido was one of the principal tools to elicit compliance 
and constrain civil society from within, the results confirm that differences in the state’s capacity 
for social regulation across territory may indeed emerge from elite decisions during periods of 
state-building marked by intense political polarization. In particular, elites have incentives to 
develop stronger institutions of social control where groups outside the governing coalition 
threaten and resist the emerging state. Independent of the initial motivations, these institutional 
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differences may in turn have enduring consequences of their own, as studies of the Mexican 
agrarian reform have shown. 
4.5 The Cleavage Politics of Mass Schooling and Nation-making 
 The spread of mass public education is another critical setting to examine the processes 
of interest in this chapter—namely, how intense polarization between state-building coalitions 
and domestic opponents shapes the development of social regulatory institutions across territory. 
Historically, the provision of mass schooling marked a fundamental transformation in the uses of 
public power and the weight of the state in society. Large swaths of the population first came 
into direct and repeated contact with states through the public school. Mass education systems 
also permitted the cultivation of norms of compliance and national identities, thus making the 
nation-state truly national. The expansion of basic education is therefore one of the key processes 
in the rise of “infrastructurally” powerful states (Mann 2012), capable of deeply penetrating 
everyday life, standardizing society, and shaping attitudes and behavior.  
 Latin American states were late arrivers to this process, relative to the developed world 
(Engerman, Sokoloff, and Mariscal 2012). In Mexico, school provision and literacy rates 
increased considerably during the Porfirian dictatorship (Soifer 2015; Vaughan 1982), but access 
to the education system remained predominantly an elite prerogative. As in the rest of the region, 
the turning point came in the twentieth century. According to census data, less than 28% of the 
adult population could read or write on the verge of the Revolution in 1910; by 1950, the literate 
population had increased to 57%, for the first time outnumbering illiterates. The transformation 
of a predominantly agrarian and illiterate society was a product of postrevolutionary state-
building. 
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 Existing arguments about the expansion of education, focusing on the national level, 
emphasize the role of inclusive political institutions and democratization in promoting broad-
based investments in this and other public goods (Ansell 2010; Lindert 2004; Stasavage 2005). 
Others suggest that high levels of socioeconomic inequality depressed investments in public 
education in Latin America (Engerman, Sokoloff, and Mariscal 2012). However, these 
arguments cannot account for the spread of education in an overarching authoritarian context, or 
for substantial within-country differences in the prevalence and pace of the expansion of basic 
schooling.  
 I instead build upon another classic body of literature that emphasizes states’ historical 
use of public education as a tool to establish social control, build national cohesion, and induce 
changes in mass behavior and beliefs (Gellner 1983; Harp 1998; E. Weber 1976). Although 
many of these works emphasize interstate pressures and international imitation as triggers for 
nation-building projects (Darden and Mylonas 2016; J. W. Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992), 
their approach to education can be recast to illuminate the sub-nationally uneven development of 
mass schooling. If states, especially in revolutionary contexts, exploit public education as an 
instrument of control and social engineering, we can expect educational investments across 
territory to respond to the structure of domestic conflict separating the state coalition from 
opposing groups. In particular, state elites are likely to rely on their perceptions of internal threat 
as well as their conceptions of the kind of reform that is most needed in the social realm—in 
short, what sectors of society must be brought under state control and transformed. 
 In the Mexican case, the religious cleavage structured state-builders’ choices in this 
domain during the crucial postrevolutionary period, with important consequences for the breadth 
and pace of access to schooling and for long-run outcomes. There is a rich comparative literature 
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on the salient role of religion in the politics of mass education in Western Europe (Ansell and 
Lindvall 2013; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Morgan 2002), but few empirical works have 
systematically examined the effect of the clerical-anticlerical cleavage on educational outcomes 
in Latin America. In Mexico, the overriding concern among leading state-builders with 
“extirpating fanaticism” and overcoming resistance from political Catholics led them to 
concentrate state effort in areas of historical Church strength, thus leading to faster 
improvements in education and leaving a positive institutional legacy. The empirical analysis 
below will show that this argument can be supported statistically using highly disaggregated, 
unexploited historical data. Before, however, it is worth substantiating it with an examination of 
the postrevolutionary education system under the lens of this political and cultural struggle.  
 It is well known that the expansion of primary education was one of the pillars of the 
postrevolutionary project, central to nation-state building in both the institutional and the less 
tangible cultural-ideological domain. From either of these two perspectives, which I discuss in 
turn, it is possible to appreciate how state elites built the mass education system in direct 
opposition to Catholicism and the Church. On the basis of this explicit commitment to 
undermining clerical influence, it can be inferred that investments in educational institutions 
across territory unfolded along religious cleavage lines, as elites calculated that more intense 
efforts were needed where the Church’s social power was greatest.  
 First, establishing social control requires physical presence, and in this concrete 
dimension the capabilities of the education bureaucracy were unparalleled. Established in 1921 
at the very onset of state-building, the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) coordinated the 
most numerous and far-flung of the state’s civilian bureaucracies. Teachers acquired a 
fundamental role as the main, and often the only, permanent agents of the national state in local 
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communities. This single fact illustrates the importance of schooling as the channel to penetrate 
territory and establish the state’s authority.  
 But the structuring force of Mexico’s religious cleavage is best appreciated in the all-
embracing role that teachers were assigned to play in local communities. Indeed, during this 
formative stage statesmen were as invested in the functions of teachers outside the classroom as 
within them. Put bluntly, national elites expected the school teacher to become the secular 
alternative to the local priest, and ultimately replace him as the dominant figure of authority and 
agent of social integration and political socialization. Thus teachers were expected to perform a 
series of social regulatory tasks that mirrored those of clerics: they would mediate in local 
disputes, give advice to community members, organize the community to engage in collective 
endeavors, and connect it with the outside world. Describing his image of the ideal rural 
community, the head of the SEP emphasized the importance of building schoolhouses in, or at 
least near, Church grounds (Raby 1974, 15–16). In extreme cases, the replacement was 
coercively enforced, as in the state of Tabasco where a Jacobinist governor engaged in repression 
against Catholic groups, banned priests from the state, and turned church buildings into 
“rationalist” schools (Martínez Assad 1979). 
 Moreover, teachers served as a link between the village and other state agencies. They 
collaborated with local residents in bureaucratic and legal activities demanding literacy and 
numeracy skills, like petitioning for land and judicial procedures. Conversely, they acted as 
agents of the central state by implementing policy in several domains, promoting agrarian 
reform, and providing knowledge and legibility. The SEP archives, for example, contain 
teachers’ responses to exhaustive questionnaires about the communities they served, including 
questions about geographical conditions, available infrastructure, economic activity, health 
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outcomes, religion, and local customs and “superstitions.”124 To help pacify mobilized 
communities and guarantee their own personal safety, teachers were also granted the right to 
carry arms. 
 Beyond teachers’ role in consolidating state social control in detriment of the Church in 
these concrete ways, leading figures in the state coalition perceived secular primary schooling as 
the ultimate vehicle for socio-cultural change, legitimation, and citizen formation. In this 
domain, too, the set of practices and beliefs associated with Catholic culture constituted the 
relevant counterpoint. As historian Alan Knight has argued, the revolutionary myth was crafted 
quite late after military victory, and to a large extent as a response to mass Catholic resistance 
(2010). The various Mexican revolutionary factions lacked the partisan and ideological 
coherence of the Marxist revolutions of the rest of the twentieth century, and thus a consistent 
historical narrative with iconic figures and tenets was slow in the making. Anticlericalism, 
however, was a shared principle among key state elites, and of all social groups political 
Catholics proved the most recalcitrant, mounting the armed challenge of the late 1920s. 
Accordingly, state attempts at social and cultural transformation emphasized secularization. 
 As the regime reached its most radical phase in the 1930s, social engineers gave new 
impulse to the state’s schooling project. Under “socialist” education, militant teachers were 
expected to build a new type of class-conscious secular citizen (Lerner 1979; Lewis 2005; 
Vaughan 1994, 1997). Education and cultural policy-makers in the center designed patriotic 
festivals to replace religious festivities (Bantjes 1997), supplied standardized textbooks (Loyo 
1984), and reformed school curricula to build national cohesion and cultivate citizens’ allegiance 
to the revolutionary state. Teachers would inculcate new habits, values, and beliefs among the 
                                                 
124
 Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Fondo Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP), Serie Dirección General de 
Educación Primaria en los Estados y Territorios, 37.33.1 Varios Estados. “Fichas de Investigación del Medio 
Geográfico, Económico y Social.” 1945. 
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benighted peasantry, making them literate, loyal, and hard-working. Although the regime made 
concessions regarding the enforcement of anticlerical legislation after the Cristero War, it is 
nevertheless clear that the religious cleavage continued to shape state and nation-building during 
this decisive period. The new revolutionary citizen was modeled on the basis of anti-Catholic 
prejudice. I argue that institutional investments followed a similar pattern.  
 Indeed, the religious cleavage structured the state’s educational undertakings to the point 
that the most radical officials and teachers displayed a missionary zeal, implementing literacy 
and hygiene campaigns under the banner of “cultural missions” and articulating their goals in 
quasi-religious language of “redemption” and “conversion” (Becker 1995). The anticlerical 
thrust behind the construction of the education system in the 1920s and 1930s is captured in 
Cárdenas’s own personal papers: Catholic clergy, he wrote, “must be considered as foreigners 
and pernicious foreigners, because they hinder the progress of peoples.” The dike against their 
influence had to be the school, which needed to “inculcate the ideology of the Mexican 
Revolution” to “liberate Mexico from the fanaticism that has powerfully served exploiters to sink 
the people into misery and ignorance” (Cárdenas 1972, 297). 
 The ruling coalition’s cultural and nation-making project thus had a concrete institutional 
foundation in the primary school, and an agent in the school teacher. Correspondingly, both 
became targets of Catholic resistance. In the 1930s, the state’s intense efforts in religious areas 
generated a strong backlash that included the torching of schools, the expulsion and assassination 
of teachers (Raby 1974), insurrections led by former Cristeros, and boycotting campaigns 
coordinated by clergy and lay Catholic organizations (Bantjes 1998; Fallaw 2013).  
 These responses contributed to a conservative turn in state policy. By the 1940s, 
postrevolutionary governments had backed down from their radical secularizing attempts and 
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reached a modus vivendi with the Church. The massive expansion of schooling during the first 
decades after the Revolution was successful in important respects. It boosted enrollment and 
literacy, helped disseminate a revolutionary myth, and lay the foundations of a more robust and 
long-lasting popular nationalism than in other countries in Latin America (vom Hau 2008). 
However, the image of society promoted by the most radical social engineers in the state-
building coalition failed to materialize. Cultural historians point to a contentious negotiation 
between state and local societies, whereby the latter selectively took advantage of aspects of the 
education project they desired, like the acquisition of literacy skills, and ultimately granted basic 
compliance in exchange for the moderation of state attempts at social engineering (Rockwell 
1994; Vaughan 1997). 
 Even as later governments renounced efforts at radical secularization and social 
transformation, however, they continued to work upon the educational infrastructure laid and 
expanded during the first decades of postrevolutionary nation-state building. During this 
formative period, state elites resorted to education to bring restive sectors of the population under 
control and induce consent. Below, I use systematic historical data to further support the 
argument that such efforts to establish social control in the context of a sharp religious cleavage 
may have led to heavier institutional investments in more clerical areas. 
4.5.1 Data 
 To evaluate the impact of the religious cleavage on educational outcomes, I introduce a 
new measure of Church strength that consists in the number of Catholic clergy per 1,000 citizens 
at the municipality level, which I coded using the 1900 census.125 This measure has important 
advantages for my purposes because it reflects the depth of the Church’s roots across Mexico 
                                                 
125
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to have compiled and made use of these data. 
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before the Revolution in 1910 and the implementation of anticlerical or educational policy in the 
period under study. In other words, it is the best available systematic measure of the religious 
geography at the time when the revolutionary coalition took command of the state. 
Disaggregated data on Church presence is not available for later periods, and given state 
persecution and restrictions on the number of clergy, they would fail to capture the concept of 
interest (Church strength). Wilkie, for example, reports that by 1935 only 322 priests were 
permitted by law to serve in the country (1970).  
 A map depicting this variable appears below as Figure 4.2. As the map clearly shows, the  
Church was historically stronger in the center-west, which would become the Cristero heartland 
in the 1920s. Other areas in central and south-western Mexico also had high Church presence, 
while northern and eastern states were relatively underserved. 
In contrast to the results presented below, those using insurgency during the Cristero War 
as the key independent variable were inconclusive.126 One possibility is that the measure of 
clergy relative to population is more sensitive to municipal variation than my dummy variable 
for religious insurgency between 1926-1929. More importantly, given the ideological 
commitment of state elites outlined above, in the specific case of education it is likely that state-
building decisions responded to the strength of the Church more than to violent religious conflict 
per se. 
 
 
                                                 
126
 The relationships were in the expected direction but imprecisely estimated. 
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Figure 4.2. Catholic priests per 1,000 people in Mexican municipalities (1900) 
 
 
Note: For clarity, municipal boundaries are not shown. The data are grouped in quintiles. Municipalities formed after 1900 appear in white.
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 Thus, whereas the religious contention as captured by the Cristero War was decisive in 
driving patterns of fiscal and coercive capacity or land reform, as I have shown, here the 
institutional strength of the Church demonstrates to be systematically important for educational 
outcomes. An important implication of the findings in this section is that the impact of the 
religious cleavage on state capacity outcomes is not reducible to a legacy of civil war. I discuss 
this in detail in the conclusion. 
 As a robustness check, I replicate all models using another measure of Church strength 
that takes into account territorial penetration—the number of churches per 1,000 km2. This 
variable is available for a smaller sample of municipalities than the number of priests, but it 
confirms that the observed associations are robust to different ways of measuring the concept of 
interest. Results for these models appear in Table 4.5 in the Appendix. 
 To measure the spread of mass primary education, I use municipality-level data on 
literacy from the 1930 and the 1950 censuses, relative to total population. The years between 
1930 and 1950 bracket a period when much of the heavy lifting in expanding school 
infrastructure and realizing mass literacy was achieved. As referenced above, the percentage of 
the adult Mexican population that could read and write doubled within these two decades. It is 
also a reasonable time period to observe effects of educational investments made during the 
critical state-building stage.  
 Literacy is a good window into the relationship of interest given the belief among 
anticlerical state-builders that it was readily emancipatory and secularizing. However, I 
complement the analysis of changes in literacy with cross-sectional data on school enrollment 
rates for 1950, to ensure my results are robust to the use of alternative measures.  
 206 
 
 To examine the presence of long-run effects, I use data on average years of schooling of 
the municipal population in 2005, obtained from the national statistics agency (INEGI). All 
additional variables have been described in other parts of this study, except a measure of state 
capacity specific to education during the Porfiriato. This variable is measured as the number of 
school teachers per 1,000 people in the municipality in 1900, coded from the census. It 
complements my other indicators of pre-existing state capacity, to minimize concerns about 
endogeneity. 
4.5.2 Empirical strategy 
 Given that my interest is on evaluating whether municipalities where the Church was 
more implanted experienced relatively stronger state investments in education, I model change in 
the literacy rate between 1930 and 1950, rather than absolute levels of literacy. This is done by 
specifying the dependent variable as a first-difference between the two data points, which 
ensures that the results are not driven by different baseline conditions. The results of these 
models are thus interpreted as the relationship between a predictor variable and the size of the 
increase in literacy within these two crucial decades. 
 In some specifications, I add a range of carefully selected controls that could be 
correlated with the depth of Church presence in 1900 and simultaneously drive the differential 
increase in literacy across municipalities. The most important concerns in this respect are first, 
that the strength of the Church before the Revolution was likely correlated with strength of the 
state; and second, that the literacy rate may have increased more in municipalities that already 
had higher state capacity in education since the Porfiriato. I therefore include as covariates two 
measures of state strength across municipalities, both of them contemporaneous to the measure 
of Church strength and one specific to educational capacity: the number of public employees per 
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capita, and the number of teachers per capita in 1900. While I cannot affirm these variables fully 
account for the potential association between deeper historical patterns of state capacity and both 
Church strength and the pace of future educational improvements, their inclusion gives 
confidence that no obvious endogeneity stems from this source. 
 I also control for observable geographic characteristics, an indicator variable for 
municipalities that comprise state capital cities, and several variables that capture the 
demographic and socioeconomic structure of municipalities. These include population density, 
(log) population size, the percentage of the population working as peons in agriculture, and the 
percentage employed in commercial or industrial activities, all in 1900. The socioeconomic 
measures are important because numerous authors have argued that market forces drive the 
expansion of education (Gellner 1983), and they could also correlate with the density of Church 
presence. Relatedly, these variables capture differences in development and societal demand for 
literacy and numeracy skills. In some models I also control for the population growth rate 
between 1930 and 1950, to account for different population pressures on the education system 
across municipalities. Finally, all specifications include state fixed effects to remove all factors 
common to municipalities within a given state that could confound the relationship of interest.  
 These controls are also included in two cross-sectional models where I change the 
dependent variable to be the school enrollment rate in 1950; and second, the average years of 
schooling in 2005. The estimation method for all models is OLS. 
4.5.3 Results 
 Table 4.3 presents results for the relationship between the historical strength of the 
Church and educational outcomes after Mexico’s anticlerical Revolution. Overall, there is a 
positive association between the intensity of Church presence in 1900 and measures of education 
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that reflect institutional investments by the postrevolutionary state-building coalition. This result 
is consistent across measures of investments in education, and there is suggestive evidence of 
long-run effects. The results in the chapter Appendix, using the number of churches per square 
kilometers to capture Church strength, are generally consistent with those presented in Table 4.3. 
Columns 1 to 3 report results using the change in the literacy rate between 1930 and 1950 
as the dependent variable, starting with a baseline specification that only includes state fixed 
effects and progressively adding controls. All models suggest that a more robust historical 
Church presence accelerated the expansion of literacy and public primary schooling during 
postrevolutionary state-building. Based on the coefficient in column 3 and exploiting exclusively 
within-state variation, a one standard deviation increase in the number of Catholic priests per 
1,000 in 1900 in a municipality is associated with an additional increase in the literacy rate of 0.4 
percentage points between 1930 and 1950.127 More densely populated municipalities and those 
with more commercialized economies in 1900 also experienced more pronounced increases in 
literacy, while rough terrain appears to have hindered state efforts in education. 
 This result is consistent with anticlerical state-builders making relatively stronger 
investments in educational institutions in areas of Church strength, in order to establish social 
control. Similar conclusions emerge from column 4. Municipalities with stronger Church 
presence at the beginning of the twentieth century are associated with higher school enrollment 
rates in 1950. One additional priest per 1,000 people is linked with an increase of 0.5 points in 
the percentage of children enrolled in school. The coefficient is larger than the one on the 
historical number of teachers, which in this case is also positively associated with the outcome 
variable.
                                                 
127
 Notice that my measures of literacy are relative to total, not the adult municipal population. 
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Table 4.3.  Linear models of historical Church strength and educational outcomes, 1930-
2005 
 
DV: 
 in literacy rate (1950-1930) 
DV: 
School 
enrollment 
(1950) 
DV: 
Average 
schooling 
(2005) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Catholic priests per 1,000 (1900) 2.042*** 1.756*** 1.375** 0.495* 0.159* 
 
(0.387) (0.410) (0.484) (0.194) (0.071) 
Terrain roughness 
 
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Distance to Mexico City 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance to state capital 
 
-0.025
†
 -0.024
†
 -0.005
†
 -0.002 
  
(0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) 
State capital (dummy) 
 
-3.720
†
 -4.286** -1.040* 1.244*** 
  
(1.871) (1.397) (0.437) (0.271) 
% pop industry & commerce 
(1900) 
  
0.399* 0.226* 0.193*** 
   
(0.162) (0.090) (0.042) 
% peons (1900) 
  
-0.009 -0.023** -0.012** 
   
(0.017) (0.008) (0.004) 
Teachers per 1,000 (1900) 
  
-0.002 0.356*** 0.203** 
   
(0.274) (0.082) (0.056) 
State officials per 1,000 (1900) 
  
-0.022 0.010 0.055*** 
   
(0.100) (0.048) (0.012) 
Log population (1900) 
  
-0.163 -0.097 0.205** 
   
(0.653) (0.197) (0.056) 
Population density (1900) 
  
0.008*** 0.002 0.005*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Population growth rate (1930-50) 
  
0.003 -0.003
†
 
 
   
(0.006) (0.002) 
 
Constant 15.705*** 
21.816**
* 22.779** 9.729*** 4.228*** 
 
(0.073) (2.549) (7.685) (2.644) (0.511) 
State fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,928 1,913 1,876 1,876 1,895 
Parentheses contain robust standard errors clustered at the state level.  
†
 p<0.1, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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 Finally, column 5 suggests that state institutional investments during this period of 
educational expansion may have indeed produced long-run effects. Exploiting within-state 
variation, the results indicate that the population in municipalities where the Church had deeper 
roots before the Revolution have more years of schooling on average in recent times, compared 
to the population in municipalities in the same state but that had a shallower clerical presence. 
Every unit increase in the number of priests per capita is associated with 0.16 additional years in 
the average schooling rate. This is consistent with findings for other regions of the world that 
historical state-building junctures, when basic state structures are created, can produce initial 
differences in organizational capacity and educational infrastructure that inertially persist (e.g. 
Huillery 2009; Mattingly 2017). 
 The gains in education observed in municipalities where the Catholic Church had been 
stronger historically, during and after a period of state-building commanded by an anticlerical 
coalition, suggest that cleavage-based considerations about social control indeed shaped the 
expansion of mass schooling. Taken together with the results on agrarian reform, these patterns 
support the broader argument that when states emerge in a context of acute domestic 
polarization, investments in state institutions to penetrate and constrain society reflect the 
underlying lines of conflict. This is an important historical source of unevenness in state 
capacity. 
 The results are also consistent with the observation made by scholars in the comparative-
historical institutional tradition that the origins of institutions may have little to do with their 
subsequent effects (Pierson 2004; Ziblatt 2006). It is well-known that differences in educational 
attainment and the provision of mass public education have important consequences for 
economic growth and human development. Yet investments in education may be guided by 
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political concerns with constraining opposition to the state and legitimizing its rule. In the case of 
Mexico, efforts by an anticlerical state-building coalition to overcome Catholic resistance and 
indoctrinate the masses where the Church held more sway indeed seem to help explain how 
educational institutions evolved. 
4.6 The Extension of the Civil Registry 
 This section analyzes how societal resistance along the religious cleavage shaped the 
extension of the civil registry, another basic institution through which the postrevolutionary 
Mexican state secured a foothold in society. Registering citizens and compiling basic 
demographic and vital statistics are defining functions of modern states, whose ability to govern 
directly, uniformly, and bureaucratically rests on standardization and “legibility” (Scott 1998). 
Historically, citizen registration and the sanctioning of relevant events in the lives of ordinary 
people were also crucial arenas in the struggle between church and state for social control.128 The 
now seemingly mundane institution of the civil registry is thus a window into how the conflicts 
between insiders and outsiders to state-building coalitions—in this case of a religious nature—
shape investments in state institutions. 
 In Mexico, already by the mid-nineteenth century Liberal governments had advanced 
civil laws that turned social relations and personal life events into the state’s business. Formally, 
all births, deaths, marriages, and divorces required the state’s recognition, and as in other 
domains the state’s actual capacity to enforce these regulations grew during the Porfirian 
dictatorship. Yet as in education, the “massification” of the civil registry came in the aftermath 
of the Revolution.  
                                                 
128
 Latin American countries imported the Napoleonic civil code, the landmark document in the expansion of state 
control over marriage, the registration of births and deaths, and the like, in detriment of clerical authority. 
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 Precise data for the pre-revolutionary period are not available, but figures derived from 
an archival source indicate that in 1922, at the onset of state reconstruction, only 3.7 marriages 
and 31 births per 1,000 people were registered in the civil registry.129 The same source reports 
increases to 6.3 and 40 after fifteen years. As further evidence of the consolidation of the state’s 
authority in this domain in the decades after the Revolution, the 1930 census—the first data point 
available—indicates that 48% of all people living in couples did so under a marriage sanctioned 
by civil authorities, a figure that increased to 61% in 1940 and 68% in 1950.130 
 Indeed, strengthening the state’s role as the regulator and recorder of basic life events 
occupied an important position in the agenda of Mexican state-builders, as was the case in other 
regimes born out of revolutions (Diamant 2001). In the early 1930s, as Church and state reached 
the agreement to end the Cristero War, new regulations were introduced reinforcing the 
prohibition on clergy from celebrating marriages and baptisms without prior civil registration, as 
well as linking school enrollment and other services to civil registration. The institutional 
Church, as part of the post-war modus vivendi, became more willing to complement religious 
ceremony with the civil certificate (Boylan 2007, 178). By 1936, over three thousand offices 
were implementing registration procedures in some 2,350 municipalities.131 
 From a cultural-ideational perspective, this represented yet another intervention to 
undermine clerical authority and form national citizens: individuals would internalize the norm 
that the main life events of all persons required the state’s formal recognition. But accurate 
demographic statistics and the capacity to identify citizens were also vital for the practical 
                                                 
129
 Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo SEP, Oficina de Estadística Escolar/Dirección General de Estadística, caja 
9268. Campañas Educativas. Folleto “Qué es el Estado Civil y por qué se hacen estadísticas de nacimientos, 
matrimonios, divorcios, defunciones y nacidomuertos.” 
130
 I calculate the total number of people living in couple as the sum of people in free union, in marriages sanctioned 
only by the Church, only by the state, and by both Church and state. I use the two latter categories to calculate the 
number of people with state-sanctioned marriages. 
131
 See note 129 above for source. Mayors were in charge of civil registration functions in most municipalities.  
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purposes of constraining mobilization and conducting the routine tasks of government and 
administration. The state thus actively disseminated information about the benefits of civil 
registration. A brochure circulated in 1938 through public schools warned that major 
inconveniences could emerge in the event that a crime was committed and the person lacked a 
birth certificate to prove her identity, and hence her innocence. A birth certificate was also the 
ideal way to prove one’s identity in order to be eligible for land allocations, and necessary to 
attend school and inherit property. Similarly, the brochure explained that women could only hold 
their husbands to their legal obligations with a civil marriage certificate, while properly 
determining the number of schools or teachers required accurate demographic statistics.132 
 Catholic hostility to the state, materializing in civil war during the Cristiada but 
continuing throughout the 1930s, altered the course and intensity of state-building across 
territory in several spheres, as I have shown. Given the civil registry’s central importance for the 
infrastructural regulation of society, in this domain state elites also prioritized clerical and 
insurgent areas, where their legitimacy and social control capabilities had proven to be more 
tenuous. Through the expansion of the registry, the state could deepen its presence and gain basic 
knowledge about society, in order to control Catholic mass resistance and prevent further major 
insurgent outbreaks.  
 State intent, of course, may not translate into actual outcomes, as stressed above with 
regard to the attempts at secularization through public schooling. However, governments raised 
the probability of success for their strategically distributed registration efforts by linking 
registration to rights and services. Incorporation into state records could thus carry important 
                                                 
132
 See note 129 above for source. 
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benefits for groups hostile to the state. Below, I use historical data to examine the effects of the 
religious cleavage on the extension of institutions of registration in the context of state-building. 
4.6.1 Data 
 Despite Scott’s influential work on registration and legibility as the distinctive 
characteristics of rule by modern states (1998), few studies have used systematic civil registry 
data to examine how rulers expand these capacities. Following Diamant’s qualitative study of 
postrevolutionary China, I use civil marriage registration as a window into the development of 
these administrative capabilities (2001). Starting in 1930, it is possible to calculate the proportion 
of people married by civil and/or religious ceremony in each municipality using the census. I 
coded these data for 1930 and 1940, which allows me to capture the pace of increase across 
municipalities in the decade of state consolidation after the Cristero War.  
 As mentioned, civil marriage increased by some 13 percentage points at the national level 
from 1930 to 1940, for the first time reaching a clear majority of couples. To ease the process of 
data collection, however, the indicator I employ at the municipality level is simply the 
percentage of people—rather than couples—that declared to be married by civil ceremony, alone 
or in conjunction with a religious ceremony.133 
 As in the section on agrarian reform above, I report results using the incidence of 
insurgency during the Cristero War as the explanatory variable. In this case, the results are robust 
to using the number of priests per capita before the Revolution to capture the spatial dynamics of 
the clerical-anticlerical cleavage. Because registration is key to maintaining order and deterring 
insurgency in infrastructural ways, which possibly combined with state elites’ interest in 
undermining the Church to determine the allocation of institutional effort, I opt for modeling 
                                                 
133
 Data were hand-coded for a large number of municipalities using census reports.  
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registration outcomes as a function of the Cristero War in the statistical analysis. I return to these 
different ways of measuring the underlying cleavage in the conclusion. 
 Other historical variables used in the analysis to deal with potential issues of selection 
and confounding have been described previously in this study. 
4.6.2 Empirical strategy 
 I estimate models of the change in the percentage of the population married by civil 
ceremony between 1930 and 1940, using OLS. As in the case of literacy above, by modeling 
change instead of absolute levels I am able to assess the effect of religious opposition on the 
extension of registering institutions throughout the 1930s, after taking into account baseline 
differences across municipalities. All model specifications include state fixed effects to account 
for all state-level factors potentially explaining both municipalities’ selection into the Cristero 
War and the pace of increase in civil registration. In addition, I evaluate whether the results are 
robust to considering differences in state administrative capacity prior to the Revolution, the 
socioeconomic and demographic structure of municipalities at the time of the Cristero War, and 
geographic characteristics. 
4.6.3 Results 
 Table 4.4 presents results for three model specifications. The main finding is that civil 
marriage registration increased more pronouncedly from 1930 to 1940—the decade of 
consolidation of the postrevolutionary state—in municipalities that experienced rebellion during 
the Cristero War. The coefficient in the fully specified model shown in column 3 indicates that 
on average, the percentage of the total municipal population that was married by civil ceremony 
increased by 0.37 additional points throughout the 1930s in rebel municipalities, compared to 
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those that remained peaceful within the same state. As a reference, the average increase across 
all municipalities was approximately 5 percentage points. The results also indicate that the 
expansion of registration capabilities tended to be weaker as distance from state capitals 
increased. Other variables do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels. 
 The picture that emerges from a systematic analysis of this basic social regulatory 
institution is thus consistent with the general argument advanced in this chapter, as well as with 
the empirical patterns uncovered in the sections on agrarian reform and education. Investments in 
institutions of social control were guided by religious contention and the governing coalition’s 
anticlerical purposes. With the expansion of the civil registry, the state attempted to make society 
more legible, and hence controllable. While apparently trivial, civil marriage registration brought 
the power of the state into the sphere of family life and social relations. The results in this section 
suggest that political motivations anchored in salient domestic cleavages can be a strong 
determinant of the intensity of elite efforts to build registration and administrative capabilities 
across a country’s territory. The findings thus shed further light into the forces driving the 
development of state institutions associated with modern and effective governance.
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Table 4.4.  Linear models of Cristero War insurgency and the civil registry, 1930-1940 
 
Dependent variable:  civil marriage 
registration (1940-1930)
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Cristero War insurgency (1926-1929) 0.359* 0.332
†
 0.368* 
 
(0.143) (0.165) (0.167) 
Terrain roughness 
 
-0.002 -0.002 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to Mexico City 
 
0.000 0.001 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Distance to state capital 
 
-0.007
†
 -0.007* 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
State capital (dummy) 
 
-0.452 -0.305 
  
(0.451) (0.676) 
% peons (1900) 
  
-0.008 
   
(0.012) 
Teachers per 1,000 (1900) 
  
-0.248 
   
(0.213) 
State officials per 1,000 (1900) 
  
0.008 
   
(0.035) 
Revolution insurgency (1910-1917) 
  
-0.232 
   
(0.361) 
% pop in industry & commerce (1930) 
  
-0.034 
   
(0.058) 
Log population (1930) 
  
0.131 
   
(0.187) 
Population density (1930) 
  
0.002 
   
(0.002) 
Population growth rate (1930-1940) 
  
-0.008 
   
(0.006) 
% rural population (1930) 
  
-0.001 
   
(0.007) 
Constant 4.886*** 5.764*** 5.115
†
 
 
(0.035) (0.799) (2.516) 
State fixed effects YES YES YES 
N 2,232 2,172 1,878 
Parentheses contain robust standard errors clustered at the state level.  
†
 p<0.1, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the uneven spread of state institutions of social control across 
territory in the context of postrevolutionary Mexico. During this period, several institutions today 
indissolubly linked with state governance reached, for the first time, the mass of ordinary people. 
This process of accelerated state-building took place amid high levels of political polarization 
along a religious cleavage, with the state itself engaging in a sharp and at times violent conflict 
over the influence of Catholicism on citizens’ attitudes, identities, and behaviors. I have shown 
that this domestic fracture had a decisive influence on state elites’ decisions concerning the 
construction of institutions of social regulation across the territory.  
 I examined three important processes by which political elites built the capacity of the 
state to exercise social control without resorting to physical force: the implementation of agrarian 
reform, the expansion of mass primary education, and the extension of a civil registration 
system. These three policy packages multiplied the weight and presence of the state in 
postrevolutionary Mexican society. The set of practices and infrastructures that accompanied 
them held potential for bolstering state social control in two main ways. 
 First, they entailed higher capacity to monitor communities, see through social 
complexity, and make citizens dependent on state allies to access desired goods and services. In 
this concrete, material ways, they reinforced the state’s ability to constrain contentious collective 
action. Social groups hostile to the governing coalition, like political Catholics, would be less 
able to act on the basis of their anti-state preferences. Second, state builders saw agrarian reform, 
mass education, and civil registration as means to consolidate the state’s grip over society by 
reconfiguring those very preferences and attachments. In addition to constraining societal 
contention, then, they would remake and persuade citizens in the cultural-ideational plane. 
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 Through an examination of the historical record and newly compiled datasets, I showed 
that institutional investments in these three modes of social regulation were significantly heavier 
where the Church held more sway, Catholic resistance was pervasive, and the postrevolutionary 
state’s legitimacy thin to nonexistent. State institutions to penetrate society and shape behavior 
were thus built in a dialectical struggle with political Catholicism.  
 The findings in this chapter hold important implications for my argument about the 
relationship between the religious cleavage and state formation across territory. The results for 
the construction of the education system suggest that the impact of the religious cleavage on state 
capacity patterns is not reducible to a legacy of civil war. Rather, its effect was more general and 
pervasive. The antagonism between political Catholics and the anticlerical state, well-established 
before and after the period of open armed conflict (1926-1929), shaped state capacity outcomes 
because it structured elite state-building efforts, and citizens’ willingness to comply, all 
throughout the state-building period. 
 Put differently, the religious cleavage informed elites’ state-building choices not only due 
to the fact that it sparked the Cristero Rebellion. Their decisions about the construction of 
institutions across territory obeyed to ideological commitments and political calculations that 
went beyond the emergence of Catholic insurgency per se. Similarly, in the opposite camp, the 
religious question shaped attitudes and behaviors toward the state among political Catholics 
before, and well after the large uprising of the late 1920s. The cleavage incited a range of forms 
of contention, including but not restricted to rebellion. Throughout the study, I have used novel 
data on both the geography of insurgency and the historical strength of the Church in order to 
capture this underlying confrontation and make it empirically tractable. Theoretically, however, 
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the deep causal factor behind the uneven development of institutions lies in the polarization of 
society along the cleavage throughout the critical period of state-building.  
 Finally, the findings in this chapter contribute to our understanding of state-building 
processes outside contexts where sustained interstate warfare or military threats pushed rulers to 
build the state domestically. In those instances, domestic divisions may become less salient and 
pronounced; higher levels of internal cohesion, in turn, may allow rulers to build capacity 
uniformly within their borders in order to project power externally. However, in a large number 
of cases in Latin America and beyond, cleavage politics has played an important role in state-
making. Acute internal polarization is often a powerful force behind both decisions to state-build 
and the outcomes of state-building. For governing coalitions in polarized contexts, advancing 
ideological preferences and constraining contention among opponents can be strong motivations 
to build a more powerful state machinery. At the same time, because the construction of the state 
occurs in opposition to parts of society, investments in different types of institutions, and 
citizens’ willingness to comply with the state, vary sharply across territory. As a result, 
institutions develop unevenly. 
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4.8 Appendix 
Table 4.5.  Linear models of educational outcomes with alternative measure of Church strength, 
1930-2005 
 
Dependent variable:  literacy rate 
(1950-1930) 
DV: School 
enrollment 
(1950) 
DV: 
Average 
schooling 
(2005) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Churches per thousand km
2
 (1900) 0.008* 0.006* 0.004 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Terrain roughness 
 
-0.008** -0.008*** -0.002* -0.002*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to Mexico City 
 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to state capital 
 
-0.010
†
 -0.010
†
 -0.003 -0.000 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
State capital (dummy) 
 
-1.273 -3.199
†
 -0.800 1.385*** 
  
(0.863) (1.604) (0.534) (0.291) 
% pop in industry & commerce 
(1900) 
  
0.323* 0.213* 0.187*** 
   
(0.123) (0.101) (0.048) 
% peons (1900) 
  
0.024 -0.009 -0.007 
   
(0.033) (0.013) (0.009) 
Teachers per 1,000 (1900) 
  
0.177 0.395** 0.245** 
   
(0.387) (0.114) (0.084) 
State officials per 1,000 (1900) 
  
-0.086 -0.021 0.065*** 
   
(0.117) (0.048) (0.016) 
Log population (1900) 
  
0.618* 0.119 0.235*** 
   
(0.289) (0.161) (0.064) 
Population density (1900) 
  
0.005* 0.001 0.003*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Population growth rate (1930-
1950) 
  
0.008 -0.001 
 
   
(0.007) (0.001) 
 Constant 15.473*** 19.356*** 12.817*** 6.236*** 4.184*** 
 
(0.115) (1.714) (3.236) (1.432) (0.693) 
State fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,415 1,414 1,373 1,373 1,390 
Parentheses contain standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipality level.  
†
 p<0.1, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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5 LITERACY AS A CLUB GOOD: PARTY POLITICS AND EDUCATION IN 
COLOMBIA 
 
 
 
Abstract 
I examine the politics behind the expansion of education and literacy skills, the first major social 
welfare intervention by the state in the mass of the population and a pillar of nation-building. 
Using original historical data from Colombia, I argue that party politics and church-state 
relationships shaped the development of state capacity to provide education across Colombian 
municipalities. In order to achieve dominance in an electorally competitive system, the 
Conservative Party and its clerical allies leveraged literacy restrictions on mass suffrage, in place 
until 1936, to broaden the vote base in municipalities under their control and, conversely, 
suppress the growth of the electorate in Liberal municipalities. This opened a sizable gap in 
educational attainment along partisan lines, aided by the retarded secularization of the public 
education system and the Catholic Church’s historical partisan leanings. The empirical analysis 
exploits long-run cross-sectional variation, as well as changes in municipal partisan affiliation 
over time, to credibly establish the effects of partisanship on literacy. I document that the 
Liberal-Conservative gap persisted throughout the century of popular education, and show that 
differences are also observable with other educational indicators like school enrollment. The 
findings suggest that historical conflicts between rival partisan camps within a polity are an 
important source of subnational variation in state performance, and they contribute to our 
understanding of the links between party politics, religious cleavages, and state-building. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 A state with the capacity to implement policy uniformly throughout territory is a 
precondition for equal and effective access to the social and political rights attached to 
citizenship. One such right is education, which modern states throughout the world have adopted 
as one of their essential functions. In developing countries, states expanded the provision of 
education to the mass of the people mostly in the twentieth century. Public schools thus became 
primary sites of state-society interaction and deployment of state capacity. However, in many 
countries the power of the state extends irregularly across the physical and social landscape. This 
sharp variation within national territories belies the promise of equal citizenship rights and 
contribute to the reproduction of regionally stratified social orders (O’Donnell 1993, 2004).  
 The unevenness of the state has received increasing attention in empirical work 
(Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015; Harbers 2015), and a strong case has been made 
that national measures of state capacity should incorporate territorial reach as a constitutive 
dimension of the concept (Fukuyama 2013; Soifer 2008, 2015). However, theoretical accounts of 
the origins of this variation remain scant and insufficiently integrated into existing theories of 
state building, which tend to focus on cross-national and cross-world regional variations 
produced by exposure to inter-state warfare (Centeno 2002; Tilly 1992). 
 This chapter examines the historical development of state capacity for public good 
provision within Colombia, at the level of the municipality (roughly equivalent to a U.S. county) 
and over the entire twentieth century, when mass literacy and primary education were achieved. I 
focus on education as a window into the state’s ability to extend and uphold social citizenship 
rights. Colombia is an ideal case for this type of investigation because historically it has ranked 
low in overall “stateness” and displayed very high subnational variance in state capacity, even by 
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Latin American standards. Beyond structural obstacles like a difficult geography (Safford and 
Palacios 2002) or nationally-constant factors, like a historically low level of exposure to external 
threats (Centeno 2002; Deas 2015), what political variables explain the uneven development of 
the state within Colombia’s borders? Why did considerable cross-municipal variation emerge in 
education?  
 To answer these questions, I compiled a new historical dataset of municipalities that 
spans the period of extension of education and literacy skills to society at large, using census 
data and primary sources collected through archival research. This dataset includes literacy rates 
across Colombian municipalities for roughly every decade from 1912 to 2005, school enrollment 
rates for various years, and contemporary measures of educational infrastructure. My main 
argument is that the partisan struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, which historically 
structured Colombian politics and the process of state formation, generated large and durable 
differences in access to education and literacy across municipalities.  
 Unlike Mexico, where nineteenth-century Liberals and especially the anticlerical state 
that emerged from the Revolution secularized public schooling and forcefully confined the 
Catholic Church to the sphere of civil society, in Colombia the state and Conservative Party 
established the building blocks of the education system in tandem with the Church. Moreover, 
literacy restrictions on the suffrage—in place during a critical period of Conservative hegemony 
that started at the end of the nineteenth century, and only eliminated in 1936—created incentives 
to expand or suppress literacy instruction based on partisanship.  
 I show that, as a consequence, municipalities historically controlled by the Conservative 
Party obtained an initial advantage over Liberal ones in literacy and other educational indicators, 
which persisted throughout the century of mass education. In order to credibly establish the 
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effect of partisanship and its legacies on educational institutions, I analyze outcomes at different 
time points over a century-long period, consider a wide range of potential confounders, compare 
municipalities located within the same Colombian departments, and exploit changes in the 
partisan profile of municipalities during crucial periods of extension of literacy skills. The 
findings are robust to these different ways of empirically analyzing the data and across 
alternative measures of the relevant variables.  
 The gap between historically Conservative and Liberal counties, which widened in the 
first half of the century, appears to have narrowed in recent decades, but it persists despite major 
changes in the education system and the collapse of the Liberal-Conservative dualism in 
Colombian politics. Hence, the geography of state capacity, patterns of inequality, and 
Colombians’ de facto access to the rights of citizenship across the country remain grounded in 
the political cleavages of the past.  
 The chapter contrasts these developments in education with patterns of fiscal capacity 
across municipalities, where the exact opposite configuration is observed. As I showed in chapter 
2, a very significant expansion in the ability to raise fiscal revenue domestically occurred during 
a period in which the Liberal Party controlled the state between 1930 and 1946. At least since 
then, Liberal municipalities have consistently produced higher tax revenues per capita than 
Conservative ones. These partisan effects on taxation, as my empirical analysis revealed, are not 
simple products of selection or confounding by socioeconomic differences, geographic 
conditions, or other municipal characteristics.  
 Rather, they are part of a broader phenomenon of partisan state-making that, I have 
argued, helps account for subnational variations in state capacity. This is particularly the case in 
countries like Colombia where state-building emerged not as a response to external warfare—
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which might increase domestic cohesion (e.g. Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth 2015)—but 
was instead associated with high levels of internal political polarization, intense partisan or 
group conflict, and an exclusionary use and construction of the state apparatus. 
 The contrast between taxation and public good provision in education, emphasized here 
and also observable in the case of postrevolutionary Mexico, confirms the need to disaggregate 
state capacity not only territorially but also functionally. Existing research has tended to conflate 
different dimensions of the state and assume they co-vary in the same direction. By making this 
assumption, we lose the opportunity to theoretically and empirically analyze how different state 
institutions are built, and how they interact with one another (Soifer and Vom Hau 2008). In 
some instances, like the one analyzed here, we simply may also be mischaracterizing state 
power. 
 The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses why variation in 
educational outcomes in Colombia followed partisan cleavage lines, based on an analysis of the 
history of state-building and the provision of education in the country. Section 5.3 introduces the 
data and shows that, throughout the twentieth century, the Liberal-Conservative divide shaped 
state capacity outcomes but was associated with opposite patterns in education and taxation, a 
contrast that persists into the contemporary period. Next I subject the relationship between 
historical partisanship and educational indicators to systematic empirical analysis at the 
municipality level. Section 5.5 concludes.  
5.2 Party Politics, Religion, and Mass Education 
 In this section, I present my argument that the structure of partisan opposition in 
Colombia conditioned subnational patterns in education. I turn to the history of the construction 
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of the Colombian state, and the central role of the Liberal-Conservative polarity in institution-
building and public good provision, to argue that more Conservative areas were put on a path of 
superior educational performance, relative to Liberal ones. I start by outlining the existing 
connections between parties, the state, and the Catholic Church before the spread of literacy and 
primary education in the twentieth century. I then explain how these linkages created a persistent 
Conservative advantage. 
5.2.1 Strong parties and weak state 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, Colombia ranked low in basic state capacity and 
public service provision even in the Latin American neighborhood. Frequent civil wars since 
Independence; an extremely difficult topography; weak foreign trade; and strong regionalism and 
elite divisions impeded state building and produced important institutional differences across 
regions (Safford and Palacios 2002; Saylor 2014; Soifer 2015, 2016a). A relatively more 
effective state only began to emerge in the first decades of the twentieth century, aided by coffee 
export revenues.  
 In the 1870s, for instance, there were only about 4,500 public employees at all levels 
throughout the country, for a population that exceeded three million (Safford and Palacios 2002, 
242-43). Large parts of the territory, especially the extensive Eastern Plains and the Amazonas 
regions, were sparsely populated and barely had any state presence (Rausch 1999). Physically, 
state institutions were restricted to the Andean highlands (the most populated in pre-colonial 
times and the heart of the colonial state), population centers in the river valleys that separate the 
country’s three mountain chains, and parts of the Caribbean coast.  
 Circa 1900, primary school enrollment for the total population hovered around 3.5%, 
compared to 8.4% in Argentina or 5.3% in Chile, and large differences existed across regions 
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(Ramírez and Téllez 2007, 462). The same authors report that in the traditionally Conservative 
department of Antioquia, enrollment neared 6.7% in 1905, compared to only 4.1% in Tolima, 
1.8% in Santander, or 1.2% in Atlántico (2007, 475). These regional variations are typically 
attributed to underlying differences in economic modernization (Urrutia 1976), in line with 
classic arguments about the rise of mass schooling (Gellner 1983), given the increased demand 
for education that comes with industrialization and the commercialization of the economy.  
 Without denying the importance of the economic dimension, I will argue that party 
politics and struggles over religion also shaped the evolution of the education system, thereby 
shaping important outcomes like the diffusion of literacy. These general connections between 
politics, religion, and education are well-documented in both classic and more recent works on 
Western European cases (Ansell and Lindvall 2013; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). My unique 
contribution is to show the profound implications of these domestic cleavages for the spatial 
development of the state, on the one hand, and the persistently unequal educational opportunities 
available to citizens within a single polity, on the other, using very disaggregated and long-run 
evidence from Colombia. This type of investigation is particularly relevant for Latin American 
cases, given the sharp inequalities that exist in access to the rights of citizenship that define, and 
authorize, rule by the modern state. 
 The indicators mentioned above suffice to demonstrate the overall weakness of the 
Colombian state at the end of the nineteenth century and the low level of state provision of 
public goods. In this context, two types of institutions were nevertheless well-established. 
Political parties and the Catholic Church had deep roots in Colombian society, and their strength 
would prove crucial for education policy and the construction of state institutions more 
generally.  
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 The cleavage that emerged between elite factions early in the republican era, mainly over 
issues of government centralization and the role of religion in public affairs, congealed by the 
mid-nineteenth century in what would be the most durable party formations in Latin American 
history.134 Partisan loyalties did not remain confined to the elites but were “massified” through 
sustained electoral competition135 and the partisan wars of the nineteenth century, the last and 
most bloody of which was the Thousand Days War of 1899-1902. Organizationally, Colombian 
parties were diffuse networks of officeholders and local bosses. These elites entrenched 
themselves in local government structures and kept loyal clienteles through partisan protection 
rackets, the distribution of favors, and other selective rewards to co-partisans. 
 Local conflicts between rival elites and villages, sometimes only loosely connected to the 
ideological underpinnings of elite conflict, became nevertheless codified as part of the master 
cleavage. In turn, the grievances produced by armed conflict reinforced partisan attachments and 
helped convert them into “hereditary hatreds” (Dix 1987; Pécaut 2001). Moreover, under high 
political polarization and a state incapable of providing basic guarantees, electoral contests often 
turned violent, thus further strengthening group attachments. 
 Early on, then, Colombian politics acquired a Manichaean, in-group-versus-out-group 
logic that organized mass political identities, electoral behavior, and access to the state, but also 
social relations more generally. The Liberal-Conservative fracture, as scholars have argued, 
separated alternative partisan “subcultures.” This dualism continued to characterize Colombian 
                                                 
134
 The Conservative Party formed as an alliance between Bolivarians—an elite faction defending the legacy of 
Bolívar and favoring a powerful national executive—and moderate Liberals, alienated by the radicalism of other 
liberal elites who claimed the legacy of Santander. For a good historical account of the development of the two 
parties, see Safford and Palacios (2002, 112–56, 197–215).     
135
 Universal male suffrage was in place between 1853 and 1863, a period of political polarization. Despite 
restrictions on the suffrage during most of the nineteenth century, a long electoral tradition and parties’ popular 
mobilization and counter-mobilization efforts in order to consolidate hegemony seem to have contributed to the 
consolidation of mass partisanship. 
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politics into the twentieth century, with somewhat lower levels of polarization following 
Conservative victory in the War of the Thousand Days, but again intensifying in the mid-1930s  
and producing a new civil war starting in the mid-1940s.136 Though we lack individual-level 
historical measures of out-group animosity or social distance across the party divide, the extent 
of polarization is apparent from the formation of politically homogenous communities, the 
stability of electoral alignments, the prevalence of out-party stereotypes, and the sheer frequency 
of partisan-inspired violence.  
 The formation of strong partisan identities early in Colombian independent history, well 
before the extension of institutions like primary education, or even territorial consolidation (the 
boundaries of current Colombia were only defined in 1903 with the separation of Panama), had 
major implications for subsequent state development. Liberal-Conservative polarization implied 
that more ambitious state-building measures, when adopted in the twentieth century, proceeded 
on the basis of sharp antagonisms that permeated throughout society. They also tended to have a 
pronounced partisan tilt.  
 Indeed, policies to build state capacity were typically tightly associated with the pursuit 
of partisan hegemony, which became the leading objective of party organizations. Core state 
institutions in Colombia were not simply under-developed or absent from parts of the territory, 
but exploited for openly partisan purposes. Parties’ factional use of the governing apparatus 
when in power heavily conditioned state-citizen relations—it blurred the distinctions between 
political affiliation with the party in opposition, on the one hand, and resistance to the state, on 
the other. In doing so, it hindered the broad-based legitimation of basic state institutions, and the 
emergence of shared norms of compliance, that jointly facilitate policy implementation and 
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 The causes of midcentury violence have been much discussed. For a study emphasizing its partisan-political 
origins, see Henderson (1985). 
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further investments in state capacity. By virtue of extreme partisanship and polarization, state 
institutions failed to elicit broad consent or “quasi-voluntary compliance” (Levi 1988, 1997). 
5.2.2 The marriage between Conservatives and the Catholic Church 
 In addition to the parties, the Catholic Church constituted the other firmly-implanted 
institution in nineteenth century Colombia. It was thoroughly involved in politics and the 
provision of education—at this time a privilege of a small minority and a marker of social 
stratification. Ecclesiastical issues were, of course, at the very core of the Liberal-Conservative 
cleavage. Roman Catholicism dictated the programmatic outlook of the Conservative Party, and 
legitimated it as a moral force. The party’s founding elites “consciously chose the Church and 
Christianity as emotionally powerful symbols” to attract support from a pious population 
(Safford and Palacios 2002, 201).  
 A solid alliance thus emerged between the Church and the Conservative Party. 
Conservatives received the open support of high and low clergy as champions of tradition, 
clerical privileges that dated to the colonial era, and a social order regulated by Catholic 
morality. The support of Catholic clergy for Conservatism became a lasting feature of the 
Colombian party system. This, of course, had important political consequences. In many rural 
areas, where government institutions were weak and had historically worked in tandem with the 
Church, parish priests were often the dominant figure of authority, as well as the main agents of 
social regulation. In fact, even many moderate Liberals feared the socially disintegrative effects 
of curtailing the power of the Church and undermining popular religiosity. In any case, clerical 
involvement became a definitive component of partisan struggles. Well into the twentieth 
century, the Church served as a territorially-extensive organizational carapace for Conservative 
Party politics. 
 232 
 
 I argue that the alliance between the Church and the Conservative Party was critical for 
the emergence of a durable educational gap between Liberal and Conservative municipalities. 
The ultimately unsuccessful Liberal attempts at secularization of education and Church-state 
separation meant that the Church, in some ways more of a national institution than the central 
state itself, retained an influential position in the conduction of public education. And given its 
partisan ties, Church involvement worked to create long-lasting advantages for historically 
Conservative areas, as I will show. 
 In this crucial aspect, Colombian history differed from that of Mexico, where Liberals’ 
victory in the War of the Reform (1857-1860) and the Second Franco-Mexican War (1861-1867) 
exhausted Conservatism as a political force and set the basis for a secular state, a project that 
fiercely anticlerical revolutionaries would complete in the twentieth century.137 In Colombia, in 
contrast, Conservatives ultimately emerged victorious from the struggles of the nineteenth 
century. Liberals were politically dominant from midcentury to the late 1870s, with a brief 
Conservative interlude from 1855 to 1861. As in Mexico during the Reforma, the “Radical” 
faction of Colombian Liberalism curtailed Church privileges, sold Church property, expelled the 
Jesuits in 1850 and again in 1861, and implemented several other anticlerical measures to 
separate Church and state. 
 However, these secularizing plans quickly unraveled after a series of civil wars in the late 
nineteenth century. Liberal efforts in the 1870s to broaden public education and assert state 
control in this area triggered a Conservative rebellion in 1876—the so-called “war of the parish 
priests.” Although defeated, the rebellion severely weakened Radical Liberalism and stopped 
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 Political Catholicism and (lowercase) conservatism of course remained powerful forces in Mexico, as Catholic 
resistance to the anticlerical postrevolutionary state clearly shows. However, Conservatives’ support for the French-
imposed empire of Maximilian (1864-1867) irremediably associated Conservatism with treason and disloyalty to the 
nation. Thus no significant political movement in Mexico has ever again claimed the Conservative label.     
 233 
 
school reform in its tracks. Moderate “Independent” Liberals allied with Conservatives to unseat 
Radical Liberals from power, winning the 1878 election. After another civil war in 1885 ended 
in Radical Liberal defeat, a new constitution in 1886 and the Concordat of 1887 restored the 
organic linkages between the Church and the Colombian state. The Church was compensated for 
the loss of property, obtained the monopoly over marriage and citizen registration, and regained 
the control over the curriculum and the education bureaucracy. Specifically, Catholic clergy had 
the prerogative of supervising teachers’ observance of moral and religious principles and 
demanding their dismissal, as well as designing school programs and textbooks (Helg 1987).  
 Alienated Liberals again rebelled, and lost, in the bloody Thousand Days’ War, paving 
the way for Conservative hegemony until 1930. In that year, a moderate Liberal capitalized on 
the split of the Conservative vote across two candidates and won the presidential election. Only 
in 1934 would a more radical Liberal return to the national executive—and again face strong 
Conservative and clerical resistance. The relevant point is that for a long and critical period of 
half a century, the more progressive wing of the Liberal Party remained politically excluded and 
powerless. 
 To summarize, the political situation in early twentieth-century Colombia was 
characterized by a weak yet thoroughly politicized state apparatus, entrenched partisan identities 
at both the elite and mass levels, and a powerful Catholic Church clearly aligned with one of the 
parties. For the purposes of my argument, it is again worth stressing two historical facts. First, 
the Church retained thorough control over education in nineteenth and early 20th century 
Colombia. Second, Church, state, and Conservative partisan interests formed a tight complex, 
firmly in power from the 1880s to the 1920s. These linkages would shape educational 
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institutions and subnational patterns of expansion of schooling and literacy, with consequences 
that are still observed. 
5.2.3 Partisan bias in the expansion of education and literacy 
 Why did polarization around the Liberal-Conservative divide translate into variation in 
educational outcomes across Colombia? Why did areas of historical Conservative support obtain 
an early advantage in literacy and schooling, and why did it persist as education was extended to 
the masses? Secular Colombian Liberals, after all, shared with their international counterparts the 
belief that education and literacy would bring civilization to the masses and dispel religious 
superstition, and they had made efforts in the 1860s and 1870s to strengthen and secularize 
public education. Moreover, spreading literacy and basic education had been, at least 
rhetorically, a shared objective of all political elites since Independence. Here I explain how 
Conservative electoral interests and the Catholic Church’s long-lasting involvement in schooling 
and literacy campaigns nevertheless turned the country’s historical partisan geography into an 
important source of variation in educational attainment. 
 As mentioned above, access to education and literacy skills in Colombia was reserved for 
the few at the onset of the twentieth century. In contrast to the rich democracies, where state-
sponsored primary education was already well-established in the late nineteenth century (Ansell 
and Lindvall 2013; Engerman, Sokoloff, and Mariscal 2012), the extension of primary 
education—crucial for the formation of state-society linkages and nation-building—occurred in 
Latin America only in the twentieth century. Colombia was a particularly late arriver to this 
process, as rapid increases in primary education coverage were not seen until the 1950s (Ramírez 
and Téllez 2007). Progress in the first half of the century was slow and uneven, with enrollment 
for the primary school-age population hovering around 30% throughout this period (Helg 1987). 
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 However, children spent brief periods in school that are not fully reflected in enrollment 
rates (Helg 1987; Lebot 1978), and governments, in partnership with the Church, did promote 
and oversee literacy campaigns to broaden access to reading and writing skills. The first 
available figures from the 1912 census indicate a very high illiteracy rate for the population 
above eight years of age, of around 83% (Helg 1987, 35).138 By the 1938 and 1951 censuses, 
respectively, illiteracy among those older than seven was down to 46.2% and 42.5%. Although 
Colombia still lagged behind other Latin American countries, significant reductions in illiteracy 
were experienced in the first half of the century, as these figures indicate.  
 Literacy, however, had a fundamental political component, since the centralist 
Conservative Constitution of 1886 reintroduced, at the national level, literacy (and property) 
requirements in order to exercise the right to vote. In the federal arrangement of the 1863 
Constitution, voting rights had been left to the states, many of which also imposed literacy 
requirements. Therefore, literacy was inextricably linked to partisan-electoral fortunes, except 
for a short window between 1853 and 1863.139 Universal male suffrage would only be 
reestablished in 1936, during a major period of Liberal reform after half a century of 
Conservative dominance. In that year, Liberals approved a constitutional reform eliminating 
literacy and property restrictions on voting, which they calculated played into the hands of 
Conservatives. 
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 Ramírez and Téllez (2007) report lower illiteracy rates for the adult population in this period. Their figures are 
from the Oxford Latin American Economic History Database (OXLAD), which reports an illiteracy rate of 61% in 
1910 and 56% in 1920. The difference arises because the OXLAD figures are for the population older than 15 years 
of age and employ backward projections using data from later censuses. The observation that significant reductions 
in illiteracy took place in this period holds regardless.  
139
 The Constitution of 1853, in effect for a decade, had introduced universal male suffrage. Female suffrage was 
only adopted in 1957. Source: “Historia del voto en Colombia.” Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Available 
at http://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Historia-del-voto-en-Colombia-.html. Accessed May 12, 2017. 
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 I argue that these historical restrictions on the suffrage turned the spread of literacy skills 
and the provision of education into a political-electoral weapon. Conservatives—in control of the 
state apparatus since the late nineteenth century—and their clerical allies could selectively invest 
or under-invest in education in order to expand the ranks of literate Conservative Party voters 
and, conversely, limit the growth of the electorate in Liberal areas. Committed Liberals, in 
contrast, excluded from power, defeated, and especially lacking the support of an extensive 
organization with historical control over education like the Church, had no means of evening the 
scales. 
 Exploiting voting barriers to expand or suppress the size of the electorate in Conservative 
versus Liberal areas was a suitable strategy because of Colombia’s largely uninterrupted 
electoral tradition. Parties fought wars and contested elections, and the latter were the dominant 
route to power. Participation in presidential and national legislative elections was largely 
reserved for elites140, but the country was thoroughly politicized, and electoral contests always 
remained meaningful. Under the constitution of 1886, the president was elected indirectly every 
six years (then reformed to four), and through direct vote after 1910. Meanwhile, the lower 
chamber was elected every four years and local legislatures and municipal councilors every two, 
creating an “unending succession of campaigns” that kept partisan divisions alive and local 
machines constantly active (Safford and Palacios 2002, 249). These three last types of elections 
were direct since the mid-nineteenth century.  
 The thorough “partidization” of the state apparatus when either of the two parties was in 
power, along with electoral manipulation and intimidation, left the party in opposition powerless 
and essentially unable to win the presidential office, unless it could exploit divisions between 
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 Elections for local legislatures and municipal councils imposed no literacy requirement. 
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rival factions of the incumbent party. This is how Liberals lost power in the late 1870s, returned 
to the presidency in 1930, and lost again in 1946. For this same reason, the opposition party often 
abstained from the presidential election, arguing a lack of democratic guarantees and an even 
playing field (e.g. 1914, 1918, 1926, 1934, 1938, 1949). However, it is clear that for political 
elites and local machines, expanding their party’s electoral base was far from pointless. For 
Conservatives before the return to universal male suffrage in 1936, investing in increasing 
literacy levels in safely Conservative areas, and doing the exact opposite in Liberal strongholds, 
was a means to consolidate their electoral standing.  
 The electoral incentives embedded in suffrage restrictions, in the context of an alliance 
between the Church and the Conservative Party, are therefore a crucial link in the causal chain 
between Colombia’s historical partisan geography and educational outcomes. With the clergy 
heavily involved in school affairs and literacy campaigns, Conservatives had the means to 
leverage existing voting barriers as a springboard for electoral expansion. In doing so, they built 
a partisan pattern into the spread of literacy skills across Colombia. In the statistical analysis 
below, I show that municipalities more favorable to the Conservative Party experienced greater 
increases in literacy than comparable Liberal municipalities, consistent with this political logic. 
These differences, rooted in historical party politics, continued to characterize Colombia 
throughout its subsequent history.  
 The political uses of literacy play an important role in my analysis as sources of Liberal-
Conservative educational differentials. More broadly, however, clerical-Conservative control 
over the state apparatus and the education system allowed concentrating education provision on 
supporters, who were also more receptive to these efforts due to their political affinity with those 
in power. Education, of course, had a strong conservative (and Conservative) thrust, in line with 
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the Concordat of 1887. Financially and administratively, the responsibility for primary education 
rested for the most part with the departments (the second level of government), but the Church 
was heavily involved in implementation and design.141 
 Religious instruction formed the core of public education, which during the Conservative 
hegemony was free but not mandatory, following Vatican mandates—the Church considered it a 
family decision out of the state’s concern. In the municipalities, parish priests were members of 
education inspection councils and, as mentioned, supervised teachers and exerted a strong 
influence over their career prospects. Teachers had the responsibility of escorting their class to 
mass in the community’s presence, and their payroll required the priest’s signature (Helg 1987, 
60). Clergy were also involved in teacher selection and training in normal schools, in some 
Colombian departments with complete control.  
 In the extensive, sparsely populated, and largely ungoverned “national territories,” which 
depended directly on central authorities, the state fully abdicated of educational functions 
(Rausch 1999). In 1902, it gave Catholic orders—which had arrived in large numbers under the 
Concordat, fleeing secularizing trends in Europe—full administrative control over these areas. In 
reality, their task resembled colonial missionary work in stateless territory more than simple 
policy implementation. 
 The Church’s continuing influence over educational institutions served as a mechanism 
to reproduce superior educational outcomes in Conservative municipalities, relative to Liberal 
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 Under the 1903 elementary-education law, the national government supplied education materials and designed 
the curriculum (with the Church); departments selected teachers, decided on their allocations, and paid their salaries; 
and municipalities were in charge of constructing and maintaining schoolhouses. Departments were responsible for 
spreading primary education and bore the heaviest financial burden. Under Colombia’s unitary system, the president 
appointed departmental governors, and these in turn appointed mayors. This produced partisan coherence at all 
levels of government. 
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ones. Until at least the 1960s, the Church acted quite openly as a partisan force.142 Clergy used 
the pulpit and their social standing to “indoctrinate the faithful with a partisan political 
catechism” (Safford and Palacios 2002, 286). They also remained involved in education and 
literacy campaigns for decades, despite some reforms that weakened their control. 
 Conflict over educational issues and Church influence began to reemerge in the 1920s, in 
the last years of Conservative hegemony. A German pedagogical mission recommended making 
primary education mandatory, and other reforms which the Church and the more clerical faction 
of the Conservative Party opposed. Liberals won the 1930 election after these divisions within 
the Church-Conservative camp led to fragmentation of the Conservative vote into two 
candidates. During the first Liberal administration (1930-1934), however, the moderate faction in 
power implemented little change in the domain of education, to avoid antagonizing the Church. 
Conservatives retained control over the Education Ministry, and the religious orientation of 
education was maintained (Helg 1987).  
 Open confrontation with the Church and Conservatives took place after 1934, when 
Colombia started to experience its version of post-Great Depression mass popular politics. Under 
the banner of a “Revolution on the March,” the more radical wing of the Liberal Party gave the 
state a more interventionist socioeconomic role, promoted tax and agrarian reform, and sought to 
strengthen state control over education (Stoller 1995). The depth of reform paled in comparison 
to the Mexican experience under Lázaro Cárdenas in the same period, but polarization again 
peaked, and would lead to a new wave of partisan violence and “Conservatization” of the state 
starting in the mid-1940s. The Revolution on the March was also short-lived, as Liberals were 
divided and ultimately backed down from their more radical objectives.  
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 There are of course exceptions to the political involvement of the clergy and the support for Conservatives. This 
nevertheless describes the general trend. 
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 Nevertheless, Liberals’ school reform project faced strong clerical and Conservative 
resistance. The Church called the laity to withdraw children from public schools, and priests 
actively demonized Liberals as sinners. Despite somewhat reducing the Church’s influence, 
radical Liberals were thus ultimately unable to erase the Catholic-conservative orientation of 
Colombia’s education system. Moderate Liberals were also unwilling to adopt anticlerical 
attitudes. In fact, the weak Colombian state, lacking an extensive apparatus, continued to rely on 
civil society and the Church to provide education and expand literacy, even under the Liberal 
Republic (1930-1946). In 1940, for example, education boards were formed in the municipalities 
by government decree to oversee education, collect funds, and combat illiteracy. The National 
Board was presided by the national executive and the country’s archbishop. Municipal boards 
were formed by the mayor, five citizens, and the parish priest.143 
 With the return of the Conservatives in 1946—capitalizing on the split of the Liberal vote 
into a moderate and a more radical-populist candidate who was assassinated in 1948—the 
Church recovered some of its prior influence, and state bureaucracies were purged from Liberal 
elements. The country also entered a new period of partisan civil war (La Violencia), in part 
fueled by Conservative-led repression in order to expand the party’s electoral dominance to 
competitive and Liberal municipalities (Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik 2011; Karl 2017; Roldán 
2002). Following the well-established pattern, partisan criteria dictated state action and public 
good provision.  
 Overall, then, Conservatives controlled the state for most of the time since the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, and Liberals proved unable and sometimes unwilling to break 
a pattern of strong clerical influence over education. In the second half of the twentieth century, 
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 “Decreto Número 722 de 1940.” Ministerio de Educación. Diario Oficial 24340. April 16, 1940.  
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in an attempt to stop partisan violence, the two parties agreed to share the state and rotate the 
presidency during the National Front (1958-1974) (Hartlyn 1988). This was a period of 
educational expansion. Multiple reforms have since then broadened access to education, putting 
Colombia close to the objective of universal literacy and full coverage in primary education. 
However, these more equitable governments and reformers still operated on the basis of inherited 
patterns and state infrastructures. As I show below, educational outcomes across territory 
continue to reflect the partisan struggles of the past. 
5.3 Data and Measurement 
 In this section, I describe the educational and partisanship variables included in my 
dataset and present the basic pattern that emerges from a comparison of municipalities 
historically aligned with each of the parties. I also discuss how partisanship is associated with 
inverse municipal patterns in education and taxation, which provides clear indication that 
different causal processes may underlie the development of different functions associated with an 
effective state. Section 5.4 below then presents more systematic evidence in support of my 
argument about historical party politics and patterns of educational development across 
Colombia. 
5.3.1 Data 
 I compiled an original historical dataset containing several measures of education at the 
municipality level. The main indicator in the empirical analysis below is the municipal literacy 
rate, which I calculated using multiple censuses since the early twentieth century. Literacy was 
first reported in the 1912 census, so unfortunately it is impossible to extend the analysis back to 
the nineteenth century. Starting with the first available measures from 1912 nevertheless allows 
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for meaningful examination of the relationship of interest, mainly how the Liberal-Conservative 
cleavage shaped the spread of literacy to the majority of the population. The 1912 figures capture 
the distribution of literacy skills during the long period of Conservative hegemony, and after the 
restoration of Church-state ties in the 1880s. They are also a good starting point to analyze the 
progressive shift to mass literacy in the twentieth century. As mentioned, illiteracy was still very 
high at this time (83% for the population above 8 years of age).144 
 The dataset also contains measures of the municipal literacy rate at seven other time 
points: 1918, 1938, 1951, 1964, 1973, 1985, and 2005. These correspond to census dates. Up to 
1973, the data were hand-coded using census documents, except for 1918 and 1951, which I 
obtained from the datasets compiled by Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015) and 
Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik (2011), respectively. Later years come from the Centro de 
Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) at Los Andes University. The literacy rate is 
calculated relative to the total municipal population in all years, with the following exceptions: in 
1951, the denominator is the population above seven years of age; in 1985 and 2005, the 
population above fifteen years. These changes in the denominator create minor comparability 
issues, but since my interest is on the trends followed by Liberal versus Conservative 
municipalities, not absolute literacy rates over time, they are not a major concern.  
 In addition to literacy, I collected data to examine if the partisan cleavage also shaped 
other educational outcomes. In particular, since literacy instruction sometimes occurred through 
temporary campaigns and not permanently-established public schools, it is worth examining 
other indicators of state educational effort across territory. For these purposes, I rely on school 
enrollment rates, which are a commonly used measure of public service provision and the depth 
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of state penetration of society, beyond coercive and extractive functions (e.g. Soifer 2015; Ziblatt 
2006). Specifically, I use schooling rates in each municipality in 1918 and 1957, just before the 
formation of the bipartisan National Front and with school expansion under way. The 1918 data 
are from the census. The 1957 figures come from the Ministerio de Educación Nacional (1957). 
This report is available in the historical collection of the National Library in Bogotá. 
 Finally, in addition to the contemporary measures of literacy, I use the number of schools 
per thousand citizens in 2005 to examine if the historical distribution of partisan control is 
associated with greater educational infrastructure, a possible channel for the sustained advantage 
in literacy observed in historically Conservative municipalities. This variable was calculated 
using data from CEDE. 
 As a first approximation to the relationships of interest, I classified municipalities as 
having a Conservative or a Liberal majority, using the average vote share for candidates of each 
party in the 1930 and 1946 presidential elections. Given limited data availability for the 
nineteenth century and for reasons briefly explained here and detailed by Oquist, a leading 
Colombia scholar, these two elections “present unique characteristics that make averaging them 
the superior alternative for measuring the traditional partisan identification of municipalities” 
(1973, 67). These are the only two presidential elections contested by both parties in a long 
period relevant to my analysis.145 As mentioned, parties tended to abstain from the presidential 
contest when in opposition, weakened by the rival party’s control of the state, anticipating defeat, 
and rightfully invoking a lack of an even playing field. By contrast, accurate measures of 
                                                 
145
 The Liberal Party abstained from presidential elections after Conservative victory in the Thousand Days’ War in 
1902, and again in 1950. The 1922 election is an exception, but accusations of major fraud and violent incidents 
advise against using data from this election to obtain unbiased measures of electoral support. Conservatives 
abstained from presidential elections during the Liberal Republic (1930- 1946). The next election in 1958 
inaugurates the period of the National Front, during which the dominant factions of both parties backed the same 
candidates.  
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partisan support can be obtained from these two elections. Both were untainted by major 
accusations of fraud and produced democratic turnover. Conservatives received more votes in 
1930 but lost the presidency to the Liberals due to a split of their support base in two candidates. 
The exact opposite occurred in 1946.  
 Support for each party across both elections is strongly correlated ( = 0.75, p<0.001), 
confirming the stickiness of partisan identification and the very low levels of cross-cleavage 
voter mobility. Parties tended to be electorally dominant at the local level. Only 18.5% and 20% 
of municipalities were competitive in 1930 and 1946, respectively, using an average electoral 
margin of less than 20 points as a generous threshold of competitiveness. Changes in the partisan 
affiliation of municipalities across elections are explained by targeted persecution, intimidation, 
and the sectarian use of the state apparatus by the party in power, much more than by 
retrospective evaluations, persuasion, or other conventional electoral factors (Guerrero 1991; 
Gutiérrez Sanín, Acevedo, and Viatela 2007).146 Starting in the mid-1940s, Conservatives took 
this long-used strategy to the extreme, engaging in systematic violence and repression to achieve 
electoral expansion and, as the sitting president of the country and Conservative Party founder 
had put it a century earlier, “exterminate the contrary party at all costs.”147 Violent Conservative 
electioneering is considered to be at the root of La Violencia (Guzmán, Fals Borda, and Umaña 
2005; Karl 2017).  
 Election results reflect the previous point. Between 1930 and 1946, with the Liberals in 
power, 154 (23%) of the 661 municipalities at the time switched from a Conservative to a 
Liberal majority, while only 10 experienced the opposite change. Between 1946 and 1958 (using 
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 Parties’ offered exact opposite explanations for the explosion of political violence by midcentury, but both were 
based on this point. Liberals blamed it on Conservative-led persecution and repression after their return to power in 
1946. Conservatives argued Liberal authorities had set off the violence during the Liberal Republic. 
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 Mariano Ospina in a letter to the governor of Antioquia in 1860, quoted in Safford and Palacios (2002, 223). 
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legislative election results for the latter year), 17% of 772 municipalities switched to a 
Conservative majority, and none saw the opposite change. 
 Table 5.1 presents the unconditional relationship between the historical partisan leaning 
of Colombian municipalities, based on the 1930 and 1946 elections, and average literacy rates 
for several years between 1912 and 2005. The last column in the table shows the difference 
between municipalities with a Conservative versus a Liberal majority historically. There is a 
substantial gap in all years in the table, which widens until the late 1930s and then slowly 
narrows, but persists, throughout the century of literacy expansion. In 1938, two years after the 
elimination of literacy restrictions on the vote, Conservative municipalities advantaged Liberal 
ones in the average literacy rate by some 4.5 percentage points, the greatest observed difference. 
Historically Liberal municipalities appear to start catching up at a faster pace after the dissolution 
of the bipartisan National Front in 1974, but in 2005 they still trailed Conservative municipalities 
by about 1.8 points. 
 
Table 5.1. Average literacy rate across Colombian municipalities, by historical 
partisan affiliation, 1912-2005 
Year
a
 
Conservative majority 
(N=358) 
Liberal majority 
(N=458) 
Percentage point 
difference 
1912 23.98 21.76 2.22* 
1918 27.37 24.36 3.01** 
1938 39.59 35.08 4.51** 
1951 51.39 47.17 4.22** 
1964 47.95 44.2 3.75** 
1973 52.94 49.74 3.20** 
1985 79.69 78.08 1.61* 
2005 86.18 84.36 1.82** 
* p< 0.05 , ** p< 0.001 
a
 The literacy rate is calculated for the population above seven years of age in 1915, and above fifteen in 
1985 and 2005. In all other years the denominator is the total municipal population. Municipalities were 
classified as Liberal or Conservative based on the average vote share for candidates of each party in the 
1930 and 1946 presidential elections. See text for details. 
Source: Own calculations based on a historical dataset of my own construction. Election data come from 
DANE (1973). Municipal literacy rates were calculated using national censuses.  
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 As noted, this comparison does not take into account other municipal-level characteristics 
other than partisanship that may account for the observed differences in literacy. The statistical 
analysis in the next section tests the robustness of these differences across party lines by 
introducing controls and exploiting changes in partisan affiliation over time. However, the 
figures in Table 5.1 are suggestive of substantial and persisting effects of historical cleavage 
structure on educational outcomes, consistent with the historical argument developed in the 
previous section. 
5.3.2 Education versus Taxation 
 Before proceeding to the statistical analysis, it is worth placing the above patterns against 
the development of other state institutions. The figures presented in Table 5.1 point to a 
consistent institutional advantage for Conservative municipalities in public good provision. On 
this basis, it would be reasonable to jump to the conclusion that in Colombia, an overall stronger 
and more effective state emerged in territory historically held by the Conservative Party. A 
positive relationship between tax extraction and expansion of rights and services is at the core of 
state-building models that see capable states emerging from the bargain between rulers and 
citizens (Levi 1988, 1997; Tilly 2005), and the use of one-dimensional measures of state capacity 
is widespread in the literature. 
 My examination of different dimensions of state power nevertheless shows that 
significant divergences may emerge across arenas if we simultaneously disaggregate states 
territorially and functionally. Moreover, it suggests that internal cleavage structures—in this 
case, the deep-seated Liberal-Conservative fracture—can be associated with opposite patterns 
across state functions. To illustrate the point, Table 5.2 presents average per capita tax revenues 
in municipalities of historical Conservative-versus-Liberal majority. The table summarizes the 
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extractive capacity of both local governments (various years) and the national government 
(1950). When available, the table also includes revenues from direct taxes, which require more 
administrative and “cognitive” capacities and societal compliance, because they are not hidden in 
prices. 
 
Table 5.2. Average tax revenues per capita across Colombian municipalities, by historical 
partisan affiliation, 1926-2005 
Type of revenue Year 
Conservative 
majority 
(N=358) 
Liberal 
majority 
(N=458) 
Liberal-
Conservative ratio* 
Municipal taxes  
(per capita) 
1926 1.18 1.94 1.6 
1940 0.44 0.76 1.7 
1950 1.61 2.47 1.5 
1964 9.49 13.82 1.5 
2005 50,370 62,385 1.2 
2005 (property tax) 19,478 25,005 1.3 
 
    
National taxes  
(per capita) 
1950 (total) 1.37 3.8 2.8 
1950 (income tax) 0.16 1.01 6.2 
*Differences in means between Liberal and Conservative municipalities are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level or higher in all years shown in the table. 
Figures are expressed in current Colombian pesos of each year and include all direct and indirect taxes, unless 
otherwise indicated. Other types of government revenue are excluded. Municipalities were classified as Liberal or 
Conservative based on the average vote share received by candidates of each party in the 1930 and 1946 presidential 
elections. See text for details. 
Source: Own calculations based on a historical dataset of my own construction. Tax revenues in each municipality 
were obtained from official government records and documents collected through archival research. Relevant printed 
primary sources are Contraloría General de la República (1941b, 1951b); DANE (1969); and Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público (1927). Municipal tax revenues for 2005 come from the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo 
Económico (CEDE) at the Universidad de los Andes. 
 
 The main takeaway is that Table 5.2 and Table 5.1 are mirror-images of each other. 
Literacy rates are consistently higher in municipalities with a Conservative majority throughout 
the century, but tax extraction per person is consistently lower. There are statistically significant 
differences in per capita tax collection across the partisan divide in all years, with citizens in 
Liberal municipalities bearing on average a heavier tax burden. The last column of Table 5.2 
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expresses per capita fiscal revenues in Liberal municipalities as a ratio of revenues in 
Conservative ones. Until the 1960s, the average taxpayer in a Liberal municipality contributed at 
least 50% more in municipal taxes. The difference is even more pronounced with taxes collected 
by the central government, which in fact collected the vast majority of revenue. The partisan-
based gap also deepens if we look exclusively at direct taxes. In 1950, for example, the income 
tax produced 6.2 times more per person in Liberal than in Conservative municipalities. As I 
showed in chapter 2, these differences remain after controlling for a host of potentially 
confounding factors, and historical evidence exists that Conservatives strongly resisted the 
expansion of the state fiscal powers during the Liberal Republic (1930-1946), a decisive period 
of fiscal state-building.148 
 In short, when looked through the lens of the partisan cleavage that structured the 
formation of the Colombian state, the “massification” of literacy—a major intervention in 
society—followed an opposite pattern than the development of fiscal capacity. Soifer identified 
the dearth of work on the relationship between various arenas of state power as “an important 
gap in the study of state development” (2008, 247). This chapter makes a contribution in this 
respect. Under my theoretical argument, variations across dimensions may emerge because of the 
way in which opposing political camps within the polity approach the state and use its power, 
especially when polarization is high and the opposing groups are fairly evenly matched. In the 
case of Colombia, both parties used the state in exclusionary ways that produced a complex 
spatial distribution of state capacities. Conservatives disproportionately promoted literacy and 
education among co-partisans out of partisan interest, cementing a long-run advantage; however, 
                                                 
148
 Direct taxes represented less than 7% of national government revenues before the Liberal Republic. By the time 
Liberals left power in 1946, they represented more than 50%. Conservative elites in Antioquia organized massive 
protests to resist tax reform (Safford and Palacios 2002, 291).  
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their resistance to the development of stronger tax institutions under polarizing Liberal 
governments perpetuated the Colombian state’s fiscal weakness. 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
 In order to credibly establish an empirical relationship between the partisan composition 
of municipalities and educational attainment, it is necessary to consider alternative explanations 
for the observed correlations. Specifically, we want to account for the possibility that systematic 
differences across municipalities may explain both the strength of the parties and subsequent 
educational outcomes. In this section, I show that empirical patterns remain consistent with my 
historical argument after implementing several strategies to deal with this inferential challenge. I 
take four main steps to do so.  
 First, I collected municipal-level historical information to control statistically for a host 
of potential confounders. Second, I rely exclusively on variation within Colombian departments 
(the second level of government) to remove all observed and unobserved factors shared by 
municipalities located in the same department. This is done by estimating all models with 
departmental fixed effects. Because departmental governments remained in charge of most 
educational functions for a long period and departments are associated with many cultural, 
economic, and geographic variations, municipalities in the same department are more 
comparable to each other. 
 Third, I exploit changes in the partisan affiliation of municipalities across election cycles. 
This adds a temporal component to the analysis and removes all potential sources of bias that 
remained constant across elections. Relatedly, I estimate models with lagged values of the 
dependent variable to examine change in municipalities of different partisan type, relative to a 
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baseline. Fourth, I estimate the relationship between historical partisan control and literacy at 
various time points in the twentieth century in order to adequately document the existence of a 
persisting, long-run impact of the partisan cleavage on educational attainment. 
5.4.1 Alternative explanations 
 Existing arguments suggest that electoral competition, and in general political institutions 
that give “voice” to citizens, lead to investments in the expansion of education (Lake and Baum 
2001; Lindert 2004; Stasavage 2005). This national-level argument, taken to the subnational 
level, would imply that more competitive municipalities should have experienced greater 
investments in education, especially after the elimination of suffrage restrictions in 1936. I 
consider this possibility below, but it should be noted that substantial increases in literacy were 
already occurring before this broadening of the political voice (the 1938 census reported a 
literacy rate of approximately 54% for the population above seven years of age). 
 Another prominent line of explanation holds that the expansion of mass education 
responded to modernization and economic change, in particular increasing industrialization and 
commercialization. This classic argument (Gellner 1983) has been made for Colombia (Parra 
1977; Ramírez and Téllez 2007; Urrutia 1976). Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff offer another 
structural explanation that emphasizes inequality as a cause of educational underdevelopment 
(2012). These socioeconomic factors do not appear to be related to partisanship across 
Colombian municipalities in obvious ways. The predominantly Conservative department of 
Antioquia led the way in industrialization and education, but at the same time important cities 
and sites of economic activity throughout the country tended to lean Liberal (Bushnell 1993, 
190). Other scholars have made the case that local partisan affiliations in Colombia were 
influenced by many idiosyncratic historical and political events and are not simple functions of 
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factors like economic interests, inequality, or geography (Chacón, Robinson, and Torvik 2011; 
Pinzón de Lewin 1989).  
 Nevertheless, in the models below I include a range of control variables to account for 
the potential confounding effect of socioeconomic structure and more precisely estimate the 
effect of partisan control. These include census measures of urbanization and total population. 
Urbanization is a widely accepted measure of the kind of socioeconomic factors that are thought 
to drive mass education (see Ansell and Lindvall 2013). In addition, I also control for several 
covariates that are related to economic production and development and also capture Colombia’s 
varying geography. These include the distance between the municipal seat and the department’s 
capital along the geodesic (in kilometers), calculated using geographic software; surface area 
(km
2
), altitude, and an indicator variable for department capitals, from CEDE; and average 
annual rainfall (mm), the share of land suitable for agriculture, and the share of land suitable for 
livestock, taken from the dataset compiled by Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015). 
 In some model specifications, I also add other variables related to the presence and 
strength of state institutions in the municipality. These include the number of public employees 
per 1,000 citizens in 1924 for each of the three levels of government, as well as (log) municipal 
tax revenues per capita in 1926.149 I obtained these data from the 1924 statistical yearbook and 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público (1927), respectively. These measures for the 1920s 
help me rule out the possibility that variations in other institutional dimensions of the state 
explain both parties’ electoral support in 1930-1946 and educational development throughout 
twentieth century. 
                                                 
149
 I linearly interpolated population figures between 1918 (from the census) and 1928 (from the 1936 statistical 
yearbook) to obtain estimates of the 1926 municipal population. 
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 Descriptive statistics of all variables used in this chapter can be found in Table 5.6 in the 
Appendix. 
5.4.2 Empirical tests of Conservatism on literacy 
 I begin by regressing the literacy rate in 1938 on the electoral strength of the 
Conservative Party in the municipality, with departmental fixed effects and no additional 
controls. Conservative support in this baseline model is measured as the vote share received by 
the two Conservative candidates in the 1930 presidential election. 1938 is the best available time 
point to evaluate patterns of expansion of literacy before the introduction of universal male 
suffrage in 1936. 1938 also represents the first time the census reported that the majority of the 
population above seven years of age was literate (53.8%), a considerable improvement of the 
1912 figure of 17%. A map displaying the variation in the literacy rate across Colombia’s 
municipalities in 1938 appears as Figure 5.1 in the chapter Appendix. 
 Model 1 in Table 5.3 presents the results. Coefficients in all models are estimated via 
OLS. Consistent with the pattern presented in the previous section, support for the Conservative 
Party in the municipality is positively and significantly associated with the literacy rate, even 
after the inclusion of the departmental fixed effects. Based on the coefficient in model 1, every 
standard deviation increase in the Conservative vote in 1930 (approximately 30 points) is linked 
to 1.4 additional points in the literacy rate by 1938.  
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Table 5.3. Linear models of Conservative Party support and literacy expansion, 1938 and 1951 
 
DV: 1938 literacy rate   DV: 1951 literacy rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Conservative support (1930) 0.047*** 0.034** 0.041** 0.053*** 0.040** 0.053*** 
 
0.031* 0.042* 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.015) (0.017) 
Lagged DV (1918 literacy) 
 
0.482*** 0.474*** 0.421*** 0.314*** 0.265*** 
 
0.536*** 0.265** 
  
(0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061) 
 
(0.087) (0.090) 
Switch Con to Lib (1930 to 1946) 
  
-1.828* -1.955* -2.097* -2.513** 
 
-2.400* -3.428*** 
   
(0.865) (0.887) (0.902) (0.960) 
 
(0.997) (1.003) 
Competitive municipality (1930) 
   
0.238 -0.226 -0.401 
  
-0.082 
    
(0.812) (0.820) (0.807) 
  
(0.918) 
Log population (1918) 
   
-0.072 0.143 1.388* 
  
0.596 
    
(0.569) (0.603) (0.655) 
  
(0.705) 
% urban population (1938) 
   
0.137*** 0.127*** 0.076** 
  
0.102*** 
    
(0.028) (0.029) (0.024) 
  
(0.031) 
Municipal employees per 1,000 (1924) 
     
0.633 
  
0.485 
      
(0.339) 
  
(0.336) 
Dept. employees per 1,000 (1924) 
     
0.740* 
  
0.988** 
      
(0.298) 
  
(0.374) 
National employees per 1,000 (1924) 
     
0.238 
  
0.067 
      
(0.211) 
  
(0.233) 
Log municipal taxes per capita (1926) 
     
2.396** 
  
3.029*** 
      
(0.732) 
  
(0.882) 
Constant 49.138*** 32.843*** 33.258*** 32.501*** 38.454*** 22.764*** 
 
43.543*** 40.181*** 
 
(1.490) (2.493) (2.570) (5.609) (6.301) (6.872) 
 
(3.493) (7.328) 
Geographic controls NO NO NO NO YES YES 
 
NO YES 
Departmental fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES 
R
2 0.47 0.61 0.6 0.63 0.66 0.71  
0.58 0.69 
N 673 645 631 627 581 574   589 574 
Parentheses contain heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The number of observations drops in some models due to the administrative creation or elimination of 
municipalities and missing values in some of the predictors. Geographic controls include distance to the department capital, surface area, altitude, department capital 
(dummy), rainfall, and shares of agriculture-suitable and livestock-suitable land. * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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Did Conservative governments and their Church allies disproportionately provide literacy 
skills in areas they controlled, in order to expand the pool of Conservative voters, and before 
literacy restrictions were eliminated by Liberals in 1936? The coefficient on Conservative 
support in model 1 is consistent with this argument, but more demanding tests are offered by 
model 2 and subsequent columns in Table 5.3. All these models include the literacy rate in 1918 
as a control, and therefore examine changes in literacy within the municipalities between 1918 
and 1938, rather than absolute levels.150 I use 1918 as a baseline to avoid losing observations, 
because data are missing for all municipalities in the department of Magdalena in the 1912 
census.151 
Adding the lagged value of the dependent variable as a control helps alleviate potential 
endogeneity by removing all municipal characteristics that constantly affect the literacy rate 
across years. The coefficient on Conservative support is interpreted as the size of the increase in 
the literacy rate between 1918 and 1938 associated with a one-percentage point increase in the 
Conservative vote share in 1930. This therefore directly tests for a differential treatment of 
Conservative municipalities during a period of significant expansion of literacy, in which the 
ability to read and write was a precondition for the right to vote. 
 As expected, the coefficient on Conservative Party support in model 2 is positive and 
significant at conventional levels. The fact that the 1938 figures technically include the effects on 
literacy of eight years of Liberal governments since 1930 may be a cause for concern, however. 
Ideally, we would examine change up until that year, but data are only available for 1938, when 
the census was conducted. It is unlikely, however, that Liberal educational efforts in the short 
                                                 
150
 Algebraically, the estimate for the effect of Conservative support on the 1938 literacy rate in an equation with 
1918 literacy rate on the right-hand side is identical to the one obtained when the dependent variable is instead 
specified as a first difference (1938 minus 1918). See Angrist and Pischke (2009), sections 5.3-5.4. 
151
 The department of Magdalena included municipalities in the present-day departments of Magdalena and Cesar. 
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period they had held power by the time of the census have a major impact on the estimates in 
Table 5.3. Moreover, notice that Liberal efforts to close the partisan gap in literacy would bias 
the effect of Conservatism downwards. It should also be recalled that the Church remained 
heavily involved in education and literacy campaigns throughout the period, Conservatives 
controlled the Education Ministry until 1934, and literacy restrictions were only lifted in 1936. 
 Model 3 conducts another test of the argument that a gap in literacy levels emerged along 
party lines for partisan reasons, independent of other factors. The model includes an indicator 
variable for the 23% of municipalities that switched from a Conservative to a Liberal majority 
between the 1930 and 1946 elections.152 This specification is yet more demanding in that it 
isolates the effects of partisanship in these municipalities from all observable and unobservable 
characteristics that remained constant over the time period, and that could be related to their 
literacy levels. Consistent with the argument of partisan bias in Conservative-clerical educational 
effort, the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant, while the coefficient on the 
Conservative vote share increases in size. The “punishment” for moving from a Conservative to 
a Liberal majority is a shrinkage in the expansion of literacy between 1918 and 1938 of 
approximately 2 percentage points. 
 This result suggests that Conservative municipalities that underwent a process of 
Liberalization during the Liberal Republic experienced, as a result of this change in partisan 
affiliation, significantly lower increases in the literacy rate than they would have experienced had 
they remained loyal to the Conservative Party. A third of these 154 municipalities were located 
in the departments of Boyacá and the Santanders, which Conservatives would explicitly mention, 
                                                 
152
 Because Conservatives did not field candidates in presidential elections between these years, I am forced to use 
the 1930-1946 change to capture a process of Liberalization and assess its potential impact on the increase in 
literacy between 1918 and 1938, which is of interest given that literacy restrictions on the vote were eliminated 
around that time. Examining change between 1918 and 1951 nevertheless produces consistent results, as I show in 
models 7 and 8 in Table 5.3. 
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in future debates about the origins of La Violencia, as sites where “triumphant Liberals had let 
loose persecution on the defeated Conservatives” starting in 1930.153  
 Columns 4 to 6 in Table 5.3 progressively add controls to the specification shown in 
column 3. Column 4 adds an indicator variable for municipalities where none of the two parties 
reached 60% of the vote, to evaluate whether electoral competitiveness drives increases in 
literacy. It also adds the (log) of total population in 1918 and the share of the municipal 
population living in urban areas in 1938, to account for modernization-type of explanations.154 A 
prior measure of this latter variable would be desirable to minimize potential problems of post-
treatment confounding, but it was first reported in the 1938 census. This is not a major concern, 
however, because rapid urban growth in Colombia only began to occur in the 1950s (Schoultz 
1972). The 1938 measure is thus in all likelihood a good proxy for previous urban-rural patterns.  
 Column 5 adds a full set of controls for geography and land suitability, which also 
capture potentially relevant aspects of socioeconomic structure. Column 6 further adds pre-1930 
measures of state presence relative to population for each of the three levels of government, as 
well as municipal fiscal capacity in 1926. The coefficients on both Conservative Party strength 
and the variable indicating change from Conservative to Liberal majority across elections remain 
stable and precisely estimated after the inclusion of controls. Based on the full specification in 
column 6, municipalities one standard deviation above from the mean in Conservative support 
saw an extra increase of 1.6 points in the literacy rate. Those that switched from a Conservative 
to a Liberal majority experienced a 2.5 points smaller increase in the literacy rate than those that 
remained aligned with the same party. 
                                                 
153
 Roberto Urdaneta quoted in (Karl 2017, 160). For conflicts in Boyacá and the Santanders following Liberal 
victory in 1930, see Guerrero (1991).  
154
 Localities of more than 1,500 people are classified as urban. 
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 As could be expected, urbanization is associated with larger increases in literacy, but no 
discernible empirical association is found for electoral competitiveness in 1930. The presence of 
departmental-level functionaries is positively associated with literacy growth, consistent with 
this level of government possessing the greatest responsibility for the provision of public 
education during the period. Interestingly, once the partisan composition of municipalities is 
accounted for, fiscal capacity is positively associated with educational attainment. Notice that the 
coefficient on Conservative strength becomes larger with the inclusion of per capita tax revenues 
as a control, which likely reflects the underlying negative association between Conservatism and 
taxation.   
 Overall, we find robust evidence that the stronger the Conservative Party in the 
municipality, the greater the increases in literacy before the adoption of mass male suffrage. 
Moreover, municipalities that defected from the Conservative Party appear to have been 
“punished” with considerably smaller increases in literacy, consistent with the argument that 
party politics dictated educational effort and shaped institutional development. The quantitative 
evidence thus supports my historical interpretation that enduring Conservative and Church 
control over the state, in combination with literacy restrictions on the vote, spawned educational 
inequalities across Colombia.   
 In columns 7 and 8 of Table 5.3, I change the dependent variable to represent the literacy 
rate for the population above seven years of age in 1951. Coefficients are therefore interpreted as 
the marginal effect of the predictor on the size of the increase in literacy between 1918 to 1951. 
These models address potential concerns about the temporal structure of prior specifications (see 
note 152 above) and provide initial evidence of the persistence of effects. 1951 is also a good 
time point to evaluate the overall patterns of expansion of literacy produced by party government 
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during the first half of the century, before the military dictatorship (1953-1958) and partisan 
power-sharing under the National Front. My conclusions regarding the partisan gap remain 
unchanged—Conservatism is systematically associated with both higher absolute levels and 
larger increases in literacy before the 1950s, a key period in the spread of literacy skills. 
5.4.3 Long-run effects and other educational outcomes 
 The above findings document that a sizable gap in educational attainment emerged along 
the partisan cleavage across Colombia’s municipalities. To recapitulate, I have argued that this 
difference was driven by three interrelated factors: the Conservative-clerical hold on the state 
apparatus since the last decades of the nineteenth century and up until 1930; Conservative efforts 
to achieve partisan dominance by broadening their vote base and limiting the growth of the 
electorate in Liberal areas, prior to elimination of literacy barriers to the suffrage; and the 
combination of the Church’s partisan leanings with its enduring influence over public education, 
even under Liberal administrations. Did the resulting partisan-based differences in educational 
attainment persist? Is the contrast in literacy observable with other measures of the state’s 
provision of this public good? 
 The remainder of the analysis explores these questions. Table 5.4 presents results for 
models that examine the level of persistence in literacy differentials. The dependent variables in 
columns 1 to 4 are the literacy rate in 1964, 1973, 1985, and 2005. Because here the measured 
outcomes are all post-1946, unlike above, I now use the average vote share in 1930 and 1946 to 
measure Conservative Party support. As discussed above, this is the best available measure of the 
traditional partisan composition of municipalities.155 All models include the 1918 literacy rate as 
                                                 
155
 Results are nevertheless robust to measuring Conservative strength in 1930. Models are not shown for reasons of 
space.  
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a predictor, which allows interpreting the results as the extent to which the partisan cleavage 
shaped the extension of literacy skills to the mass of the population throughout the century, 
relative to a baseline year when they were still limited to a minority. Excluding this lagged value 
of the dependent variable from the models produces larger and always statistically significant 
coefficients for Conservative strength (models are not shown). 
 I present results for fully specified models analogous to models 6 and 8 in Table 5.3.156 
The only differences are that given the measure of Conservative strength employed here, I add a 
variable indicating if the municipality was electorally competitive in the 1946 election (as 
defined above), and drop the indicator variable for municipalities where the majority switched 
from Conservative in 1930 to Liberal in 1946. 
Regardless of the year chosen to measure the dependent variable, the conclusion is the 
same. There is a significant and persistent difference in literacy associated with historical 
partisan politics. Municipalities more supportive of the Conservative Party experienced 
substantially greater increases than Liberal municipalities in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, and the gap remains visible a century later. The coefficient gradually decreases in size, 
indicating an erosion of the effect of the partisan struggles of the past. However, municipalities 
one standard deviation (27 points) above from the mean  in historical Conservative support were 
still associated with an extra 0.7 points in the literacy rate by 2005. These findings confirm the 
enduring institutional effects of the partisan cleavage that structured Colombian state-building.
                                                 
156
 The results do not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of certain covariates for any of the years. Only fully 
specified models are presented for reasons of space.  
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Table 5.4. Linear models of Conservative Party support and literacy expansion, 1964-2005 
 
DV: literacy rate 
 
1964 1973 1985 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Conservative support (avg. 1930 & 1946) 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.027* 0.025* 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Lagged DV (1918 literacy) 0.185** 0.182*** 0.123* 0.101* 
 
(0.058) (0.049) (0.057) (0.048) 
Competitive municipality (1930) -0.439 -0.119 -0.172 0.516 
 
(0.645) (0.687) (0.809) (0.674) 
Competitive municipality (1946) -0.717 -0.820 -0.096 -0.465 
 
(0.634) (0.692) (0.758) (0.652) 
Log population (1918) 1.380** 1.428* 1.037 0.358 
 
(0.511) (0.572) (0.625) (0.523) 
% urban population (1938) 0.056** 0.064** 0.033 0.019 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) 
Municipal employees per 1,000 (1924) 0.651** 0.534* 0.544* 0.129 
 
(0.242) (0.254) (0.268) (0.272) 
Departmental employees per 1,000 (1924) 0.353 0.357 0.617* 0.205 
 
(0.366) (0.393) (0.299) (0.248) 
National employees per 1,000 (1924) 0.224 0.151 -0.008 0.142 
 
(0.195) (0.185) (0.162) (0.167) 
Log municipal taxes per capita (1926) 2.398*** 2.698*** 2.447*** 1.960*** 
 
(0.561) (0.612) (0.595) (0.534) 
Constant 25.963*** 30.630*** 65.633*** 79.730*** 
 
(5.457) (5.691) (6.746) (5.347) 
 
    Geographic controls YES YES YES YES 
Departmental fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
R
2 0.66 0.7 0.55 0.49 
N 508 510 509 511 
Parentheses contain heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The number of observations drops in some models 
due to the administrative creation or elimination of municipalities and missing values in some of the predictors. 
Geographic controls include distance to the department capital, surface area, altitude, department capital (dummy), 
rainfall, and shares of agriculture-suitable and livestock-suitable land. 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 Is the Liberal-Conservative inequality visible when we examine other outcomes, 
specifically measures of the reach of the public school system? As mentioned previously, state 
efforts to expand literacy involved some investments in schooling, but also ad hoc campaigns 
implemented in partnership with civil society. It is thus worth evaluating the extent to which the 
partisan cleavage shaped the extension of the state’s educational infrastructure.  
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Table 5.5 presents results for a series of models that examine school enrollment in the 
1950s, and the number of schools per capita in 2005, as functions of the historical partisan 
affiliation of municipalities. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is the number of students 
enrolled in public primary schools in 1957, as a share of the municipal population. At this time, a 
major expansion of public education was already occurring (Ramírez and Téllez 2007). The 
reported results examine differential increases in public schooling across municipalities from the 
period of Conservative hegemony until 1957. The model specifications do so by including the 
1918 school enrollment rate as a predictor, which controls for baseline differences across 
municipalities. Modeling the cross-sectional variation in 1957 without the lagged value leads to 
conclusions consistent with a Conservative advantage in educational attainment (not shown). 
Column 1 presents the basic relationship with fixed effects. Column 2 adds electoral 
competitiveness, socioeconomic variables, and the vector of geographic controls. Column 3 
incorporates pre-1930 state presence and fiscal capacity. 
The results indicate that the stronger the Conservative Party was in the municipality, the 
greater the increase in primary school enrollment between 1918 and 1957. Based on the full 
specification in column 3, every standard deviation increase in Conservative support is 
associated with an extra increase of 0.49 points in the percent of the population enrolled. Using 
the 1951 census to approximate the primary school-age population, this amounts to a 3.5 points 
larger increase in the enrollment rate for every standard deviation increase in Conservative 
support. 157 This finding suggests that when it came to schooling, Liberal municipalities in any 
given department—whose residents payed more taxes, on average—tended to be systematically 
underserved by the Colombian state, compared to their Conservative counterparts. 
                                                 
157
 The population between 5 and 9 years of age represented 14% of the total in 1951. 
 262 
 
Table 5.5. Linear models of Conservative Party support and state capacity in education, 1957 and 2005 
 
DV: public school enrollment 
(1957)  
DV: schools per 1,000 people 
(2005) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Conservative support (average 1930 & 1946) 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
0.010*** 0.007** 0.004
† 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
School enrollment (1918) 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 
 
-0.035** 0.011 0.005 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.025) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Competitive municipality (1930) 
 
0.030 0.158 
  
0.094 0.095 
 
 
(0.242) (0.258) 
  
(0.156) (0.150) 
Competitive municipality (1946) 
 
0.018 -0.162 
  
-0.129 -0.043 
 
 
(0.268) (0.289) 
  
(0.137) (0.143) 
Log population (1918) 
 
0.060 0.173 
  
-0.006 -0.092 
 
 
(0.185) (0.220) 
  
(0.099) (0.110) 
% urban population (1938) 
 
-0.017* -0.017* 
  
-0.031*** -0.020*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
  
(0.003) (0.004) 
Municipal employees per 1,000 (1924) 
  
0.010 
   
-0.049 
 
  
(0.090) 
   
(0.048) 
Departmental employees per 1,000 (1924) 
  
0.101 
   
-0.001 
 
  
(0.094) 
   
(0.036) 
National employees per 1,000 (1924) 
  
-0.038 
   
-0.056
† 
 
  
(0.063) 
   
(0.028) 
Log municipal taxes per capita (1926) 
  
0.051 
   
-0.497*** 
 
  
(0.229) 
   
(0.117) 
Constant 8.369*** 9.795*** 8.446*** 
 
2.097*** 1.782
† 2.763* 
 
(0.420) (1.725) (2.166) 
 
(0.197) (0.994) (1.102) 
Geographic controls NO YES YES 
 
NO YES YES 
Departmental fixed effects YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
R
2 0.32 0.39 0.41 
 
0.3 0.46 0.51 
N 639 537 486   693 543 486 
Parentheses contain heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The number of observations drops in some models due to the administrative creation or 
elimination of municipalities and missing values in some of the predictors. Geographic controls include distance to the department capital, surface area, 
altitude, department capital (dummy), rainfall, and shares of agriculture-suitable and livestock-suitable land.   
†
 p<0.1, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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 Columns 4 to 6 in Table 5.5 replicate the school enrollment models but with the number 
of schools per 1,000 people in 2005 as the dependent variable. Although the evidence is less 
conclusive (the coefficient on Conservative strength is significant only at the 10% level in 
column 6), there is some indication of a positive empirical association between the level of 
support for the Conservative Party in the first half of the century and schooling infrastructure in 
the long run. 
 Taken together, the findings in this section further support my argument that partisan 
politics and state-Church relationships spawned divergent trajectories of educational 
development across Colombia’s territory. Mass literacy and public education represented major 
societal transformations in which the Colombian state, despite its well-known weaknesses, 
played a prominent role. Yet the state was not a neutral political entity, but a power instrument 
for partisan forces fighting for supremacy. Enduring patterns of educational inequality can be 
traced to this sharp cleavage that structured the extension of the state’s powers.  
5.5 Conclusions 
 To conclude, I return to some of the larger theoretical points about the relationship 
between political cleavages and state development. I have argued that the variation that we 
observe in state performance across territory and functions is shaped by historical conflicts 
between opposing groups in a polity. In many contexts, the agents that organize such domestic 
conflicts are political parties. Dominant theoretical approaches to state-building, reflecting their 
focus on early modern Europe, have tended to emphasize external threats and warfare as the 
engines of institutional development. However, parties and domestic conflicts can play important 
roles in decisions to state-build, as well as influence the content and allocation of state-building 
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efforts. When internal polarization is high, state-building and party-building are intersecting 
processes, and this has important implications for the development of institutions that underpin 
state capacity. 
 My investigation of the development of the state’s capacity to provide education in 
Colombia illustrates the importance of examining state-building over the long run through the 
lens of party politics and historical cleavages. I found substantial and long-lasting differences in 
educational attainment across Colombian municipalities that can be traced to the conflict 
between rival partisan camps, as well as to the alliance between the Conservative Party and the 
Catholic Church to further a particular conception of the social order. The hegemonic struggle 
between Liberals and Conservatives historically produced major episodes of violence, but also 
took place in the electoral arena. My empirical findings suggest that Conservative efforts to use 
literacy restrictions on the suffrage as an instrument to achieve electoral dominance contributed 
to the emergence of an enduring gap in literacy along partisan lines.  
 More broadly, Conservative control over the state for long historical periods and the 
retarded secularization of the public school system translated into systematic under-provision of 
education in Liberal areas. This relative disregard for Liberal supporters cemented spatial 
patterns of inequality in the era of mass education that even today, continue to structure the 
relationship between citizens and the Colombian state. In the 1960s, a sense of neglect from the 
central state and unfulfilled expectations about the expansion of social citizenship rights loomed 
large in the decision of radicalized Liberal groups in the countryside to engage in armed 
resistance (Karl 2017). 
 Finally, my analysis points to the importance of further exploring how the resolution of 
the religious conflict in different countries in Latin America shaped the development of state 
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institutions and education systems. The case of Mexico provides a relevant contrast to the 
Colombian experience. Whereas in Colombia the Catholic Church retained organic linkages to 
the state well into the twentieth century and collaborated in—when not controlled—the 
construction of educational institutions, in Mexico an anticlerical state frontally confronted the 
Catholic Church and built the public school system to undercut religious influence.  
 In the former case, the Church aided crucial state functions (and Conservative interests). 
Superior educational outcomes emerged in areas of Conservative Party strength with the 
Church’s cooperation. In the latter, religious resistance became the greatest challenge to the 
consolidation of the postrevolutionary state. It weakened its fiscal capacities and ties to broad 
segments of the population, yet it also stimulated heavy investments in education, agrarian 
reform, and other tools of social control and reform. Paradoxically, both countries may have thus 
reached a similar outcome—superior educational attainment in regions of deep historical Church 
influence—through divergent pathways.
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5.6 Appendix 
Table 5.6.  Descriptive statistics. Dataset on education and taxation in Colombian municipalities 
    Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Education variables 
     
 
Literacy rate (1912) 681 22.76 12.40 0 82.38 
 
Literacy rate (1918) 704 27.31 12.26 0 85.35 
 
Literacy rate (1938) 802 36.92 13.09 3.46 76.36 
 
Literacy rate (1951) 756 49.12 15.24 2.47 89.07 
 
Literacy rate (1964) 869 45.34 10.14 7.26 70.10 
 
Literacy rate (1973) 927 50.63 11.09 7.73 80.39 
 
Literacy rate (1985) 1,121 77.85 10.57 0.11 97.25 
 
Literacy rate (2005) 1,122 83.86 8.51 30.04 100 
 
School enrollment (1957) 732 9.56 2.73 0.21 18.77 
 
Schools per 1,000 people (2005) 1,118 2.79 1.67 0 9.43 
Taxation variables 
     
 
Per capita municipal tax revenues (1926) 755 1.58 2.07 0 41.24 
 
Per capita municipal tax revenues (1940) 712 0.61 0.70 0 8.27 
 
Per capita municipal tax revenues (1950) 714 2.08 2.73 0 29.17 
 
Per capita municipal tax revenues (1964) 844 11.81 12.53 0.16 166.2 
 
Per capita municipal tax revenues (millions) (2005) 1,096 0.06 0.06 0 0.65 
 
Per capita property tax revenues (millions) (2005) 1,096 0.02 0.03 0 0.50 
 
Per capita national tax revenues (1950) 700 2.69 11.79 0 199.8 
 
Per capita income tax revenues (1950) 645 0.62 4.51 0 93.64 
Other variables 
     
 
Conservative support (1930) 686 54.62 29.93 0 100 
 
Conservative support (average 1930 & 1946) 816 46.99 27.25 0 100 
 
Switched Cons. to Lib. majority (1930 to 1946) 661 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 
Competitive municipality (1930) 686 0.19 0.39 0 1 
 
Competitive municipality (1946) 791 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 
Log population (1918) 764 8.63 0.74 4.38 11.88 
 
% rural population (1938) 802 15.67 22.89 0 98.7 
 
Municipal employees per 1,000 (1924) 724 3.02 5.96 0 155 
 
Departmental employees per 1,000 (1924) 657 1.95 1.80 0 23.75 
 
National employees per 1,000 (1924) 712 1.09 2.91 0 41.42 
 
Log municipal taxes per capita (1926) 755 0.12 0.82 -7.02 3.72 
 
Distance to department capital (km) 1,102 73.50 58.14 0 392 
 
Surface area (km
2
) 1,018 669.28 1,425 15 17,874 
 
Altitude (m) 755 1,331 876 2 3,087 
 
Department capital 1,019 0.03 0.16 0 1 
 
Annual rainfall (mm) 1,018 1,895 1,067 160 9,200 
 
% agriculture-suitable land 1,004 0.50 0.34 0 1 
  % livestock-suitable land 1,004 0.27 0.28 0 1 
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Figure 5.1.  Literacy rate for the population above seven years of age in Colombian municipalities (1938) 
 
Note: Data were grouped in quintiles to color the map and come from the 1938 census. The large area in white contained less than 5% of the population and was 
not subdivided in municipalities, so data are not available. Other municipalities that were created after 1938 also appear in white. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation set out to document and explain the incapacity of the Mexican and 
Colombian states to uniformly create conditions for “peaceable, social, and comfortable living,” 
a promise that ultimately accompanies—and authorizes—rule by modern states (Hobbes 1996, 
111). This core empirical puzzle was embedded in larger questions about the origins of effective 
and territorially extensive political institutions, the formation and uses of state power, and the 
highly unequal ways in which purportedly equal citizens within a single country experience 
political rule. The project asked why patterns of state strength vary so widely within countries, 
what role historical struggles play in institutional development and current outcomes, and why 
states develop unevenly across both territory and function simultaneously. These are questions of 
substantive theoretical interest and practical relevance, given the persisting incapacity of many 
contemporary state organizations to effectively conduct the work of government, bring formal 
rights to life, and serve as institutions for social integration. I sought to offer some answers as to 
why states have failed to live up to those expectations, held not only by scholars and foreign 
spectators, but by the very populations they rule.  
In the conclusion of his pioneering study of the Latin American state, Centeno reflected 
that “instead of asking, Why no states? meaning why no political development, we should 
explain why one form of political organization as opposed to another” (2002, 277). Following 
Centeno’s lead, the dissertation took the Mexican and the Colombian states to be not 
unqualifiedly weak, inchoate, or plainly incompetent across the board, as if they had just failed to 
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go through constructive periods, have a meaningful impact on their societies, or ever attempted 
to accumulate capacities and functions. Rather, I focused on the very uneven character of their 
powers across territory and domains of governance. As I explained in the opening chapter, this is 
not an odd or irrelevant institutional characteristic we can afford to ignore, but a staple feature of 
many states, in Latin America and beyond, that greatly affects how they relate to citizens and 
what they can actually achieve. These are states capable of performing certain tasks in certain 
regions with relative efficacy, resisting changing historical conditions, and in some respects 
meaningfully shaping their societies; yet at the same time they sometimes fail resoundingly in 
core activities, are unable to protect basic rights with minimal uniformity, and de facto leave 
parts of their territory to the arbitrary rule of unofficial sovereigns. I sought to understand the 
historical process by which state institutions came to develop in this way, and the reasons for 
which life under the state is a very different experience even for citizens subject to a common 
ruling organization. 
 These are, of course, large questions with no single or univocal answer, but the preceding 
chapters hopefully contribute to a more adequate understanding of processes of state formation 
and institutional development in the cases under examination and more broadly. In what follows, 
I revisit the main arguments and findings, offer some concluding remarks about what I consider 
to be the main theoretical and empirical contributions of the dissertation, reflect on some relevant 
omissions and shortcomings, and point to potential avenues for future research. 
 The opening chapter offered an organizing theoretical framework to understand the 
within-country political mechanics of processes of state formation, conceived not only as vertical 
bargaining processes between rulers and subjects, as many influential models propose, but as 
intense redistributional power struggles between rival political groups in a given polity. Central 
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to this framework was an understanding of cleavages as conflicts involving sequential, mutually-
constitutive, even dialectical interaction between political enemies having, each, broad support in 
civil society. A core premise of the general argument that followed was that state-building 
processes unfold within a given structure of political conflict in which governing elites and their 
supporting coalitions seek to impose their control over political “others.” 
 I drew a basic analytical distinction between state-building projects that take off with the 
purpose of fighting or counterbalancing external enemies, can tap into reservoirs of inter-group 
solidarity and domestic cohesion, and in the process turn the state into an institutional vehicle to 
address common interests, and those where the most intense political enmity is located within the 
polity’s own borders. Taking this point deeper into subnational dynamics, I argued that in 
polarized political systems patterns of state development across geography and spheres of state 
power reflect the lines of internal political antagonism during formative historical periods. State 
institutions and state-society linkages form unevenly in the crucible of struggles for political 
control and out-group subordination, which spawn different trajectories of state capacity across 
regions depending on who built what part of the state, who remained excluded during these 
instances, and how support for rival groups was distributed across territory. 
 The framework comprised two core drivers of uneven state development and two 
associated mechanisms of historical persistence, by which the cleavages of the past can continue 
to influence the performance of the state in the present. First, because state-builders operate in a 
given political space and make sense of the political and social environment on the basis of 
cleavages of “us” versus “them,” they make decisions about the construction of state 
infrastructure and the deployment of resources that follow these internal fault lines. Under deep 
cleavages, state-builders cultivate state capacities in ways that can help them restrict political 
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participation, reshuffle identities, and contain mobilization and resistance among perceived 
opponents. These uneven investments can create initial institutional differences that are then 
reproduced over time via the continuity in the architecture of the state—available governing 
infrastructure and patterns of institutional presence and deployment across territory. 
 Second, in highly polarized polities, the ability of emerging state institutions to link with 
society and make successful claims to legitimate authority varies sharply across cleavage lines. 
Because states are heavily dependent on citizen collaboration and the diffusion of social norms 
of compliance to carry out several tasks effectively, the adversarial relationship that political out-
groups develop with a given institution of the state, as it intensifies contact with the population, 
translates into variation in performance across territory. The cultural reproduction of habits, 
attitudes, and patterns of behavior toward the state that arise during formative institutional 
periods may in turn help reproduce a geography of state power that responds to historical 
political antagonisms, even as polarization itself subsides.  
 A central advantage of this approach was that it allowed us to incorporate both state-
builders’ investments in the state apparatus proper and state-society interactions into a unified 
and relatively parsimonious framework, to then explain outcomes related to state strength as joint 
products of these two basic sets of factors. Theoretically, then, my framework integrated more 
institutional approaches to the state, emphasizing elite coordination behind state-building 
projects and organizational features of the state apparatus, with insights from other bodies of 
work that center on questions of legitimation and societal compliance with political authority. 
 Another important contribution of the argument presented in general terms in chapter 1, 
and substantiated empirically in subsequent chapters, is that it helps us think systematically about 
the domestic pressures and dynamics driving the development of the state across a national 
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territory. While external threats and warfare are well-established as engines of state development 
in the literature, many have noted the exceptionality of the historical, geographical, and 
geopolitical conditions that motivated the bellicist model. This means that we need other 
explanations for how state institutions develop, acquire capacity, and function in the absence of 
sustained military competition and unifying threats from outside. 
 My core argument emphasized the inseparability of state-building processes from 
domestic intergroup conflict and power struggles. As a recent review explained, state capacity 
has become one of the most utilized concepts in the study of development, economic growth, and 
differences in prosperity across world regions, countries, and sub-national units (Johnson and 
Koyama 2017). The renewed attention to the state, even re-appreciation of its role, has produced 
much-welcomed interventions on the topic from scholars across the social sciences, and it has 
expanded an already enormous and intrinsically interdisciplinary body of work on the central 
political institution of  the modern era. In this context, political scientists are uniquely equipped 
to ground processes of state formation in serious analysis of power and intergroup struggle, 
which, as Weber argued and was noted in the opening chapter, is the essence of politics. 
 Throughout the project, I stressed that state capacity is developed in pursuit of political 
(i.e., contestable) projects, with the purpose of exercising greater control over others and 
accomplishing goals that though shared by some, are detrimental to the interests and aspirations 
of others. This, of course, is a reminder much more than it is a novel point. However, as I sought 
to demonstrate, taking this perspective to its full consequences can help illuminate complex 
patterns of variation in institutional development and state performance that previously remained 
unintelligible, and that are not well explained unless political conflict is brought to the forefront 
of analysis. This approach thus forces us to take politics and historical experience seriously. It 
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departs from accounts of state-building that subsume political variables under other economic or 
geographic factors, as well as from those that gloss over the cleavages and partisan struggles that 
spur individuals and groups into action, give state-building coalitions purpose, and shape the 
responses to state measures across the society.  
 The theoretical argument and findings in previous chapters show that struggles for 
political supremacy play a key role in the formation and development of state institutions, even if 
those institutions subsequently serve other functions. States are crucial for civil order, the actual 
validity of citizenship rights of all kind, and many outcomes related to social wellbeing, but their 
origins and development follow political purposes that may be only loosely connected with these 
welfare-enhancing roles. In this sense,  the dissertation warns against functionalist explanations 
of the development of state capacity and provides further evidence that the origins of political 
institutions should not be inferred from their effects, as scholars in the comparative historical 
tradition have insisted. 
 The dissertation also contributes to our understanding of the sources of state-building 
failure and the role of national cohesion in the formation of effective states. Early influential 
works noted that apart from the institutional changes spurred by warfare, the process of state-
making in early modern Europe was aided by relative homogeneity within the boundaries of 
polities, and that those rulers who successfully created further cultural homogeneity constructed 
more powerful and durable states (Tilly 1975).158 Greater homogeneity facilitated the extension 
of state apparatuses and administrative arrangements, lowered the costs of securing compliance, 
and favored the attachment of individuals and social groups to governing institutions and to each 
                                                 
158
 Tilly noted that “in world perspective the cultural homogeneity of the area in which the first powerful national 
states arose is a condition of prime importance” (1975, 19). Similarly, “the more heterogeneous the population, the 
more often a policy notably successful in one place would fail utterly in another” (79). 
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other. Following a similar logic, a large body of empirical work links ethnic and cultural 
diversity to lower public good provision.159  
 The argument in this dissertation suggests that it is the intensity of domestic political 
antagonisms, rather than diversity per se, which complicates broad-based institutional 
development. While underlying sociological differentiation according to some predetermined 
categories or high “objective” levels of fractionalization may increase the likelihood of political 
polarization, I here emphasized that uneven patterns of state development (which reduce overall 
levels of state capacity) stem from acute conflicts in the political arena. In other words, we must 
be attentive to the political activation of difference into cleavages that sort individuals into 
opposing camps. Colombia is a paradigmatic example. As I showed, a most intense friend-enemy 
distinction, centered on partisanship, fractured society and strongly influenced the development 
of state capacities across territory, without this cleavage clearly fitting into any predefined 
sociological categories. Divisiveness, not diversity, is detrimental to stateness. 
 State-building projects achieve highly uneven success, and thus subsequent institutional 
performance varies widely within countries, when domestic cohesion is low and the very 
construction of the state is perceived as a zero-sum game between political enemies. States that 
are built factiously, upon politically divided grounds, may be lastingly marked by the conflicts in 
which they developed, whereas states may function more harmoniously or uniformly in polities 
where a common institutional core could emerge prior to, or despite the fragmentation of society 
into distinct political camps. A key contribution of this study was articulating theoretically and 
showing empirically how high political polarization during state-building generates distinctive 
                                                 
159
 For representative examples, see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) and Habyarimana et al. (2007). The link between 
diversity and public goods has been questioned on various grounds. For an argument that both depend on historical 
levels of state capacity, and thus the relationship is spurious, see Wimmer (2015). 
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patterns of state development at the subnational level, with different dimensions of state capacity 
possibly displaying their own and sometimes even contrasting trajectories. 
 The discussion above already touches on another important contribution of this study, 
consisting in bringing the literatures on state formation and party-building and party systems into 
closer dialogue with each other. Although there are important works that examine the links 
between parties and states,160 it is nevertheless true that parties are often absent from studies of 
state capacity and vice versa. The dissertation points to at least two key ways in which both sets 
of institutions can shape each other.  
 First, political parties, or to the least rulers with partisan interests, are the agents that set 
the state in motion and direct the action of state institutions. Rulers are supported by specific 
partisan constituencies and make investments in state capacity out of partisan interest. While this 
is true in everyday politics, it can be highly consequential when core state institutions are still 
inchoate and during critical periods of state formation. High levels of polarization can impress a 
squarely partisan logic into state-building projects, thereby conditioning what types of state 
capacities are invested upon and where. Relatedly, sharp conflicts that spur party-building are 
also likely to motivate highly partisan patterns of use and development of the state’s capacities, 
which may in turn lastingly shape government performance across territory and function. 
 Second, as many have argued, states govern more effectively when and where they 
possess tight linkages with society and can elicit compliance without the constant threat of 
coercion. Political parties are the primary institutions that perform these linkage functions 
between state and society. Parties can help states penetrate society, construct legitimacy, channel 
demands, and thereby cultivate the belief that state institutions are entitled to demand obedience. 
                                                 
160
 Relevant works include Bensel (1990); Shefter (1994); and Slater (2010). There are also important studies 
dealing with parties in Latin American cases in which state variables play an important role. For example, Greene 
(2007) and Mainwaring (2006). 
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Where they are weak or under-developed, rulers might find it difficult to organize collective 
compliance without coercion, or to enter into synergy with society. At the same time, party-
states, and generally states that are turned into outright partisan forces, face clear challenges in 
linking with political out-groups and inducing feelings of obligation among them. During 
formative periods, they may instigate attitudes and habits of noncompliance that are then hard to 
change. As a result, political geography may lastingly shape their ability to effectively 
implement tasks requiring citizen collaboration. The findings in chapter 2, concerning the uneven 
development of fiscal capacity in both Mexico and Colombia, are a clear illustration of these 
points.   
 Nevertheless, the relationship between political parties and state-building processes is an 
area that calls for further research. We need to better understand the conditions under which 
state-building projects can emerge and generate broad-based compliance across cleavage lines, 
how states’ and parties’ social and territorial penetration relate to and possibly reinforce each 
other, and how the characteristics and capacities of the state itself influence the ways in which 
parties compete and link with their constituencies. 
 Moving to less abstract grounds, the dissertation revisited historical processes of state 
development in both Mexico and Colombia using novel and exhaustive data. The vast majority 
of these data were collected through in-depth archival work in both countries, hand-coded given 
the condition of archival materials, and complemented with information obtained through other 
unexplored primary sources. As is well-known, working in archives is an exercise of finding 
needles in haystacks, and since archives are run and filled by states, one is often reminded of 
their shortcomings by the very challenge of locating relevant information and compiling 
systematic data from fragmentary sources.  
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 To recapitulate some of the main data contributions of the project, chapter 2 relied on 
new municipal-level datatsets on historical tax revenues, covering both national and local 
governments in each country. This allowed mapping the fiscal capacity of the Mexican and 
Colombian states—and hence their administrative reach and roots in society—at a highly 
disaggregated level, during and after formative periods. In chapter 3, I used a new geo-
referenced dataset on the location of more than 1,700 rural militias in postrevolutionary Mexico. 
This is the most exhaustive source on the organization of coercion during this crucial period of 
Mexican history. The chapter broke new empirical ground in a topic that has so far remained 
elusive for students of the postrevolutionary authoritarian regime (including historians), in part 
due to the difficulty in setting a firm empirical basis. The dataset is among the most complete 
sources of information on semi-formal local armed groups more generally, and in particular for 
postrevolutionary settings. 
 Chapter 4 drew on newly compiled municipal-level data on education, historical Church 
presence, and the expansion of the civil registry in Mexico, which were manually recovered from 
historical censuses. I also analyzed existing municipal-level data on the implementation of 
agrarian reform. In chapter 5, I returned to the case of Colombia and relied on data on historical 
school enrollment, as well as literacy levels in each municipality, as reported in eight different 
censuses held throughout a century. Thanks to the availability of electoral data in historical 
sources, in this case I was also able to exploit the country’s historical electoral alignments as an 
entry point into the partisan cleavage. 
 In addition, the dissertation presented newly coded datasets on the geography of conflict 
during two major events of Mexican history, namely the Mexican Revolution and the religious 
Cristero War. These datasets were carefully constructed using an array of secondary sources, and 
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therefore they drew on the work of numerous scholars. To examine institutional legacies, I also 
compiled various indicators of contemporary state capacity across Mexico and Colombia, for 
distinct dimensions of the state. This rich empirical basis is itself an important contribution and 
can be productively exploited by future studies. 
 The findings in the empirical chapters, built upon the data sources just described, 
contribute to various bodies of work, and they advance our understanding of the sources and 
consequences of within-country variation in state capacity for several constituent dimensions of 
the concept. Because I have articulated the ways in which the arguments and results inform 
relevant literatures in each individual chapter, here I limit myself to some general observations 
about the implications of the findings taken as a whole and the opportunities they open for future 
research. 
 A key lesson is that territorial patterns of institutional capacity and actual performance 
can vary substantially across dimensions of the state. This is not an empirical accident but a 
natural consequence of the fact that states form not as coherent monoliths, but instead comprise a 
set of institutions that may develop at different paces and respond differently to conflicts and 
cleavage-based interactions between state and society during processes of state formation. Elites’ 
cleavage-based incentives to cultivate certain capacities but not others, in some areas of the 
territory but not others, along with citizens’ varying interactions with different agents and 
institutions of the state (the police and army, the tax collector, the schoolteacher, and so on) may 
well produce a geography of state power in which unevenness is both territorial and functional. 
This directly informs ongoing debates about the content and proper measurement of state 
capacity, and it forces us to rethink state-building as a series of nonlinear, interlocking processes, 
 279 
 
taking place across geographic space and potentially producing different patterns across 
institutional arenas. 
 This perspective is clearly borne out by the results across the chapters. For the Mexican 
case, chapter 2 showed that Catholic opposition to the postrevolutionary state had negative 
consequences on fiscal capacity; at the same time, it pushed state leaders to develop institutions 
that could penetrate society in Catholic areas, recast identities, undermine resistance, and 
ultimately exercise repression. Indeed, chapter 4 documented how the religious cleavage led to 
heavier investments in secular, revolutionary education in Catholic areas to “defanaticize” the 
population and inculcate loyalty to the state. It also spurred a more rapid expansion of the civil 
registry and deeper land reform in areas of Cristero violence. Meanwhile, chapter 3 showed the 
tight relationship between opposition to the state along cleavage lines and rulers’ embrace of 
local militia forces, loosely controlled by the army, to exercise coercion and surveillance.  
 The chapter also revealed that, perhaps ironically, the Mexican state’s reliance on these 
semi-formal, far-reaching, and un-professionalized network of coercive agents to maintain order 
would negatively impact its performance in the long run, in the core functions of keeping the 
peace and controlling territory. The existence of militias de facto maintained the means of 
violence dispersed in society for decades, and it predisposed some areas to persistent violence 
and citizen mobilization to take law and order into their own hands. Crucially, this arrangement 
also stunted the development of civilian law enforcement and justice institutions at the local 
level. More rudimentary civilian police forces, less civic judges, higher homicide rates, and 
vigilantism—i.e., Mexico’s serious challenges in the realms of security and justice—were all 
found to be associated with historical militia presence. 
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 In Colombia, the Liberal-Conservative cleavage also created uneven patterns of state 
capacity across domains. Chapter 2 showed the negative association between the Conservative 
Party’s strength at the local level and the ability of the state to expand the state’s fiscal powers 
under Liberal administrations. In chapter 5, I contrasted the negative association of Conservative 
strength with tax extraction throughout the twentieth century, with the consistently poorer 
educational record of Liberal municipalities. Conservatives’ control over the education system, 
in alliance with the Church, during the initial periods of expansion of mass literacy opened a 
partisan-based gap that persists to this day. For party elites, this was an attractive strategy in the 
longstanding partisan struggle for political hegemony, given competitive elections and literacy 
restrictions on the suffrage. 
 Given the quite distinct political development of Mexico and Colombia in the twentieth 
century, of which the revolutionary nature of the state in the former case is only one aspect, it is 
noticeable that, at a general level, a common theoretical logic based on the effects of deep 
cleavages proved useful in explaining subnational patterns of state capacity in both cases. 
Indeed, as was explained in the introduction to chapter 2, Mexico and Colombia differed in 
political regime type (authoritarian versus democratic), formal constitutional design (federal 
versus unitary), the sociopolitical bases of the state (populist versus elitist), the nature of the 
party system (single-party dominant versus two-party), and church-state relations 
(confrontational versus collaborational), among other factors, during key state-building periods. 
Evaluating the external validity of the general argument developed around this two cases, and 
contrasting them with countries where states were built more coherently, are possible avenues for 
future research. 
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 In addition, more systematically addressing the uneven capacities of states in the 
administration of justice is a promising area for future studies. In chapter 1, I conceptually 
identified the legal function as one of the core dimensions of state capacity. Chapter 3 touched 
on this sphere of state power with the analysis of civic judges at the local level and law and order 
outcomes in Mexico. However, I have only scratched the surface of this topic, of crucial 
importance for the development of both the Mexican and Colombian states and their 
contemporary deficiencies.  
 Future work can also seek to provide more systematic tests with respect to the operation, 
and relative weight, of the institutional and cultural mechanisms of historical persistence 
articulated in the theoretical framework. In addition to examining the outcomes of state-building 
in the short- and medium-runs, the chapters also suggested that the structure of conflict during 
formative moments may spawn longer-term legacies. To support the proposed mechanisms, I 
drew on qualitative analysis of the historical record and of secondary and primary sources. In 
chapter 3, for example, I used archival materials that showed the sustained involvement of rural 
militias in policing, as well as their sometimes tense relationships with local authorities, to 
document how they thwarted the development of civilian apparatuses. When possible, I also 
indirectly assessed the weight of different mechanisms through statistical analysis. Nevertheless, 
systematic tests of the theorized mechanisms themselves were not provided, due to issues of data 
availability. This is admittedly an important limitation and, more generally, an issue that 
demands more attention among historically-minded social scientists. 
 The empirical chapters also collectively shed light on the role of religious cleavages in 
the formation of the Mexican and the Colombian states. Classic works have shown the deep 
implications of religious-based contestation and church-state relationships for political 
 282 
 
development in Western Europe. Less systematic work on the topic exists for Latin America, 
despite the fact that the Catholic Church was historically a quite powerful institution, often with 
more territorial presence and social control than the state itself. Moreover, struggles between 
secularizing and clerical-conservative forces produced some of the most violent and protracted 
conflicts in the region, and they still influence political beliefs and behaviors. The project 
deepens our understanding of these issues. In Colombia, the relative influence of the Church 
across territory played a role in the formation of partisan alignments, which as I showed proved 
critical for state capacity. Moreover, chapter 5 showed the lasting effects of the marriage 
between the Church and the Conservative Party on educational outcomes across the country.  
 For Mexico, the dissertation showed the pervasive implications of the confrontation 
between the anticlerical state and the Church for the country’s institutional development, even in 
spheres apparently unrelated to religious affairs like taxation or the organization of the coercive 
apparatus. The broad range of data compiled for the project allowed me to intervene in 
longstanding debates among historians and other social scientists about the functioning of 
Mexico’s durable authoritarian regime and the ways in which Catholic conservatism shaped the 
process of state (and party) formation. Like some historians have recently done, I conclude that 
the clashes over religion in the 1920s and 1930s had a profound, and until now underappreciated 
impact on the strength of the Mexican postrevolutionary state. However, as I showed relying on 
more comprehensive data than has been available to other researchers, the effects across 
dimensions of state power are complex and spatially varied. 
 Furthermore, chapter 4 raises important questions about how postrevolutionary states 
engage with religiously devout groups and more generally treat cultural cleavages. Revolutionary 
regimes have everywhere upset the functioning of local communities, implemented policies of 
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cultural homogenization, and sought to create surrogate, civil religions, with varying success. In 
this respect, the Mexican case belongs to the broader family of countries where state institutions 
were born in revolution and developed capacity in confrontation with conservative, 
counterrevolutionary forces that could sometimes mobilize broad popular support. A promising 
area of future research is comparing the empirical patterns and legacies uncovered in chapter 4 
with those produced, at the subnational level, by other revolutions. The same applies to the 
findings in chapter 3, considering postrevolutionary states’ proclivity to rely on civilian militias 
to contain local resistance and control society at the grassroots. 
 Two other general findings spanning both cases are worth mentioning. First, the 
statistical analyses showed that state capacity and performance are not a simple function of 
economic development or wealth. Of course, economies in certain contexts may just be too poor 
to sustain minimally functioning political institutions and far-reaching infrastructures. At the 
sub-national level, wealthier areas are naturally more able to finance public goods and are likely 
to receive more attention from rulers interested in extraction. However, systematic examination 
of the determinants of state strength across dimensions and territory clearly indicated that 
political variables play an important and autonomous role in state-building. 
The second point concerns the weight of history in contemporary political life and the 
opportunities for change in the ability of states to create inclusive social orders and protect 
citizenship rights. At face value, it may appear that I have told a plain story of historical 
determinism and hard-to-erase contrasts in state performance. Many scholars have suggested that 
the fate of the Latin American state was largely written during the nineteenth century. Perhaps 
less discouragingly, I have argued that twentieth-century political conflicts and state-building 
projects had important independent effects on patterns of institutional development across 
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Mexico and Colombia. Moreover, my analysis explains only part of the existing variation, which 
has also responded to more recent developments. And while the passage of time has not undone 
some of the legacies of past processes of state formation, I also emphasized that states are built 
by politically motivated actors that can meaningfully reshape existing conditions. Looking 
ahead, more inclusive political coalitions than those of the past may emerge to address the 
glaring deficits in state capacity in both Mexico and Colombia, and set the basis of more muscled 
and legitimate states. 
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